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Conventional risk analysis and assessment tools rely on the use of probability 
to represent and quantify uncertainties. Modeling complex engineering problems with 
pure probabilistic approach can encounter challenges, particularly in cases where 
contextual knowledge and information are needed to define probability distributions 
or models. For the study and assessment of risks associated with complex engineering 
systems, researchers have been exploring augmentation of pure probabilistic 
techniques with alternative, non-fully, or imprecise probabilistic techniques to 
represent uncertainties. This exploratory research applies an alternative probability 
theory, quantum probability and the associated tools of quantum mechanics, to 
investigate their usefulness as a risk analysis and assessment tool for engineering 
 
  
problems. In particular, we investigate the application of the quantum framework to 
study complex engineering systems where the tracking of states and contextual 
knowledge can be a challenge. This study attempts to gain insights into the treatment 
of uncertainty, to explore the theoretical implication of an integrated framework for 
the treatment of aleatory and epistemic uncertainties, and to evaluate the use of 
quantum probability to improve the fidelity and robustness of risk system models and 
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The representation of uncertainty in risk assessments often relies on the use of 
probabilistic methods. Most modern probabilistic methods follow the Kolmogorov 
formalism where the Kolmogorov axioms define the probability mathematical 
framework. Researchers have been exploring augmentation of pure probabilistic 
techniques with alternative, non-fully, or imprecise probabilistic techniques to 
represent uncertainties. Recognizing that contextual information, an essential 
component of the risk assessment framework, cannot be fully captured by pure 
probabilistic techniques, the risk research community has been continuously looking 
for ways to enhance our ability to capture more information and contextual 
knowledge in the Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) process. This raises the 
challenge of how to reconcile or combine pure and imprecise probabilities.  
For the study of risks associated with complex engineering systems, the 
exploration of different probability theories can be of great interest since probability 
plays an important role in most risk assessment techniques. PRA or quantitative risk 
assessment techniques have been used for 30 plus years. While PRA techniques based 
on conventional probabilistic treatments, such as Kolmogorov axiomatic, Frequentist, 
or Bayesian treatments, have been widely and successfully used to investigate and 
model many complex engineering problems, the diversity in the type of engineering 
problems, problem conditions, and characteristics often require tailoring different 
specialized techniques. Modeling complex engineering problems with pure 




contextual knowledge and information are needed to define probability distributions 
or models.  
In this dissertation, we applied an alternative probability theory, quantum 
probability and the associated tools of quantum mechanics, to investigate their 
usefulness as a risk analysis and assessment tool for engineering problems. In 
particular, we would like to investigate the application of the quantum framework to 
study complex engineering systems where the tracking of states and contextual 
knowledge can be a challenge. In this research, we attempt to gain insights into the 
treatment of uncertainty with an alternative probability framework. The framework is 
based on geometric objects to model systems, events, and uncertainties. This 
dissertation explores the use of quantum probability and the tools of quantum 
mechanics to model complex engineering systems for risk assessments. 
 
Organization of the Dissertation 
Chapter 2 starts with a general overview of PRA methodologies, from 
conventional pure probabilistic frameworks to their extension to incorporate 
imprecise probabilities into current techniques. An alternative probabilistic 
framework, quantum (von Neumann) probability, is introduced as a possible bridge 
between pure and imprecise probabilities. In Chapter 3, using the quantum framework, 
a simple experimental model is constructed to represent a complex engineering 
system, namely a levee-flood wall storm protection system. Chapter 4 provides a 
short primer on quantum probability and quantum mechanics. Chapter 5 takes simple 




describe complex engineering systems. The models are then utilized to explore how 
this quantum framework offers new capabilities and insights to augment existing 
PRA methodologies. In Chapter 6, the quantum techniques are compared to a number 
of current techniques such as fragility curves and event trees for new insights. 
Chapter 7 takes a look on the interpretation of the quantum approach in modeling 
engineering systems and assessing risks. In Chapter 8, 9, and 10, these chapters 
explore how the quantum framework can be applied to a variety of risk related 
problems, from the modeling of heterogeneous engineering systems, the combination 
of probabilities for concurrent failure modes, to modeling scheduling risks. Finally, 
future directions are discussed in the closing chapter of this dissertation (Figure E1).   
 





The Role of Probability in PRA and the Current Probabilistic Approach in PRA 
Current PRA techniques generally consist of the following three elements: 1) 
sets of scenarios, which can be physics or probability models to represent events and 
engineering systems (simple or composite), 2) the frequency of occurrences of the 
events associated with the scenarios, usually in the form of probabilistic models for 
events, and 3) the consequences associated with the occurrences of the events, which 
can be numerical values, event triggers, event sequences, or impact statements. 
Uncertainties are quantified using probabilistic distributions and models. Contextual 
knowledge and information about the events, the sequences, the configurations, the 
interactions, the physical processes, and the parameter spaces are essential ingredients 
for the quantification of uncertainties, serving as the glue that connect the 
probabilities together.   
One of the critical PRA elements is the use of probability to characterize event 
occurrences, describe physical processes, and to represent and model uncertainties. 
Those physical processes have intrinsic variability (randomness). The use of 
probabilistic models to describe stochastic processes (referred to as “aleatory” 
uncertainty) is a central element of PRA. Beyond that, risk scenarios used in the 
representation of the physical problem introduce yet another type of uncertainty, 
referred to as epistemic uncertainty, which is a reflection of the completeness of our 
knowledge about system behavior, models, and modeling parameter. The epistemic 
uncertainty is a quantification of the degree of knowledge or the state-of-knowledge 
of the fidelity of the models, modeling parameters, and assumptions in representing 




the conditions.  The challenge is on the mapping or association of uncertainty models 
to a probability distribution. Contextual information and knowledge play critical roles, 
but the amount of information that can be encoded in the probabilistic models is 
limited by the mathematical and probability frameworks.   
The concept of probability itself is not absolute or definitive but subject to 
interpretation. There are a number of interpretations of probability and a number of 
different theories of probabilities, from axiomatic formulations such as Kolmogorov 
probability, to Cox’s logical probability, and to imprecise probability such as that of 
Dempster-Shafer. The choice of which probability interpretation and theory to use in 
modeling uncertainty can greatly affect the outcome of the PRA results and 
conclusions (Table E1). Since the states of the system being modeled can change as a 
function of time, there is also a differentiation between static and dynamic techniques. 
Quantitative techniques rely on probability models. Conventional probabilistic 
methods may encounter limitations in the capturing and incorporation of contextual 
knowledge in risk analysis, which can impose limitations when dealing with 
ambiguity, defined as the possibility of different interpretations for a result based on 
the availability of contextual knowledge.  If analysis scenarios yield identical 
probabilities in an ambiguous state, the proper interpretation of the results might 
require additional contextual information and knowledge because the scalar 
probabilities do not capture or later retain the information necessary to support 






Table E1: Different treatments of probability theory. 
Treatment/ 
Interpretation  Representative works by  Principles 
Classical  Cardano, Pascal, Fermat, Bernoulli, Laplace   
Principle of indifference, assign equal 
probability to events 
Frequentist  
Mills, Ellis, Cournot, 
Fries, Venn, Bernoulli, 
Gauss, Laplace, Fisher, 
Neyman, Pearson. 
 
Assign event probability based on the 






Bayes, Laplace, de 
Finetti, Jeffreys, Wald, 
Savage, Ramsey 
 
Bayes Theorem; Bayesian updates; subjective 
and a reflection of degree of confidence on 
the occurrence of events; degree of belief 
Physical/ 
Propensity  Pierce, Popper  Physical disposition or propensities of events 
Modern 
Axiomatic  Kolmogorov, Cox, Jaynes  
Kolmogorov Axioms, Measure Theory, Cox 
Theorem and postulates - propositional logic 




Jeffreys, Carnap  
Degree of confirmation based on empirical 
evidence leading to a proposition 
Measure-theoretic  Borel, Lebesgue  
Mixing of discrete and continuous probability 
distribution for event assignments. Instead of 
working with cumulative probability 
distributions, works with probability 
measures, which is based on Measure Theory 
Quantum/Dirac-
von Neumann  Dirac, von Neumann  
von Neumann noncommutative measure 
theory, Noncommutative analog of 
Kolmogorov Probability, Dirac quantum 
mechanics 
Information 
Geometry  Amari, Nagaoka  
Application of differential geometry to model 
probability distributions by mapping the 
distributions to Riemann manifold, resulting 
in the creation of a statistical manifold. 
Imprecise  Boole, Keynes, Walley, Dempster, Shafer  
Introduce non-fully probabilistic ideas and 
frameworks, the use of Dempster-Shafer 
theory of belief functions, fuzzy sets, 
evidence theory, possibility theory, interval 
probabilities, probability-boxes (p-boxes), etc. 
 
Further complications arise when the problem involves complex decision 
chains, where ambiguous upstream decisions affect the downstream outcomes (Figure 
E2). The workflow is a reduction process, where contextual information is reduced as 
a result of the parametric abstraction and the computation of numerical probabilities. 
Elements of uncertainty and ambiguity are introduced along the way. The risk 




This limitation affects the formulation of risk questions and scenarios, 
affecting the interpretation of results. The information loss also introduces additional 
uncertainties into the process. One can see that the reduction of contextual 
information, which is a form of knowledge, can introduce additional epistemic 
uncertainties.  The consequence can lead to the increase of uncertainty and risk. New 
techniques that can counter the information loss may improve the quality of the 
analysis results. 
 
Figure E2. The general risk analysis workflow. 
To summarize, current PRA techniques incorporate knowledge by overlaying 
additional structures on top of probabilities (e.g. event tree, decision tree, fault tree, 
Bayesian network, etc.). These techniques limit what and how much information can 
be encoded in the model. Furthermore, at each state selection or transition, 
information loss occurs. These limitations can potentially be addressed by having 
additional structures built into the probability framework itself to encode additional 
information.  
Such a framework may align better with how a system behaves and how we 
track system states. Information can be captured internal to the structure itself and 
incorporate ignorance. Information loss can be reduced, uncertainty and ambiguity 




the use of quantum probability and the tools of quantum mechanics to increase the 
information encoding in risk models and to improve risk analysis techniques. 
 
A Short Quantum Primer 
In the quantum framework, a system can be represented by the superposition 
of all possible system states, in the form of a vector. While for example a system can 
be working or not working, in the quantum framework it is described as the 
superposition of both states. If the working state is represented by the symbol  and 
the not working state is represented by the symbol , then the system, S, can be 
described by a quantum state vector, labelled by the symbol , as a vector sum 
(linear combination) of  and , where  and  are the two basis states. 
Probabilities of finding the system in the different states connect the states via 
probability amplitudes (to be explained below), which are the components of the state 
vector.  
If system L is a levee that can either be working  or not working  at a 
given time, the state vector for L is expressed as: 
     (E.1) 
where  and   are the probability amplitudes, and the magnitude (length) of  is 1. 
In the quantum framework, probability is given by the square of the probability 
amplitudes which is known as the Born Rule. The probability of finding the system L 
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 which is equal to ; the total probability is conserved. As an example 
to provide numerical context, let the probability of finding system L not working, 
, be 0.01. Correspondingly, the probability of finding L working is , 
which is 0.99. The probability amplitudes,   (for ) and   (for ), are therefore 
the square root of the probabilities. For system L, :  where 
,    ∎ 
As a vector, many different types of vector operations can be performed on 
these quantum state vectors. The operations can: 1) change the state of a system, 2) 
create new systems by combining different systems (they then become subsystems of 
the new system), 3) extract information about system states, and 4) extract 
information about measurable system parameters. Additional vector properties are 
available to describe complex events and systems. Vectors when expressed as 
matrices, carry matrix properties among which is the non-commutative nature of 
matrix operations. When applying the sequence of operations “A and B” on a state 
vector, the resulting event might be different than those obtained from the sequence 
of operations “B and A”. In this example, A and B are operators, representing events 
and actions, which act on state vectors to transition those vectors from one state to 
another. The operation A on a system S is expressed as , where A is the 
operator acting on the system and  is the system after the operation. Different 
types of operators can represent a variety of actions, such as modeling a measurement 
operation, extracting information from a state vector, or an event causing the system 
P 0( ) 1−P 1( )
P 0( ) 1−P 0( )
l0 0 l1 1
L L = l0 0 + l1 1
l0 = 0.01 l1 = 0.99





to transition into another state. The quantum framework provides a rich set of tools 
and operations to support different modeling needs.  
The quantum framework has additional features that can describe systems 
based on the amount of knowledge (full or partial) one possesses. One possesses full 
knowledge about a system when one knows the state it is in. The state vector 
describing such a fully known system is called a pure state. When one possesses only 
partial knowledge, the state vector is called a mixed state. In this condition the system 
is a mixture of the different possible states. As one does not have enough information 
to precisely identify the state, it can only be described by the range of possible states 
in which the system could be found. 
The density operator is a linear combination of the different possible states of 
the system. The density operator is used to construct the mixed state quantum 
representation. The density operator  is expressed as: 
    (E.2) 
where  is the ith state (vector) of the system S, and  is the probability of finding 
the system S in its ith state.  is a special case of the tensor product, called the 
outer product, a product of two vectors forming a linear operator; based on the 
context of what it is constructed for, this type of operator can be utilized to encode 
information about a system (the density operator), to extract information from a 
system (the projector), or to alter the state of a system. The density operator can be 
expressed as a matrix with a specified basis, and as such, the term density operator 
and density matrix are often used interchangeably.  
ρ








The density operator formalism is effective in describing a wide range of 
system properties and the amount of information one has about the system. The pure 
state is simply a density operator with a single term:  as the system is 
known precisely to be in this state, and the probability of finding the system in that 
state is 1.0. The mixed state system is described as a statistical sum: 
,    (E.3) 
which reflects lack of precision and therefore the description is a mixture of possible 
states, . The number of components can provide a measure of how 
much or how little one knows about the state of the system. The longer the sum, the 
larger the possible number of states, and the larger the uncertainty. However, if one 
cannot fully establish the completeness of the system states, as in the case of deep 
uncertainty with “unknown-unknowns”, then the expression might take the different 
form:  
,  (E.4) 
where  corresponds to the unknown-unknowns. The density operator 
formalism opens up new opportunity to model risk problems. 
The density operator formalism increases the amount of information that can 
be encoded in the system models. In current approaches, uncertainties are encoded in 
a single set of probabilities. In the density operator formalism, uncertainties are 
encoded with two sets of probabilities. State vectors (quantum) contain one set of 
probabilities in the form of probability amplitudes, while a second set of probabilities 
(classical) describes the distribution of the states. This formalism provides additional 
ρ = S1 S1
ρ = p1 S1 S1 + p2 S2 S2 + p3 S3 S3 + ...
S1 , S2 ,…, Sn





bandwidth in encoding system information and more information can be captured and 
thereby potentially increase fidelity.  
The two sets of probabilities are interpreted to represent aleatory and 
epistemic uncertainties, respectively (Table E2). Aleatory uncertainty deals with the 
inherent, intrinsic random stochastic variations associated with a physical system. 
Epistemic uncertainty reflects the lack of knowledge and information about some 
properties and characteristics of a system. Human judgement and belief reflect the use 
of subjective knowledge and judgement (or bias) in the formulation of designs, 
opinions, and decisions, which can increase or decrease the accuracy regarding the 
“true” representation of a system. 
 
Table E2. Quantum representations for the different types of uncertainty. 
Uncertainty Quantum Representation 
Aleatory   ⇔  
Aleatory + Epistemic (physics)  ⇔  
Aleatory + Epistemic (physics)  
+ Epistemic (beliefs) 
 
 
The terms in the density operator   can be interpreted 
and mapped to the three types of uncertainties according to the following: 
 — The probabilities encoded by the probability amplitudes within this i-
th state vector represent the aleatory uncertainties. The probabilities 
correspond to the inherent intrinsic random stochastic variations associated 
with a physical system’s states. 
ρ = pi
i





  — The operator, itself a model representing some physical processes, 
represents the moderator or modulators of uncertainties (epistemic). The 
operator acts on the state vector, resulting in a change of state in the form of a 
change of the probability amplitudes; the probabilities derive from the state 
vectors post operation encapsulate both the aleatory uncertainties and the 
model based epistemic uncertainties. The contextual knowledge about the 
sequential behaviors of the system can be incorporated into a coherent 
mathematical framework.  
 — This term represents the probability of finding the system in the i-th 
state. If we have full knowledge of the system, then there is only one term 
with p = 1, and the density operator contains a single state vector. In the case 
with partial knowledge, the  will be a probability distribution satisfying the 
conservation of total probability ( ). This term is another component 
of epistemic uncertainties corresponding to the certainty of knowing the 
precise state of the system.  
 
Risk in the Quantum Context 
Risk is often defined as the probability of the risk event multiplied by the 
magnitude of the consequence or impact: Risk = Probability × Consequence. In this 
definition, risk is an event associated with a probability and a consequence. The 
uncertainty is on the occurrence of the event and a probability value is assigned to the 





event. Instead of asking for the probability of the occurrence of event A, the quantum 
approach now asks for the probability of finding the system in a particular state. This 
reframing of the question leads to the following definition of risk states, risk, and the 
risk system: 
• A risk state is a system state that can potentially impact, positively or 
negatively (risk vs. opportunity), the outcome of a system event.  
• Risks are the probabilities of finding the system in risk states, couple with 
the significance of the consequence associated with those states.  
• The risk system is that collection of possible system states that can have 
impacts (usually negative) to the outcome as specified by the risk analyst, 
who then derives some quantities to represent the degree of severity for 
those states.  
Risk assessment obtains the probability of finding certain risk states (relevant to the 
question) out of all possible states (the complete set of states), assign to them scalable 
factors to represent the degree of significance, to be used for making decisions. The 
numerical valuation or the magnitude of a risk is contextually driven and can be 
subjective.  
These concepts are mapped to elements of the quantum framework according 
to the following. Associated with each risk system is an observable called the risk 
value denoted by the operator Ri.  
• Performing the measurement Ri on a system’s basis state, yields the scalar 




If  is a failure state, the result of the measurement is Ri on the basis state is  
corresponding to a numerical value representing the significance of the consequence. 
This measurement is denoted by  
.     (E.5) 
For example, if a risk analyst assigns a real number value of 5 to the most significant 
failure state and 1 to the least significant state, then for the trivial case of a system 
with a binary working  and not working  states,  and . 
Recall that risk, that is, the probability of finding a system in a certain state 
 follows the Born Rule: 
    (E.6) 
where  is the given system state. The probability of the system  in a non-
working state can be obtained with  
.    (E.7) 
The risk value is the expectation of the observable Ri, for a system in state  it is 
denoted by  which is given by  
.    (E.8) 
The density operator (  from Table E2) represents the system, capturing the 
combination of aleatory, epistemic, and belief uncertainties.  
λi λi
Ri λi = λi λi
1 0 Ri 0 = 5 0 Ri 1 = 11
ψ
P(ψ ,φ )= ψ φ 2
φ A











• Risk analysis is the process of identifying corresponding risk states from 
the density matrix, calculating their chances of occurrence, and associating 
with them values of consequence.  
To obtain the risk value, a measurement Ri can be performed to obtain the 
expectation:  
        (E.9) 
in which  is the density operator and the righthand side is simply the trace of the 
product of two matrices  and Ri. 
 
Modeling Different Types of Problems 
In this research, the quantum framework was applied to model different types 
of engineering system and problem. Various quantum probability and quantum 
mechanical constructs were introduced to build foundation concepts: concepts such as 
how to represent and model a single system in binary states, how to perform 
measurements, how to construct complex systems, and how these concepts can be 
applied to model real engineering.  
Simple (homogeneous) systems — Simple levee and flood wall systems were 
constructed using state vector representations. Operators modeling different events 
were constructed to describe situations that can alter the state of the systems. 
Composite systems of levee + flood wall were constructed using tensor product 
operations to combine different individual systems together. Composite models and 
operators were then used to derive and reproduce results from conventional 
probabilistic techniques, such as fragility curves and event trees. Comparing the 






results of conventional and quantum techniques, besides reproducing the results as the 
conventional approach, the results were already encoded in the model itself. 
Moreover, the rule to compute probabilities, the Born Rule, was itself encoded in the 
density matrix.    
Heterogeneous systems — A heterogeneous system, in this case the Hurricane 
Protection System (HPS), was modeled. A model suitable for the investigation of this 
complex heterogeneous system was constructed using the density operator quantum 
framework. The HPS (before Katrina) and not the HSDRSS (post Katrina) was 
chosen as a reference system for the model since analyses done by the Interagency 
Performance Evaluation Task (IPET) Force and others are readily available for 
comparison. Given the scope of this dissertation, a direct one-to-one comparison 
between the quantum model with the HPS studies by IPET is not feasible. 
Nonetheless, using a simplified HPS baseline and focusing on key attributes and 
properties, comparisons at the macroscopic level highlighted the differences between 
the techniques.  The objectives for this case study were to illustrate how to model a 
heterogeneous system using the density operator formalism, to demonstrate how the 
quantum approach offers additional information about system risks over classic 
methods, and to compare and evaluate how the two approaches assess risks.  
This case study evaluated the IPET and quantum productions of the fragility 
curves. At the macroscopic level, the fragility curves produced by the two approaches 
were compared. The reference IPET model with classic techniques provides a 
snapshot of the system in time and the quantum model traces the system evolution 




two populations of levees, with the IPET model similar to a collection of a 
homogeneous (or with less variations) population of levees and flood walls, and the 
quantum model a collection of heterogeneous (with variations over time) population. 
The quantum framework extends the classic framework by capturing and modeling 
various temporal events, which were not performed in the IPET models. The quantum 
fragility curves were constructed by extracting state information from the density 
matrices, with the system first subjected to various events and conditions. The density 
matrices tracked the system states over time via operators; the system was 
transitioned to the different “states” at different times with event operators, and the 
failure probabilities were thus “updated” after each transition. The fragility curve 
constructed for the period in question, therefore, took into account the evolution 
history of the system. 
In comparisons, classic methods are similar to the modeling of a pure state, 
and the quantum approach models the HPS as a mixed state system. In the case of a 
pure state model, the failure probabilities are derived from a single state vector:  
 ; whereas for a mixed state model, the failure probabilities are derived 
from a mixture:  . Over time, various 
events altered different parts of the HPS, and introduced different mix of system 
states. The mixed state density operator acknowledges this and models the system as 
a mixture of states. For the case with the HPS, the historical events introduced new or 
altered existing system states with higher failure probabilities, such as degraded 
systems, new systems built below specifications, and systems weakened by annual 
weather events. When the different populations of states with higher failure 
ρ = p1 S1 S1




probabilities were fully taken into account with the mixed state model, as expected, 
has a higher failure probability and the total failure probability rose earlier and faster. 
The incorporation of the historical events and earlier failure states shifts the quantum 
fragility curve according to the event-driven behaviors of the population. As the 
system evolves over time, uncertainty increases as the system move further and 
further away from pure state; the system ensemble population (a group of identical or 
highly similar levee-flood wall) changes over time, turning more and more into a 
statistical ensemble (a collection of groupings of levee-flood wall).  
The quantum framework takes the classic techniques as a starting point and 
takes steps further by refining the risk questions and drilling further down beyond the 
system parameters and configurations. The  terms are classic probabilities. The 
second set of probabilities in the state vectors extends the capability to encode 
information into the mathematical construct - the density operator. Furthermore, the 
construction of the density operator captures additional contextual information in the 
form of the different terms, such as , for the 
different possible states. This refinement drill deeper into the system behaviors and 
time evolution scenarios via event operators that model environmental effects, such as 
weather events, and further explore areas where the contextual questions can actively 
re-shape the modeling processes, such as the change of system specifications. The 
quantum models are sensitive to the amount of information and knowledge available, 
and how much one would like to apply (e.g. the number of terms in the density 
operator) to formulate the model at a sufficient level of details to arrive at the answers 
one seeks. Such framework that has the flexibility to handle both precise (pure states) 
pi




and imprecise scenarios (mixed states) helps to extend the risk analysis and 
assessment process on the HPS. The density operator formalism is shown to be a 
capable framework that can be utilized to provide a coherent and concise 
mathematical structure to represent the risk states of complex engineering systems.  
Combining probabilities for concurrent failure modes — One of the current 
challenges in risk assessment is the computation of total failure probability for a 
complex system with many different failure mechanisms. In engineering risk analysis, 
frequently we might be working with systems with more than a single failure mode, 
such as seismic activities can subject a spillway monolith to lateral forces of various 
magnitudes, leading to structural failures such as cracking, sliding, or overturning. 
Calculating the total probability of failure for engineering systems with multiple 
failure modes having order-dependent probabilities (e.g., overtopping and overturning) 
can be challenging. Assumptions and approximations have to be made to obtain total 
probabilities. In the study of dam failures for example, different failure modes under a 
single hazard for the different dam sections can make the calculation of the total 
failure probability challenging. 
This problem about finding the total probability for systems with concurrent 
failure modes was analyzed with the quantum framework. The quantum formulation 
allows the integration of complex models and physical models in the form of state 
vectors, which reflect our knowledge about the relationships between the failure 
modes.  Additional information, knowledge, and physical models are expressed in 
terms of the operators, connecting the physical problem with the change and 




The quantum framework provides a set of tools to differentiate the 
characteristics of system beyond a simple probability framework. Binary event trees 
can be constructed from the state vectors using tensor products. The quantum 
framework does not predefine the paths; rather, it maintains that all states are possible 
as a result of superposition, and the system evolves as events unfold. Probabilities are 
extracted at the end of the system evolution. The quantum framework will result in 
total probabilities consistent with the law of probability when framed properly. The 
quantum calculation relies on projection to extract information; one does not just sum 
but select what to “sum” via a purposeful extraction. 
Scheduling risk for software development — Besides modeling physical 
engineering systems, the quantum framework was applied to analyze other classes of 
problems. A significant number of space missions planned by the (US) National 
Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) did not develop and launch on 
schedule, and software development has been identified as a major contributor to 
schedule delays and cost overruns which became risk drivers. Standard approaches to 
analyze schedule risks focus on the identification, quantification, and probabilistic 
representations of cost and schedule uncertainties. Often, current frameworks and 
techniques lack comprehensive perspectives on the incorporation of the continuous 
evolution of uncertainties, the transitions of the “system” from states to states, and the 
contextual information about the activities into the uncertainty models. The quantum 
approach realigns the scheduling risk modeling better to represent scheduling 
lifecycle behaviors, reflecting how different software development workflow 




To explore this concept, a simplified and generalized software development 
scenario derived from the development lifecycle for a subsystem that is part of a 
current NASA flagship mission ground system was used as a case scenario. This 
software subsystem, refer to as W, consists of three components: A, B, and C. These 
components are developed by three separate teams from three different organizations 
at different geographical locations. In this scenario, the development of component A 
and B are in parallels, and the development of component C depends on the 
completion of A and B. This development process can be represented by the schedule 
network (Figure E3). 
 
 
Figure E3: Schedule network for a software subsystem development scenario. 
 
With the quantum approach, the schedule network can be thought of as a 
complex system with many different states where each state represents the 
developmental maturity of a software component. The quantum model represents the 
various possible states in which the schedule network can be found, and the quantum 
operators model the behaviors of the system, the change of states, and the dynamic 
schedule behaviors of the system components.  
This analysis modelled different development lifecycle activities 
(methodologies), such as the development maturity lifecycle (typically follows a S-




simple operator tracing the time behavior for development maturity. Density 
operators representing the development states of component A, B, and C were 
constructed. A hybrid development approach, where different methodologies are 
mixed together, was incorporated into the construction of mixed states density 
operators. The density operators for the components were then used to form the 
schedule network density operator: .  
The model was analyzed to answer three different scenario questions, 
showcasing it robustness in handling a variety of situations and lines of queries. 
• All components have to be fully operational at launch. What is the 
probability of finding the system ready for launch? 
• Only components A and C have to be fully operational at launch. B needs 
actual flight data at the stationary orbit to complete calibration for 
operation. What is the probability of finding the system ready for launch? 
• Only components A and C have to be fully operational at launch. B needs 
actual flight data at the stationary orbit to complete calibration for 
operation, but B has to be 80% complete. What is the probability of 
finding the system ready for launch? 
The density matrix represents and captures all possible states of the system, which 
means all of the scenarios are simultaneously represented in the density matrix, and 
the system can be queried on multiple scenarios and perspectives at the same time, 
with the benefits of gaining procedural and computational efficiencies.  
The quantum model supports more intricate modeling of the actual processes, 




modeled to evaluate how they can impact the chance of realizing the system on 
schedule. The density matrix representation allows some degree of impreciseness, 
which makes it possible to derive useful results without specifying precisely the exact 
type of methodology the development team employs. The model can capture a 
specific and well-defined workflow, but it also has the flexibility to handle hybrid 
development workflow methodologies.    
The activity operator models the development lifecycle and is essentially 
modeling the development methodology. How the development methodology affects 
the schedule has never been fully incorporated in other schedule risk analysis model 
in this fashion; the most it does is to capture the effects of the methodology in 
affecting the probability distributions modeling the schedule duration. The change of 
perspectives enables the incorporation of additional elements such as workflow 
models. Workflow models to describe different development methodologies can be 
directly integrated into the process to “evolve” the probabilities. This allows 
additional degrees of freedom to test and evaluate constraints to improve schedule 
risk assessment. The direct incorporation of the “questions” in shaping the analyses 
aligns and reflects better with the dynamic nature of complex engineering systems, 
where traditional deterministic flow might not necessarily be true (e.g. event driven 
workflow).  
 
Conclusion and Future Directions 
In this dissertation, the theory of quantum probability and the associated tools 




and assessment approach for engineering problems. This research investigated the 
application of the quantum framework to study complex engineering systems where 
the tracking of states and contextual knowledge can be challenging. This dissertation 
laid out the case for why the quantum framework provides new vantages with which 
to capture and encapsulate information in the risk system models; how quantum tools 
can monitor, change and evolve the system; and how these additional information and 
tools can support risk analysis and assessments.  
This research demonstrated that the quantum framework can have robust and 
broad applications to different types of problems, beyond the study of risk for 
engineering systems. This research is a demonstration of concept, focusing on setup 
of a risk model with quantum probability and the quantum mechanics apparatus. The 
quantum framework is rich with features, and as a foundation framework, it has the 
potential to be used for modeling a wide range of problem types.  
To realize the potential, significant additional research will need to take place 
beyond this dissertation. Follow on research might pursue any of three directions. 
One is to experiment with the above models to see how well they make predications 
for complex modern storm protection systems. A second is to follow up on the 
application of the quantum framework to study problems from other engineering 
domains, such as agile software engineering workflows and practices. The third is to 
continue to map out the theoretical quantum constructs and explore how they can be 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
Uncertainty is inevitable at the frontiers of knowledge.  
- Joel Achenbach 2015 
 
There have been many explorations for alternative probabilistic models in the 
representation of uncertainty in risk assessments. Most modern probabilistic methods 
follow the Kolmogorov formalism, where the Kolmogorov axioms define the 
probability mathematical framework. However, explorations on other probability 
formalisms, beyond Kolmogorov probabilities, have been rising in recent years in 
various communities, in risk and others. Researchers have been exploring other ways 
to represent uncertainty, from exploring other probabilistic interpretations (Flage, 
Aven, Zio, & Baraldi, 2014) to other new mathematical framework such as 
information geometry (Amari & Nagaoka, 2007; Amari, 2016) where probabilities 
are derived from differential geometry techniques. Others have explored the use of 
quantum (or Dirac-von Neumann) probability (Dirac, 1930, 1958; von Neumann, 
1932, 1955), which itself came from the study of quantum mechanics in physics, in 
areas such as cognitive science (Busemeyer, Wang, & Townsend, 2006; Pothos & 
Busemeyer, 2013; Bruza, Wang, & Busemeyer, 2015). Indeed, over the past several 
decades there have been a wide range of interests in applying quantum probability in 
other disciplines such as finance, economics, game theory, decision support, 




Khrennikov, 2010; Cheon & Tsutsui, 2006; Guo, Zhang, & Koehler, 2008; Pothos & 
Busemeyer, 2009, 2013; Lozada Aguilar, et al., 2017). 
 For the study of risks associated with complex engineering systems, the 
exploration of different probability theories can be of great interests since probability 
plays an important role in most risk assessment techniques. Probabilistic risk 
assessment (PRA) or quantitative risk assessment techniques have been used for 30 
plus years, used by many such as the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (USNRC) 
(1975, 2009, 2018), the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA)  
(Dezfuli, 2010; Stamatelatos, 2011), Bureau of Reclamation, US Department of the 
Interior, and the US Army Corps of Engineers (USDIBR/USACE) (2015) in 
assessing engineering risks. While PRA techniques based on conventional 
probabilistic treatments, such as Kolmogorov axiomatic, Frequentist, or Bayesian 
treatments, have been widely and successfully used to investigate and model many 
complex engineering problems, the diversity in the type of engineering problems, 
problem conditions, and characteristics often require tailoring different specialized 
techniques. Modeling complex engineering problems with pure probabilistic 
approach can encounter challenges, particularly in cases where contextual knowledge 
and information are needed to define probability distributions or models (Pedroni, Zio, 
Pasanisi, & Couplet, 2017).  
 Researchers have been exploring augmentation of pure probabilistic 
techniques with alternative, non-fully, or imprecise probabilistic techniques to 
represent uncertainties; Pedroni, et al. (2017) provides a review of the state of current 
probabilistic and non-fully probabilistic techniques in uncertainty treatment for 




component of the risk assessment framework, cannot be fully captured by pure 
probabilistic techniques, the risk research community has been continuously looking 
for ways to enhance our ability to capture more information and contextual 
knowledge into the PRA process to help connecting the probabilities. The exploration 
of non-pure probabilistic approaches, as highlighted by Pedroni et al. (2017), points 
to one of several directions. 
 Between pure probability theories such as Kolmogorov probability and 
imprecise probability theories such as the Dempster-Shafer theory of belief functions 
(Dempster, 1967; Shafer, 2002), there exists a spectrum of different alternative 
probability theories and different interpretations of probability. In this dissertation, we 
applied an alternative probability theory, quantum probability and the associated tools 
of quantum mechanics, to investigate their usefulness as a risk analysis and 
assessment tool for engineering problems. In particular, we would like to investigate 
the application of the quantum framework to study complex engineering systems 
where the tracking of states and contextual knowledge can be a challenge.  
 Why quantum probability and quantum mechanics? Probability theories 
without interpretations are simply mathematical concepts. In order to apply these 
abstract mathematical concepts to model physical problems, they must be interpreted 
according to the context and the characteristics of the problem at hand. Researchers in 
a number of disciplines, notably in the area of cognitive and decision science 
(Busemeyer & Bruza, 2012), and engineering risk assessment (Pedroni et al., 2017) 
have identified a number of analysis problems where characteristics of the system in 




with a different mathematical structure, can potentially offer different interpretive 
pathways and provides additional tools for modeling engineering risks.   
 From another perspective, Kolmogorov probability can be regarded as a scalar 
theory with probabilities map to scalar values and functions; whereas quantum or von 
Neumann probability can be regarded as a geometric theory with probabilities map to 
vectors and operators. While people might be familiar with the concept of the risk 
vector, where the event probabilities and consequences are represented in the form of 
vectors, this is not to be confused with the geometric representation of probability 
itself that we are exploring here. 
 Why adopting a geometric approach? The geometric approach introduces 
additional dimensions beyond scalar theories, adding new degrees of freedom and 
expanding the size of the parameter space available to capture additional information 
about the systems. There are properties and capabilities not available in common 
theories that can potentially improve and enhance current techniques in the treatment 
of order events in time, imprecisions, and ambiguities. The geometric approach has 
the potential to open new research avenues for exploring new techniques.  
 In this research, we attempt to gain insights into the treatment of uncertainty 
with an alternative probability framework. The framework is based on geometric 
objects to model systems, events, and uncertainties. This dissertation explores the use 
of quantum probability and the tools of quantum mechanics to model complex 
engineering systems for risk assessments, and to increase the information encoding in 




 The next chapter (Chapter 2) starts with a general overview of PRA 
methodologies, from conventional pure probabilistic frameworks to their extension to 
incorporate imprecise probabilities into current techniques. An alternative 
probabilistic framework, quantum (von Neumann) probability, is introduced as a 
possible bridge between pure and imprecise probabilities. In Chapter 3, using the 
quantum framework, a simple experimental model is constructed to represent a 
complex engineering system, namely a levee-flood wall storm protection system. 
Chapter 4 provides a short primer on quantum probability and quantum mechanics. 
Chapter 5 takes simple models from the earlier chapter and extend them to create 
composite models to describe complex engineering systems. The models are then 
utilized to explore how this quantum framework offers new capabilities and insights 
to augment existing PRA methodologies. In Chapter 6, the quantum techniques are 
compared to a number of current techniques such as fragility curves and event trees 
for new insights. Chapter 7 takes a look on the interpretation of the quantum approach 
in modeling engineering systems and assessing risks. In Chapter 8, 9, and 10, these 
chapters explore how the quantum framework can be applied to a variety of risk 
related problems, from the modeling of heterogeneous engineering systems, the 
combination of probabilities for concurrent failure modes, to modeling scheduling 
risks. Finally, future directions are discussed in the closing chapter of this dissertation 
(Figure 1). 
 Before closing this introductory chapter, the following section provides two 
brief case studies to illustrate why exploring different probability theories can be 





Figure 1: The dissertation road map. 
 
1.1 Two Case Studies 
To illustrate the challenge of performing risk assessment with current 
techniques on these systems and how the assessments can underestimate the risk 
exposures, we will consider the failure case of the New Orleans Hurricane Protection 
System when Hurricane Katrina struck the area in 2005, and the James Webb Space 
Telescope Program. 
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Case Study #1: Hurricane Katrina and the Hurricane Protection System — The 
geography of the New Orleans region, which is a marshland below sea level 
surrounded by the Mississippi River, necessitates the construction of a system of 
levees and flood walls to protect the area from periodic high water and flooding. This 
system of levees and flood walls, built over a span of more than 50 years, forms the 
New Orleans Hurricane Protection System (HPS), now known as the Hurricane and 
Storm Damage Risk Reduction System (HSDRRS). On August 29, 2005, Hurricane 
Katrina struck New Orleans, resulting in severe flooding due to the overtopping and 
breaching of levees and flood walls. The catastrophe resulted in significant 
destructions of the region and the loss of more than 1800 human lives. Subsequent 
investigations and studies point to three areas of failure: 1) the engineering of the 
HPS; 2) the management of the project, risk, and uncertainties; 3) the human decision 
and communication processes. 
Many investigations into the failure of the HPS during Hurricane Katrina 
identified a number of critical failure scenarios. One of the more comprehensive risk 
analyses was conducted by IPET over several years, and they issued a final report in 
2009. In the comprehensive eight volumes report (IPET, 2009), the team utilized a 
number of techniques in their risk analysis methodology, including: 1) a Probabilistic 
Risk Model (PRM), 2) Event Trees, and 3) Risk Quantification (see Volume VIII of 
the IPET, 2009 report for full details). Probabilistic risk analysis was used as the 
foundation methodology, linking the different analysis elements together, to analyze 




Risk was misestimated for the HPS before Katrina, not because of a single 
reason, but a multitude of factors connecting and interacting with each other in 
intricate fashions that contribute to the mischaracterization of the state of the system. 
Prior to Hurricane Katrina, formal quantification of the risk for the HPS was never 
fully conducted, which is a significant problem by itself (ASCE, 2007). Imperfect 
knowledge about the HPS engineering system also played a role that can lead to 
ambiguous results when applying PRA methodologies to analyze the risk associated 
with the HPS.   
The HPS levee system was built piece-wise over a long duration. As such, the 
HPS was a collection of heterogeneous subsystems. At the time of the storm, the 
levee/I-wall subsystems (for simplicity we will simply refer them as the levee system) 
were all in different states since they were all built at different times with different 
histories, design criteria, and specifications. Over time, the individual levee 
subsystem was subjected to different physical elements, and the collective system was 
difficult to model given the diverse evolutionary histories and the 
imperfect/incomplete knowledge of the subsystems (ASCE, 2007; IPET, 2009).  
The core of this HPS problem can be illustrated with this simplified 
hypothetical example.  Assuming that for a perfect homogeneous system with 10 
levees all constructed at the same time, which we will call this system a “pure” state 
system, we have 10 identical levee systems. Within this population, they all have the 
same failure probability of 5%. Suppose now we have a heterogeneous system: half 
of levees (five of them) have 5% failure probability and the other five were damaged 




it a “mixed” state system since we now have a mixture of levees with different failure 
characteristics. A simplistic calculation for the probability of failure will give a higher 
number for the mixed state system over the pure state. The failure to account for the 
heterogeneous system states led to the underestimate of risks for the integrated 
system. How much knowledge we possess about the system and the knowledge about 
the evolutionary history of this system can affect the failure estimates.  
One can argue that since a quantitative computational process, like the one 
described above, is available, one should be able to improve the assessments by 
simply develop a better model with the incorporation of more parameters, 
components, and conditions. This argument only works when the modelers have 
adequate knowledge of the situation, allowing her or him to fully parameterize and 
characterize the situation with the model, reducing the uncertainty to only those of the 
aleatory kind. However, the problem with “deep uncertainty” (Cox, 2012) challenges 
the notion of our abilities to truly reduce and eliminate epistemic uncertainties. Often 
when one cannot, one fills in the knowledge gaps with expert opinions and beliefs, 
which themselves further increase the uncertainties. Moreover, while the above 
simple thought experiment can be modeled, a realistic complex situation requires 
modelers to take into account system dynamics, changing system states, and more 
importantly changing knowledge, and the process is neither simple nor 
straightforward. Conventional PRA frameworks might not handle these situations 
comprehensively since probabilities do not tell the whole story (Cox, 2009, 2012; 
Dezfuli et al., 2011; Fenton & Neil, 2013; Aven & Zio, 2014; Flage et al., 2014; Aven 




To further compound the problem, risk also changes with time. In the case of 
HPS, the systems and the environment went through significant changes over the 
extended construction period. The subsidence of the floodwalls over time, identified 
as a key failure HPS failure mode, was not fully incorporated into the risk models; the 
design specifications did not provide temporal information about their long-term 
behaviors. As pointed out in the ASCE 2007 report, “The level of risk also changes 
with time, depending on changes in the natural and man-made environment. 
Therefore, the risk analyses need to be updated as new information becomes 
available.” While some of the latest probabilistic modeling methodologies, such as 
Bayesian Network which allows the incorporation of new data into the risk models, 
are addressing some aspects of extending the concept of uncertainty by incorporating 
a temporal dimension, fundamental concern about the ability to use probability to 
fully characterize the uncertainties associated with a complex dynamic system 
remains.  
 
Case Study #2: The James Webb Space Telescope Program — For the second 
illustration, we consider the development of the James Webb Space Telescope 
(JWST) program. The JWST program is the current NASA flagship mission to 
succeed the highly successful Hubble Space Telescope (HST) Project. The JWST 
program is an ambitious mission to use some of the latest technologies to study the 
beginning of the universe. The telescope is scheduled to launch in 2021 and will fly to 
the 2nd Sun-Earth Lagrange point (L2). The telescope engineering system is 




segments, and adaptive optics. Furthermore, advanced event-driven artificial 
intelligence scheduling software systems are deployed on the ground and on the 
spacecraft for operations. A key challenge in the development and deployment of the 
system is the completeness of the testing of individual components and the integrated 
system, which is another example of a process dealing with incomplete knowledge, 
insufficient data, and long test cycle in order to assess the different scenarios and 
combinations for event driven operations.  
The JWST software system consists of many parts and components working 
together to ensure the smooth operation and functioning of the space observatory. 
Modern software systems are complex, event-driven, multi-component, and highly 
interactive. For event-driven operations, there are many possible and different 
combinations of paths as well as many complex interactions between the components. 
Exhaustive testing of all the system pathways in the traditional sense can be 
impossible, since there are far too many possible perturbations and permutations to 
check out over finite time. Statistical sampling and simulation techniques such as 
Bayesian Inferences and System Dynamics are often employed to provide confidence 
limits to support risk-informed decision making (Dulac et al., 2007; Dezfuli et al., 
2009; Dezfuli et al., 2011; Stamatelatos & Dezfuli, 2011). Similar challenges can also 
be found in other types of software systems and not limited to space systems.  
Another challenging aspect of testing modern software systems has to do with 
the lack of test data. Space systems are highly integrated, and the interactions 
between the subsystems can only be tested with the conditions on the ground or with 




location, high fidelity test data are not available. The system will not be fully tested 
until the spacecraft goes in orbit, into the actual operational environment, when 
meaningful and representative data can be collected to fully test the systems. But 
then, how do we make the risk-based launch decision? The go-no-go decision is a 
risk-based decision process. How do we determine the risk level when precise 
information are not available? Are the systems good enough to launch? 
While scientists and engineers can make good educated decisions as to what 
to expect at the extreme space environments, more often than not we will encounter 
unknowns. In this case, how do we represent system risks, and how do we evaluate a 
system that can be constantly evolving, both in states and as a system? Can we 
develop probabilistic risk models with incomplete and evolving knowledge (the 
unknowns)? Current techniques focus mostly in the modeling of the system in time 
slices. The dynamic Bayesian network, for example, handles time evolution by simple 
propagation of the system states over time slices. What if the system itself changes, 
like when a component failed? 
Risk assessments for this type of engineering problem are often limited by the 
availability of data and information. In the case of event driven interactive systems, 
the completeness of the testing scenarios is often limited by the availability of test 
data, testing resources, and the ability to enumerate the many possible paths the 
system can follow. The degree of completeness becomes a tracer of risk! The higher 
the completeness, the lower the risk, and vice versa. Since event driven systems are 
highly non-linear and the key challenge in the assessment of the system risks are 




knowledge directly affects the accuracy of the risk estimates; if we are not aware of 
the existence of some other failure states, assessments made with incomplete 
knowledge will certainly result in the underestimation of risks.  
Furthermore, the non-linear nature of the event driven processes is changing 
the states of the system dynamically, and in some cases completely changed the 
system. For example, Hubble Space Telescope (HST) has six onboard gyroscopes and 
three working ones are needed to allow the telescope to point accurately. These 
gyroscopes have limited service lifetimes, and eventually all of them will fail. Several 
years ago, HST lost four of the six gyroscopes, and the observatory went into safe 
mode since there were only two working gyroscopes and the observatory cannot be 
fully functional. Not ready to give up, some brilliant scientists and engineers devised 
a method to allow the observatory to continue to operate in a 2-gyro mode with some 
limitations. The control laws for the spacecraft were reworked and updated. The 
system was changed into a new one; the system itself changed and the system states 
changed! 
Risks can be misestimated because we do not know precisely all the system 
states, their evolutions, and changes. Our estimates are limited by the knowledge we 
possess, and our ignorance can potentially result in the misestimate of risks. The 
consequence of it could be the failure of subsystems, or a catastrophic failure leading 
to loss of mission, and for human spaceflight, the loss of lives. 
 
Probabilities do not tell the whole story — A simple pattern emerged from the above 




dynamic evolution of a complex engineering system can affect the accuracy of the 
risk analysis process, resulting in the misestimate of risk. Risk decisions often have to 
be made under challenging circumstances with limited, incomplete, subjective and 
changing knowledge. The current probability risk assessment frameworks might not 
be robust enough to handle certain cases with changing system states and incomplete 
knowledge, which could lead to ambiguities (see Johansen & Rausand, 2015 and 
Aven & Cox, 2016 for an overview of the problem of ambiguity associated with 
general and probabilistic risk assessments). Researchers have pointed out that a 
framework that takes into account changing systems and incomplete knowledge is 
presently lacking in the area of risk research (Aven & Zio, 2014). Many new 
techniques are being developed and refined, but perhaps a different way to think 
about the problem can take us down a new path. The quest is to look for other 






Chapter 2: Probabilistic Risk Assessments with Quantum 
Probability and Mechanics 
 
Take calculated risks. That is quite different from being rash.  
- George S. Patton (1885-1945) 
 
Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) has been used by many in many fields, 
and they have been very successful in treating broad classes of problems.  This 
Chapter starts with a general overview of the basic PRA methodology and how PRA 
frameworks model complex engineering systems. The role of probability in PRA and 
the current probabilistic approach in PRA are examined. A brief overview of how 
others are exploring different alternative probability theories to enhance current 
methodologies follows, highlighting areas that can benefit from the incorporation of 
other techniques beyond pure probabilistic approaches. Quantum probability and 
quantum mechanics are introduced as a framework for more in-depth exploration 
with this dissertation. 
 
2.1 General Overview 
Current PRA techniques generally consist of the following three elements: 1) 
sets of scenarios, which can be physics or probability models to represent events and 
engineering systems (simple or composite), 2) the frequency of occurrences of the 
events associated with the scenarios, usually in the form of probabilistic models for 
events, and 3) the consequences associated with the occurrences of the events, which 




methodologies can be grouped under static or dynamic approaches. Static PRA 
typically model system states in discrete time slices, essentially snapshots of system 
states in time. Event trees, fault trees, and Bayesian networks are examples of static 
techniques (Rasmussen, 1975; Swaminathan & Smidts, 1999; Ericson, 1999, Pearl, 
1988). While these techniques handle engineering systems with static behaviors well, 
many engineering systems do exhibit dynamic behaviors and static PRA 
methodologies might be less effective in modeling dynamic engineering systems (Siu, 
1994). Developed around early 1990s, Dynamic PRA (DPRA) techniques model 
system states according how the system transition from states to states over time, 
essentially an event driven approach. DPRA takes PRA techniques and adds to them 
simulation elements and stochastic tools to incorporate and reflect dynamic changes 
of the system (see for example, Mandelli et al, 2013, 2019 for simulation-based 
techniques, and Varuttamaseni, 2011 for a short summary for dynamic Bayesian 
networks). These dynamic techniques found applications in complex engineering risk 
assessments and the modeling of complex systems with dynamic interactions and 
dependencies between components, where static logic structure-based approaches 
might have limitations (Varuttamaseni, 2011; Mandelli et al., 2017; Modarres et al., 
2017; Jankovsky, Haskin, & Denman, 2018). Table 1 lists a sample of current static 
and dymanic PRA methodologies, and Appendix A provides a general overview on 







Table 1: A sample of current PRA methodologies. 
Type  Methodology 
Static -  
Model is a snapshot of a 
system state in time 
 • Risk Matrices 
• Event Tree of Event Sequence Diagrams 
• Decision Tree Analysis 
• Fault Tree Analysis 
• Event-Chain Model 
• Bayesian Interference 
• Bayesian Network and Bayesian Belief Networks 
Dynamic - 
Model includes the 
transition of system 
states over time 
 • System Dynamics 
• Dynamic Event Tree 
• Dynamic Fault Tree 
• Discrete Event Transition models 
• Monte Carlo Simulation 
• Dynamic Bayesian Networks 
 
Probability frameworks, such as Kolmogorov probability and Bayesian 
probabilistic techniques, are often used to model events and quantify uncertainties in 
PRAs. The successful execution of PRA depends on the association of events and the 
quantification of uncertainties with probability distributions. Critical to the 
association and the quantification processes is the need for contextual knowledge and 
information about the events, the sequences, the configurations, the interactions, the 
physical processes, the parameter spaces in order to create scenarios. The more 
comprehensive is the knowledge, the better the support for the quantification of 
uncertainties with probabilistic distributions and models. Contextual knowledge is an 
important ingredient since it often serves as the glue connecting the probabilities 




common approach is to capture contextual knowledge and information in event and 
system models, such as event trees and fault trees. The event tree, which is a logical 
model built from events and systems knowledge, connects the events together; the 
tree can be seen as two separate components where the knowledge is contained within 
the tree structure, connecting the probabilities and the probability distributions. 
Probabilities model the occurrences of events with the event tree structure connects 
the events and the probabilities together. Contextual information, which forms the 
scenarios, shapes the tree. 
The other half of the PRA process, the quantification of uncertainty, has been 
a subject where many brilliant minds are currently working to improve existing 
methodologies in order to achieve higher modeling fidelity. While the applications of 
traditional and Bayesian techniques have been highly successful in the treatment of 
many problems, contextual knowledge is not something that can be easily integrated 
within a probabilistic framework, especially for the conventional “pure probabilistic” 
frameworks, e.g. Kolmogorov and Bayesian (Pedroni, Zio, Pasanisi, & Couplet, 
2017). There are other areas where improvements are being sought by researchers as 
well (Aven & Zio, 2014; Zio, 2018). 
2.1.1 Representing Complex Engineering Systems. 
To build the scenarios for event tree and fault tree, the process begins with the 
logical modeling of the engineering system and the associated events. The PRA 
process starts with the definition of the problem and the identification of the 
assessment objectives. The system in question is then examined to determine key 




frameworks (for example by NASA) develop scenarios with the use of techniques 
such as master logic diagrams to identify the initiating events (IE), the engineering 
system’s behavior, the different scenarios that can lead to system failures and 
accidents, and the consequences associated with the events (Stamatelatos and Dezfuli, 
2011). Then the states of the engineering system in question are constructed and 
traced out.  
The information is then used for the construction of event sequence diagrams 
and event trees, starting with the initiating event, and branching out to subsequent 
sequential pivotal events, progressing step by step to the final outcome, which can be 
a simple binary one, such as good or bad, working or not working. Figure 2 is an 
example of a typical sequence diagram.  
 
 
Figure 2: An example of a typical sequence diagram, from Stamatelatos and Dezfuli, 2011. 
 
Once the pivotal events have been sequenced, detailed parametric models are 
developed to the level that is sufficient to support the quantification of the system and 




complex engineering systems, a variety of techniques are used based on the 
characteristics and properties of the problem and objectives. For typical linearly 
sequencing scenarios, simple sequencing logical models, dynamic flow graph 
methodology could be used. Physical models representing engineering systems and 
structures can be derived from finite element analysis, or simulation techniques such 
as structural analysis with Monte Carlo and systems dynamics. Restructuring of the 
logical tree structures can be accomplished via common cause analysis or the 
identification of cut sets (see Stamatelatos and Dezfuli, 2011 for further expositions). 
The basic events are then assigned probabilities or frequencies as part of the 
quantification process, which also incorporate the treatment of uncertainties 
depending on the completeness of the knowledge about the events and the physical 
processes. Finally, the integrated scenario model (the cut sets) are put together from 
all the different elements. With the integrated scenarios, risk analysts can perform a 
variety of analyses, such as sensitivity analysis, uncertainty analysis, and importance 
ranking. The results from the analyses are then interpreted, leading to conclusions. 
2.1.2 The Role of Probability 
One of the critical PRA elements is the use of probability to characterize event 
occurrences, physical processes, to represent and model uncertainties. Those physical 
processes have intrinsic variability (randomness). The use of probabilistic models to 
describe stochastic processes (referred to as “aleatory” uncertainty) is a central 
element of PRA. Beyond that, risk scenarios used in the representation of the physical 
problem introduce yet another type of uncertainty, referred to as epistemic uncertainty, 




models, and modeling parameter. The epistemic uncertainty is a quantification of the 
degree of knowledge or the state-of-knowledge of the fidelity of the models, 
modeling parameters, and assumptions in representing the reality of the relevant 
physical processes and the systems’ behaviors as defined by the conditions.  The 
challenge is on the mapping or association of uncertainty models to a probability 
distribution.  
The degree of success for the association of uncertainty models to probability 
distributions depends on our knowledge about the problem, from the availability of 
information and their quality, to statistical data such as event frequency and 
occurrences. Contextual information and knowledge play critical roles, but the 
amount of information that can be encoded in the probabilistic models is limited by 
the mathematical and probability frameworks. Events are not as rare when one takes 
into consideration different contextual knowledge about the systems and their 
evolutionary histories. Yet, knowledge, evolutionary history, and the dynamic 
behaviors can be difficult to quantify objectively and incorporate into probability 
based quantitative risk analysis (Aven & Zio, 2014).   
The concept of probability itself is not absolute or definitive but subject to 
interpretation. There are a number of interpretations of probability and a number of 
different theories of probabilities, from axiomatic formulations such as Kolmogorov 
probability, to Cox’s logical probability (Cox, 1946), to imprecise probability such as 
that of Dempster-Shafer, and to subjective probability (e.g. Beer, Ferson, & 
Kreinovich, 2013). A thorough review of the subject can be found in Hájek, 2012. 




uncertainty can greatly affect the outcome of the PRA results and conclusions. Since 
the states of the system being modeled can change as a function of time, there is also 
a differentiation between static and dynamic techniques (for Systems Dynamics, see 
for example Forrester, 1961; Sterman, 2000; Leveson, 2006, 2011; Dulac, 2007; 
Mohaghegh, 2010; Varuttamaseni, 2011). 
 
2.1.3 Different Probability Theories 
In looking for ways to enhance PRA frameworks, some researchers have been 
focusing on the step associated with the assignment of probabilities and the use of 
probability to quantify uncertainties. Researchers have pointed out that the use of 
pure probabilistic modeling approach in PRA techniques, while successful in treating 
many problems, might not be sufficient in fully characterizing the problem (Pedroni 
et al. 2017). Pure probability refers to probability models based on conventional 
probability framework, as in Kolmogorov and Bayesian probabilities. Numerous 
examples were cited where the use of pure probability can lead to inconclusive or 
ambiguous results (Aven, 2010; Dubois & Guyonnet, 2011; Aven and Zio, 2014; 
Pedroni et al., 2017), sometimes refer to as the ambiguity problem (Renn, Klinke, & 
van Asselt, 2011; Johansen & Rausand, 2015) which will be further elaborated in 
next section. The scalability of the conventional probabilistic techniques is also a 
question when dealing with highly complex integrated engineering systems, particular 
in the area of model fidelity and computational efficiency.  
Other probability theories and different interpretations of them exist at various 
stages of maturities (Hájek, 2002, 2012). Besides Kolmogorov probability theory on 




“subjective” end of the spectrum, there are other probability theories in between. 
Table 2 summarizes the different kinds of probability theories, from classical to 
modern ones. 
 
Table 2: Different treatments of probability theory. 
Treatment/ 
Interpretation  Representative works by  Principles 
Classical  Cardano, Pascal, Fermat, Bernoulli, Laplace   
Principle of indifference, assign equal 
probability to events 
Frequentist  
Mills, Ellis, Cournot, 
Fries, Venn, Bernoulli, 
Gauss, Laplace, Fisher, 
Neyman, Pearson. 
 
Assign event probability based on the 






Bayes, Laplace, de 
Finetti, Jeffreys, Wald, 
Savage, Ramsey 
 
Bayes Theorem; Bayesian updates; subjective 
and a reflection of degree of confidence on 
the occurrence of events; degree of belief 
Physical/ 
Propensity  Pierce, Popper  Physical disposition or propensities of events 
Modern 
Axiomatic  Kolmogorov, Cox, Jaynes  
Kolmogorov Axioms, Measure Theory, Cox 
Theorem and postulates - propositional logic 




Jeffreys, Carnap  
Degree of confirmation based on empirical 
evidence leading to a proposition 
Measure-theoretic  Borel, Lebesgue  
Mixing of discrete and continuous probability 
distribution for event assignments. Instead of 
working with cumulative probability 
distributions, works with probability 
measures, which is based on Measure Theory 
Quantum/Dirac-
von Neumann  Dirac, von Neumann  
von Neumann noncommutative measure 
theory, Noncommutative analog of 
Kolmogorov Probability, Dirac quantum 
mechanics 
Information 
Geometry  Amari, Nagaoka  
Application of differential geometry to model 
probability distributions by mapping the 
distributions to Riemann manifold, resulting 
in the creation of a statistical manifold. 
Imprecise  Boole, Keynes, Walley, Dempster, Shafer  
Introduce non-fully probabilistic ideas and 
frameworks, the use of Dempster-Shafer 
theory of belief functions, fuzzy sets, 
evidence theory, possibility theory, interval 





Aguirre et al. (2013) highlights some of the current research directions on 
alternative uncertainty theories:  
• Probability theory: this is to extend classical probability with the inclusion of 
subjective probabilities, “where a probability measure represents a degree of 
belief of an agent about the occurrence of an event A.” (Aguirre et al., 2013) 
• Fuzzy set theory: True or False or either (true or false). This is in essence an 
extension of the traditional truth table with the inclusion of an additional 
“either” state (Zadeh, 1965). 
• Possibility theory: extending the fuzzy set with the additional condition of 
normalization. (Zadeh, 1978; Dubois & Prade,1988, 2001; Dubois & Prade, 
2009). 
• Belief functions theory: the Dempster-Shafer theory - theory of evidence 
(Dempster, 1967; Shafer, 1976). This approach models the degree of belief 
using mass function, belief function, or plausibility function, and relaxes 
Kolmogorov’s additivity axiom.  
• Imprecise probabilities (Walley, 1991): a framework that admits imprecision 
in probability models and introduces probability bounds. 
 
The term imprecise probability describes a class of non-probabilistic frameworks 
that have been applied in the treatment of uncertainty in engineering risk assessments. 
Pedoni et al. (2017) summarized the branch of investigation on the use of non-fully 




2.1.4 Beyond Conventional Probability 
Quantitative techniques rely on probability models. Conventional probabilistic 
methods may encounter limitations in the capturing and incorporation of contextual 
knowledge in risk analysis, which can impose limitations when dealing with 
ambiguity (Cox, 2009, 2012; Fenton & Neil, 2013; Aven & Zio, 2014; Aven & Cox, 
2016). Ambiguity can be defined as the possibility of different interpretations for a 
result based on the availability of contextual knowledge (Renn et al., 2011; Johansen 
& Rausand, 2015). If analysis scenarios yield identical probabilities in an ambiguous 
state, the proper interpretation of the results might require additional contextual 
information and knowledge because the scalar probabilities do not capture or later 
retain the information necessary to support complex decision processes. 
To incorporate additional information, techniques such as various network-
based framework (e.g. decision tree, event tree, Bayesian networks) capture 
knowledge and information into the probabilistic models by overlaying additional 
structures on top of probabilities (Figure 3). Knowledge and probabilities are 
separated by the structures; in event trees, the probabilities are associated with the 
nodes and the tree structures capture the knowledge. At each decision points, a path is 
chosen at the expense of information loss. For example, at the node for state 1, a path 
has to be chosen to go to state 2a or 2b. After a path has been chosen and followed, 
part of the information available at state 1 will no longer be carried forward, similar 






Figure 3: Decision tree as a structure external to probabilities. 
 
Further complications arise when the problem involves complex decision 
chains, where ambiguous upstream decisions affect the downstream outcomes. While 
conventional Kolmogorov axioms’ based representations place bounds for how much 
information can be captured in the risk models, the risk analysis workflow itself can 
introduce additional information loss as well.  
The workflow to determine the probability of a risk event involves a number 
of steps: 
1. Capture information 
2. Process information 
3. Identify the risk events, develop impact assessments 
4. Risk Model representing the information/knowledge based on the risk events 
5. Compute the probabilities for particular outcomes 
6. If new data is available, perform Bayesian update on the probabilities, and 




7. At the end you get a scalar value, a number between 0 and 1 for the 
probability 
Figure 4 illustrates the general risk analysis workflow based on the above 
steps. This workflow suffers information loss along the way, from the initial data 
processing to the arrival of the probabilistic values, which inadvertently increase 
ambiguity and uncertainty. The workflow is a reduction process, where contextual 
information is reduced as a result of the parametric abstraction and the computation 
of numerical probabilities. Elements of uncertainty and ambiguity are introduced 
along the way. The risk analysis workflow removes information, and uncertainty may 
not be reduced.  
This limitation affects the formulation of risk questions and scenarios, 
affecting the interpretation of results. The information loss also introduces additional 
uncertainties into the process. One can see that the reduction of contextual 
information, which is a form of knowledge, can introduce additional epistemic 
uncertainties.  The consequence can lead to the increase of uncertainty and risk. New 
techniques that can counter the information loss may improve the quality of the 
analysis results. 
 





One might argue that current approaches of refining our methodologies and 
models by connecting different ones and adding more modeling elements work for a 
lot of problems, but we also see from the previous examples with Katrina and JWST 
that these frameworks do have their weaknesses.  Any framework that do not 
adequately incorporate historical information, knowledge, expert opinions, contextual 
information, results in ambiguity and an increase of uncertainty. The notion where we 
can keep on refining the models by adding more parts will bound to fail, when we 
reach the boundaries of our knowledge domains. Alternative frameworks must have 
the option to handle ignorance, incomplete knowledge, increase the information 
capacity in the models. We need a new framework robust enough to handle missing 
or changing data, changing states, changing system, and ignorance. 
The present challenge can be restated as the following: 
• Results from risk analyses and assessments are only as good as the fidelity of 
the system models, which are limited by how much information encapsulated 
in them. 
• To increase modeling information capacity, a framework that can allow us to 
represent fully the many different risk states, encapsulate more information 
and with enhanced computation mechanism to manipulate, process, evolve 
and extract results is desirable. 
• An internally consistent mechanism to incorporate the uncertainties into a 




a system to evaluate the risk would reduce ambiguity and improve decision 
outcomes. 
• The framework should allow risk analyst to perform both qualitative and 
quantitative risk modeling and analysis. The quantitative results provide 
concrete values for decisions to be made, and the qualitative representation 
facilitate high level decision making and communication to the stakeholders. 
• The risk systems in consideration need to be event driven and dynamic. Set 
theory-based probability framework is limited in its ability to deal with 
incomplete information and subjective knowledge. The mathematical 
framework needs to have the apparatus to capture more than just scalar values, 
but it must also be capable to capture and embed contextual information. 
• Probabilities do not tell the whole story. 
To summarize, current PRA techniques incorporate knowledge by overlaying 
additional structures on top of probabilities (e.g. event tree, decision tree, fault tree, 
Bayesian network, etc.). These models constrain what and how much information can 
be encoded in the model. Further, at each state selection or transition, information 
loss may occur. These limitations can potentially be addressed by having additional 
structures built into the probability framework to encode additional information.  
Such a framework may align better with how a system behaves and how we 
track system states. Information can be captured internal to the structure itself and 
incorporate ignorance. Information loss can be reduced, uncertainty and ambiguity 
can be handled, computational efficiency can be enhanced. Since conventional 




one approach to improve the situation. As it turns out, quantum probability might be 
the answer. This dissertation explores the use of quantum probability and the tools of 
quantum mechanics to increase the information encoding in risk models and to 
improve risk analysis techniques. 
2.2 From Kolmogorov to von Neumann 
A new branch of probability theory began to emerge around 1930s to explain 
the new development in physics at the time, namely the “new” quantum theories 
(Schrödinger’s wave mechanics, Heisenberg’s matrix mechanics, and others). The 
independent pioneering works of Paul Dirac (1930, 1958) and John von Neumann 
(1932, 1955) unified these quantum theories with a mathematical formulation based 
on the concept of Hilbert space, an infinite-dimensional complex vector or functional 
space. Central to this formulation are the Dirac-von Neumann axioms, leading to the 
modern formalism of quantum probability (see for example Chang, 2015), a non-
commutative generalization of the Kolmogorvian modern axiomatic probability 
theory. Historically, quantum mechanics came about first in the 1930s. The Dirac 
von-Neumann Axioms of quantum mechanics serves as the foundation for quantum 
physics. The branch of quantum probability was developed in the 1980s to help 
establishing a firmer mathematical foundation for the physical theory.  
Whereas Kolmogorov probability can be regarded as a scalar theory based on 
the concepts of set theory, measure theory, probability space and Boolean logic, 
quantum probability can be viewed as a geometric theory based on vectors. While 
people might be familiar with the concept of the risk vector, where the event 




be confused with the geometric representation of probability itself that we are 
exploring here.  The term quantum probability is used here in alignment with the 
quantum mechanics/physicist’s viewpoint instead of the mathematician’s perspective. 
Also, we are interested in applying the quantum framework to model engineering 
systems; it is more natural to approach from the physicist perspective than the 
mathematician perspective. Quantum Mechanics contains both a theory of probability 
as well as a comprehensive toolset to describe physical systems. Table 3 summarizes 
and compares the basic concepts between Kolmogorov and quantum probabilities. 
 
Table 3: Comparisons between Kolmogorov and Quantum Probabilities. 
Probability Framework  Characteristics 
Kolmogorov Probability  • Scalar theory 
• Set theory based within the traditional Boolean logic 
• Event A, the probability of the occurrence of A, P(A), is a 
scalar value 
• Commutative operation: union and intersection of sets; 
P(A)P(B)=P(B)P(A) 
• System S is characterized by its states 
• A state is represented by the scalar value: e.g. P(A) = 0.5 




 • Geometric theory 
• Complex Hilbert Space, a N-dimensional C* vector space 
• Event A is a point in the vector space, corresponding to a 
system state 
• A non-commutative analog of Kolmogorov’s; 
noncommutative operations 
• System S, characterized by its states, observables, 
operations, and measurements (expectations) 
• A state is represented by a state vector 
• Operations perform on the vector, changing the system 
from one state to another 





The choice of quantum probability for this study stems from the similarity in 
the lines of inquiry for both fields. The questions asked by quantum mechanics: “A 
quantum system (such as a photon) was prepared with an initial state. We want to 
know the probability of finding the system in a certain state after subjecting the 
system to certain events.” The questions asked by risk analysts: “An engineering 
system (such as a dam) was built to an initial configuration. We want to know the 
probability of finding the system in a certain state after it goes through certain events.” 
The fundamental questions ask by both share similar basis, suggesting that quantum 
probability could potentially be used to answer risk questions. 
Quantum probability offers at a minimum a number of interesting possibilities 
when applied to the formulation of a theory of uncertainty. Quantum probability is a 
generalization of the Kolmogorvian probability and therefore it is compatible with 
existing uncertainty frameworks. Second, the generalization with the additional 
mathematical vector space dimensions will open up new possibilities for additional or 
alternative representations. Third, quantum theory originated from the study of real 
physical phenomena, and it was developed to enable us to describe what we observed 
in physics.  Quantum probability might be a more suitable and natural way to 
describe reality and might allow us to develop better “models of the world.” In other 
words, the inadequacy of classical physics to describe quantum physics serves as a 
parallel for the inadequacy of classical probability to describe epistemic uncertainty.  
This work evaluates the use of quantum probability and elements of quantum 
mechanics to model risks for engineering systems. We want to see if we can gain new 










Chapter 3: A Quantum Model: Part 1  
 
 
Nature isn't classical, dammit, and if you want to make a simulation of nature, 
you'd better make it quantum mechanical, and by golly, it's a wonderful problem 
because it doesn't look so easy. 
- Richard Feynman 1981 
 
What is quantum probability and quantum mechanics? For the purpose of 
developing risk assessment models with quantum probability and the tools of 
quantum mechanics, this Chapter provides a short introduction with examples on how 
to construct basic models to represent engineering systems using quantum probability. 
The notion is to provide a few concrete examples before introducing the more 
abstract notion of quantum probability and quantum mechanics in Chapter 4. This 
Chapter will start with introducing a few basic concepts on quantum probability 
derived from the original von Neumann treatment in his mathematical treatise on 
quantum mechanics (Neumann, 1955). The approach is more from the physicists’ 
perspective than from the mathematicians’ perspective. Based on those concepts, 
several example models will be constructed to illustrate how quantum probability can 
be used to describe the probability of finding a system in a certain state. A more 
comprehensive primer on quantum probability and mechanics is presented in Chapter 
4.  
For the rest of the dissertation, the following physicist notations will be used: 




• A 3d vector in traditional notation is given by: 
 (3.1) 
 where is a unit basis vector. 
• The same vector in Quantum notation, known as the Dirac bra-ket notation, is 
given by:  
     (3.2) 
• The state vector is call a “ket” and the dual vector , the Hermitian 
conjugate (conjugate transpose) of , is call a “bra”, which corresponds to: 
       (3.3) 
  
The Absolute Minimal Fundamentals — The state of a system can be described by a 
state vector, S, with unit vectors representing the various possible unique basis states 
the system can be found in. For a system with three basis states , the 
vector S is given by:   
        (3.4) 
The components of the vector,  are called the probability amplitudes. The 
probability of finding a system in state is the squared of the probability 
amplitude. For example, the probability of finding a system in state  is simply . 
The density operator ( ) or density matrix ( ): 
ŝ1 ≡ s1( ), ŝ2 , ŝ3








          (3.5) 
is the equivalent to the state vector for the description of the statistical ensemble 
states of a quantum system, and where the probability of finding an element of the 
ensemble in state . The term density operator and density matrix are often used 
interchangeably; operator is used when a specific basis is not specified, and matrix is 
when the operator is associated with a specific basis. If the system ensemble state can 
be fully described by a single state vector, such as , it is called a pure state; 
if the system ensemble state is a statistical mixture of several possible state vectors, 
such as  then it is called a mixed state. These fundamental 
concepts will be further explained in Chapter 4. 
3.1 A Simple Example 
The quantum representation of a system state — A system state is first 
expressed in the form of a state vector, which is a mapping of the vector and its 
components to a state associated with the system being modeled. The vector space 
spans by the state vectors describe the systems.  In general, the state vectors are 
Hilbert space vectors, which are complex. For this research, we will restrict to the 
real part of the Hilbert space, focusing on the demonstration of the principles and 
concepts. 
To help illustrating the concepts, we will use the quantum mathematical 
apparatus to model a simple system: a levee system. A levee is considered to be a 
system that when it is working, water is prevented to go from one side to the other. If 
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the risk of flooding since contextually the notion of flooding in a desert - the 
consequence - is negligible. However, if the levee is built in an area below sea level, 
then the consequence of failure would be highly significant. The risk analysis process 
thus focuses on assessing the occurrence of those states, and then based on the 
context, assign a scaling factor to reflect the significance of the risk. 
For simplicity, it is assumed for this exercise that a levee can either be 
working or not working at a given time. Certainly, the system can have more states, 
but for the present purpose, it is treated as a two states system. We will label this 
levee system L, and the working state is labelled as and the not working state is 
labelled as , with and  as the basis state vectors for this system L.  The 
probability of finding the system L in a working state is denoted by  and the 
probability of finding it not working is  which is equal to . Figure 5 is 
a simplified generic representation of the flood wall system with 2 risk states: 
working or not working, with the state vector denoted by   for the specific system 
L. Recall that the probability is given by the square of the probability amplitudes (the 
basis components), in this example the probabilities of finding the system in either 












Figure 5: A simple vector representing a system state for a levee. 
 
To provide additional numerical context, for this next example let the 
probability of finding system L not working, , be 0.01. Correspondingly, the 
probability of finding L working is , which is 0.99. The probability 
amplitudes,   (for ) and    (for ), are therefore the square root of the 
probabilities. Expressing these in the Dirac notations, with system L denoted by  : 
      (3.6) 
where  ,    ∎ 
The probability of system failure is therefore finding the system in state , which is  
. If a quantitative risk measure is desirable, a scalar “scale” value can be 
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3.2 Quantum Model I: Hurricane Protection System 
In this and later sections, a basic “experimental” model is constructed using 
the quantum framework to represent a complex engineering system, namely the 
levee-flood wall storm protection system. The model is then utilized to explore how 
this quantum framework can offer new capabilities and insights to augment existing 
PRA methodologies and on the treatment of uncertainty. 
 
The Reference Scenario for the Models — To facilitate the development of the 
framework, a reference scenario based on the New Orleans Hurricane Protection 
System (HPS), now known as the Hurricane and Storm Damage Risk Reduction 
System (HSDRRS), will be used for this series of papers. The HPS is chosen as a 
reference system because extensive studies and risk analyses were performed on the 
HPS after hurricane Katrina and comparison results are readily available (IPET, 2007, 
2009). Furthermore, the actual HPS system exhibits many heterogeneous properties 
and characteristics, and heterogeneity leads to variations and introduces uncertainties 
into the system. This provides a good platform and rich environment to test different 
configurations, scenarios, conditions, and ideas with the new framework. Ultimately, 
the critical challenge is to find a framework that can support the modeling of the 
many different and complex scenarios in a coherent fashion. The following is a 
description of the “experimental” reference scenario: 
A reach consisting of a levee with an I-wall structure, underwent 
periodic seasonal water/flooding events, with sediment deposit and 
erosion at the front side (facing the river). Occasionally, the 




and the weakening of the general structure. Over time, some of the 
backside erosions were repaired, and portion of the structure were 
upgraded to bring it closer to the modern design 
specification/construction code. More significant storms occurred, 
resulting in significant overflow and backside erosion. Finally, a 
100-200 year hurricane hit the region, with catastrophic overflow 
and the destruction of the structure due to backside failure, 
resulting in a breaching event. 
 
This reference modeling scenario further specifies the parts, applicable 
terminologies, and defines a number of boundary conditions: 
• The reach is a subsystem and serves as a unit of uniform characteristics and 
properties. 
• There are 138 reaches, in 37 sub-basins, and in 8 basins for the New Orleans 
and Southeast Louisiana HPS. 
• A reach section can be a levee (L), or a levee with a flood wall (L+W). 
• A sub-basin can consist of m number of L or n number of (L+W), and a basin 
can be made up of integral units of mL and n(L+W). 
• A generic system is described by a state vector. The levee is denoted by the 
state vector  and the flood wall is denoted by the state vector .  
• Composite systems are formed by tensor products (Chapter 4.4) between the 
state vectors. The composite (L+W) system is denoted by the composite state 
vector. 
• An equivalent formalism, the density matrix (or the density operator, Chapters 




density matrix extends the capability to allow the representation of ensemble 
systems. To represent the HPS system with heterogeneous components and in 
heterogeneous states requires the use of the density matrix formalism with the 
ensemble treatment. 
• System evolutions are driven by event operators (Chapter 5.2). Operators can 
alter the state vector probability amplitudes or change the system entirely. The 
physics are incorporated into the operators.  
• While the quantum formalism is in the complex space, this work will restrict it 
to the real space. This restriction is adopted to simplify the computation to 
focus on illustrating the key principles and concepts, with the advantage of 
making the system easily visualized to better illustrate the system and the 
problem. Future work can remove this restriction to explore other capabilities. 
 
3.2.1 The Levee/Floodwall: Basic Models 
The first step begins with the development of the basic steady state system 
model following a bottoms-up approach: 1) starts with a single individual system, a 
Levee (L) and a Flood wall (W), 2) then combine them forming the composite Levee 
+  Flood wall (L+W), and 3) finally combining the composite systems together 
forming the HPS (a combination of (L+W), L, W, etc). 
As defined earlier, a system in a working state will be represented by the  
state vector, and a system in a non-working state will be represented by the  state 






  and .     (3.7) 
A note on notations: The systems will be denoted by capital letters A, B, C. The states 
of the system will be denoted by numerals 1, 2, 3. General parameters will be in 
Greek letters and lowercase letters, i, j, k, for indices.  Following this convention, a 
system is written in general as:  or  . For example, a levee system A 
in the initial state 0, is represented as: 
.  (3.8) 
 
Representation for an Individual System - The Levee — The Levee is a 
structure, usually raised and compacted earthen embankment, built between the 
protected area from a body of water such a river (Figure 6). The control of the water 
is achieved by blocking or diverting the flow of the water. Over time, levees can fail 
due to natural erosion and material degradation, or they can fail as a result of external 
events, such as seasonal flooding and hurricanes, resulting in the rise of water level 
which can overtop or breach the levee. For this work, a levee system and other 
systems are assumed to be 2-states systems, in either the working or the not 
working  states. The not working state can be a result of flooding due to 
overtopping, breaching events, natural degradation, or other events that can render the 
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Figure 6: A basic levee. 
 
The Levee state vector  is expressed as: , where  is 
the probability amplitude of finding L in the not working state , and   is the 
probability amplitude of finding L in the working state . The squared magnitude of  
 and   represent the intrinsic aleatory uncertainty associated with the working 
and failing states respectively. is the intrinsic failure probability, which reflects 
the stochastic failure probability for the levee. If we have full knowledge and history 
of the construction of the Levee, the proper inspection and quality processes, then the 
failure probability of the levee (the probability of finding the newly constructed levee 
in a defective state) should be restricted to the intrinsic stochastic failure probability. 
If the exact state of the Levee is precisely known to the aleatory limit, the state vector 
 is pure. The corresponding density matrix for the levee is:  
.     (3.9) 
Model 3-M001 Scenario: A simple levee 
A levee was built at time  with an intrinsic stochastic failure probability of 




Let the levee state be . The state vectors representing the levee state is given by: 
     (3.10) 
In matrix form: 
  ∎  (3.11) 
 
Up to this point, this model represents a perfectly built levee, with only the 
intrinsic uncertainties, evolving in time and transitioning from states to states. 
However, in reality, multiple transition pathways exist and given two levees starting 
out exactly the same initially, at some future time , the states of the two levees can 
be the same or they can be different. For example, two levees with the same built 
quality were installed in two separate areas; one area receives a higher annual rainfall 
than the other. The erosion rates could potentially be very different between the sites. 
When one inspects the two levees at some other future time , the two levees could 
be in very different states due to the different evolutionary paths. This particular 
scenario illustrates how history data and knowledge have to be an integral part of the 
model representing the states of the system. 
 
Model 3-M002 Scenario: Different possible system states due to different rate 
of degradation.  
A group of levees was built at time  and they gradually degrade over time. 




degrade more rapidly than others. There is a 60% chance one would find the 
levee at a slower degradation rate, resulting in a failure probability of 0.03 at 
time t. There is a 40% chance finding the levee at a faster degradation rate, 
resulting in a failure probability of 0.08 at time t. Describe a levee at time t in 
this group. 
 
Let the levee state with a slower degradation rate be state 1,  , and the 
faster rate be state 2,  . The state vectors representing the possible levee states are 
given by: 
     (3.12) 
     (3.13) 
 The corresponding equivalent representation of the levee system (could be 
state 1, or could be state 2) in the density matrix form:  
    (3.14) 
In matrix form: 
    (3.15) 





∎          (3.17) 
 
Model 3-M003 Scenario: Partial knowledge.  
There is 50% chance that the Levee will have a manufacturing defect or 
several defects, resulting in a higher chance of failure. Let’s say for a 
standard Levee system with good craftsmanship, we will call it Levee type 1 
(or state 1), , their failure probability is 0.01. Let’s say the manufacturing 
defect will increase the failure rate of a standard Levee system. We will call 
those Levee type 2 (or state 2), , with a failure probability at 0.02.   
 
The density matrix representing the levee system (could be type 1, or could be type 2) 
takes the following form: 
   (3.18) 
   (3.19) 






One of the failure modes is the natural degradation of the levee over time. For 
example, cyclical period of dry spells can introduce cracks into the earthen structure, 
and water seepage into the cracks can widen them and weaken the Levee structure. 
This failure mode is a time-evolutionary process, and in the quantum framework, the 
process is being modeled with an operator that operates on the state vector, 
transitioning it from one state to another state, resulting in a change of the probability 
amplitudes. We will denote this operator as H, which can be a static or time-
development operator, and the operator H† which is obtained from taking the 
complex conjugate of the transpose of H, . The formulation of the H 
operator will be fully explored in next Chapter. The transition of the levee from one 
state to another state is expressed as:  , or in density matrix form:  
 .     (3.21) 
Given that the evolutionary history plays a role in the state transition, one can 
ask the following question: “If one inspects a levee (a measurement, an observation), 
what state would one find? Using the two levees example, perhaps there is a 60% 
chance one would find the levee to be at a state corresponding to a slower degradation 
rate, and 40% chance the levee will be at a state with a higher degradation rate. This 
is a first indication that we might only have partial knowledge about the system, since 
we are not 100% sure which state we might find a levee to be in. The levee in 
question is therefore in a mixed state, a mixture of two possible states. The system 
can no longer be represented by state vectors, and we can only represent it with the 
density matrix, where is the probability of finding the system in the ith state:  
H† = (H*)T
L ' = H L





    
 
.    (3.22) 
Keen observers will notice that several different system configurations can be 
mapped into the same density matrix. A possible interpretation is to associate this 
property to the notion of ambiguity, which can further expand into the use of density 
operators to represent epistemic uncertainties.  More on this will be discussed in later 
Chapters. 
 
The Flood Wall — The flood wall is a structure providing additional flood 
control by raising the height of an earthen bank or a levee higher to reduce the chance 
of overtopping (Figure 7).  Over time, flood walls can fail due to natural degradation, 
or they can fail as a result of external events such as hurricanes, resulting in the rise of 
water level which can overtop or breach the flood walls. For this work, the flood wall 
system is also assumed to be 2-states systems, in either the working  or the not 
working  states. The not working state can be a result of flooding due to 
overtopping, breaching events, natural degradation, or other events that can render the 
system no being able to control the water level. 
 
ρL ' = piH
i





Figure 7: A basic flood wall. 
 
The formulation of the flood wall model is essentially the same as the levee. 
The flood wall state vector  can be expressed as:  
,    (3.23) 
where  is the probability amplitude of finding W in the not working state , and 
 is the probability amplitude of finding W in the working state . The squared 
magnitude of  and  represent the intrinsic aleatory uncertainty associated with 
the working and failing states respectively.  is the intrinsic failure probability, 
which reflects the aleatory failure rate for the flood wall. If we have full knowledge 
and history of the construction of the flood wall, the proper inspection and quality 
processes, then the failure probability of the flood wall (the probability of finding the 
newly constructed flood wall in a defective state) should be restricted to the intrinsic 




aleatory limit, the state vector  is pure. The corresponding density matrix for the 
flood wall is:  
.     (3.24) 
Similar to the Levee, the flood wall will also experience processes that can 
transition it from one state to another. We will denote this operator as H, which can 
be a static or time-development operator. The transition of the flood wall from one 
state to another state is expressed as:  
,      (3.25) 
or in density matrix form:  
.     (3.26) 
The flood wall can also have multiple transition pathways, and the mixed state 
density matrix is given by:  
,    (3.27) 
where is the probability of finding the system in the ith state.   
 
Model 3.M004 Scenario: A levee from an ensemble of levees. 
Two contractors are responsible for building 100 I-walls, with each building 
50. The excellent craftsmanship of contractor A results in I-walls with failure 
probability of 0.01. The I-walls from contractor B might have several 
manufacturing defects resulting in a failure probability of 0.02. How do we 





For a standard I-wall system with good craftsmanship from contractor A, with 
failure rate at 1%, we will call it I-wall A. Systems from contractor B with the 
manufacturing defect will have a higher failure rate. We will call those I-wall B with 
a failure rate at 2%.  The density matrix representing the system takes the following 
form: 
  (3.28) 
  (3.29) 
 
          (3.30) 
∎ 
 
Notice a subtle distinction here, that the mathematical structure is similar to earlier 
scenarios, we are describing systems and not just different states of a single system. 
These are crucial distinctions that will come together in later discussions, playing an 
important role in the discussion of uncertainty and ignorance. 
The above simple models and examples illustrate how an engineering system, 
the system states, and the probability of finding a system in a particular state can be 
represented by a framework based on quantum probability and mechanics. In next 




Chapter 4: A Short Quantum Primer: The Probability and Tools 
of Quantum Probability and Quantum Mechanics 
 
If you want to understand quantum mechanics, just do the math.  
- Freeman Dyson, 2007 
 
What is quantum probability and quantum mechanics? For the purpose of 
developing risk assessment models with the tools of quantum probability and 
quantum mechanics, this Chapter provides a short primer on basic quantum 
probability originates from the works of Dirac (1958) and von Neumann (1955) 
treatments on quantum mechanics. This section only covers the essential 
mathematical frameworks and results necessary for use by this dissertation. In 4.1, the 
postulates of quantum mechanics are presented to introduce a number of basic 
definitions and terminologies. Section 4.2, 4.3, and 4.4 dive into some of the basic 
definitions, concepts, and operations.  A general discussion on the properties of the 
quantum framework and how they can potentially reshape engineering system risk 
analysis (4.5 and 4.6) conclude this primer section. 
 This primer approaches the subject more from the physicist’s perspective 
than from the mathematician’s perspective. Readers are suggested to consult the 
following reference materials and texts for more in-depth treatment. Bruza, Wang, 
and Busemeyer (2015) provides a short overview and comparison between classic 




extensive introduction to quantum probability. Texts suitable for beginners: Susskind 
& Friedman (2015). At the intermediate level: Miller (2008), and at graduate level: 
Sakurai (1993). For mathematicians: Chang (2015). For general introduction to 
quantum computation: Perry (2012); the definitive text: Nielsen & Chuang (2011). 
For those who are interested in where it all begins: Dirac (1932, 1958), von Neumann 
(1938, 1955). Finally, on the application of quantum probability and quantum 
mechanics to other disciplines, such as finance: Khrennikov (2010), Rebentrost, et al., 
(2018); in psychology, and cognitive science: Khrennikov (2010), Busemeyer & 
Bruza (2012), Pothos and Busemeyer (2009, 2013), and Bruza et al. (2015). 
4.1 Quantum Probability & Mechanics: The Postulates 
Quantum mechanics is a theory and mathematical framework developed in the 
early 20th century for the studying of the physics of the small, the atoms and the 
subatomic particles. Quantum probability is a more recent mathematical theory, 
developed in the 1980s to establish the mathematical foundation for quantum 
mechanics, particular in the statistical interpretations of the theory. The quantum 
probability framework complements the conventional probability framework to 
include non-commutative operator algebra known as the von Neumann algebra 
(Meyer, 1995; Redei and Summers, 2006; Chang, 2015). The framework reformulates 
the concept of probability based on a different set of axioms (or postulates) known as 
the Dirac-von Neumann axioms (from quantum mechanics) that is based on the 
theory of complex inner product vector space, the Hilbert space, and quantum 
operators. The original set of Dirac-von Neumann axioms were not developed 




describing quantum mechanical systems in physics; Kronz and Lupher (2012) provide 
an interesting history and perspective on the different approaches and formalisms 
between Dirac and von Neumann. The postulates of quantum probability and 
mechanics can be formulated in a number of ways, and this section provides a 
synopsis of the postulates. 
 4.1.1 The Postulates. 
The postulates of quantum mechanics: 
Postulate 1: State Space 
A quantum system is described by a state vector, a unit vector in a 
complex inner product vector space (a Hilbert space) called the space of 
states (state space). A quantum state vector , a unit vector, satisfies   
    ,    (4.1) 
and where  or  denotes the inner product of two vectors. 
Postulate 2: Observables 
The measurable quantities and properties of a quantum system are called 
the observables. They are represented with self-adjoint linear operators. In 
order words, an observable O, a measurable quantity, is associated with an 
operator O that acts on the vectors in state space.  
Postulate 3a: Measurement 
The results from the measurement of observables are eigenvalues of the 




 , the result of the measurement is .  is the eigenvalue and  is 
the eigenvector. The measurement is denoted by 
      .   (4.2) 
Let ,  denote 2 different quantum states of a system.  
i.  The probability of finding   in state   is given by the 
probability P where  
          .    (4.3) 
      This is known as the Born Rule.  
ii.  If a system is described by the state vector , and associated 
with this an observable O with  , then the probability 
of a measurement with outcome value  is  
          (4.4) 
Postulate 3b: Expectation Value 
The expectation value of an observable (operator) O, denoted by  , for 
a quantum system in state  is given by the inner product  
    .   (4.5) 
Postulate 4: Evolution 
For a closed system, the evolution of system, the change from one state to 
another state is described by a unitary transformation, U: . If 
O λi = λi λi
O λi = λi λi
O




the evolution is a function of time, then the unitary operator can vary with 
time:     
   ,    (4.6) 
where  and are points in time. 
While these postulates are abstract in nature, the next section will put them into 
context and perspective. 
4.2 Conceptual Summary and Basic Definitions 
The mathematical machinery for quantum mechanics consists of mathematical 
operators acting on objects in a complex inner product vector space known as a 
Hilbert space. Objects in Hilbert space are vectors, and events are outcomes which 
are points in this vector space. The states of a quantum system are described by a 
Hilbert space vector, which is simply called a state vector. The vector evolves by 
unitary operators, operations that preserve the magnitudes of the vector, and 
Hermitian operators, operations that ensure a physical measurement have real 
expectation values (and eigenvalues). The physical measurements return values that 
follow probability distributions; hence, the measured results are expectations. The 
probabilistic interpretation of quantum mechanics, the Copenhagen interpretation, 
was based on the work of Bohr and Heisenberg, and the statistical interpretation of 
quantum measurements was originated from Max Born, with the cornerstone law 
known as the Born rule, which is one of the fundamental postulates for quantum 
mechanics (see Hájek, 2012 for a general overview).  A system fully represented by a 




the state vectors is called a mixed state system.  These concepts are described in 
greater details below.  
4.2.1 Inner Product Vector Space 
The inner product space is a vector space where a number of specific 
structures and operations, such as the notion of length, the angle between vectors, and 
the inner product between vectors are defined. The inner product can be thought of as 
a generalization of the Euclidean space scalar product or dot product to multi-
dimensional vector space (can be complex and infinite dimension). The inner product 
operation maps a pair of vectors to a scalar, and in bra-ket notations the inner product 
for the vectors  and  is written as: . Inner product satisfies the following 
conditions: 
1) Linearity:  
2) Conjugation:  
3) The normalized vector:  
4) Orthogonality condition:  
5) Positive definite:  and  iff  
4.2.2 Events 
Intuitively, events are “points in spacetime” where something happened 
leading to a condition, an outcome, or a result. For example, a risk event is the 
occurrence of “something” within the system in consideration, resulting in some 
outcome (usually negative) that has an impact on the system or others. A catastrophic 
A B B A
C A + B{ } = C A + C B
B A = A B
*
A A = 1
B A = 0




event, for example, can be the destruction of a system such as a spacecraft. In 
classical terms, the flipping of a coin leads to an event, resulting with one of the coin 
face facing up, and the outcome is either head or tail. Thus, the events form the set 
that contains all of the possible outcomes. 
Within the quantum framework, events are points in a complex inner product 
vector space known as Hilbert space; the vector space contains the complete set of 
possible outcomes. A particular collection of events forms a subspace in Hilbert 
space, and many subspaces can be formed within the Hilbert space. For example, the 
events resulting from the rolling of a 6-faces dice form a subspace, as do the events 
resulting from the flipping of a coin.  A coin with its head facing up is the event 
(outcome) of the system (the coin) after the occurrence of a measurement (the 
observation). The subspace spanned by all the possible system states forms the state 
space for the system.  
Furthermore, in this framework each elementary outcome is a basis vector in 
the subspace, and as a consequence, a vector in Hilbert space. These basis vectors 
span the vector space and orthogonal to each other. Different state vectors can be 
formed from the linear combination of these basis vectors. The classical set theory 
analogy of the subspace concept is the subset: Subset (classical) → Subspace 
(quantum). This is only an analogy, since the logic of subspace follows the axioms 
and principle of quantum mechanics and does not follow the axioms of set theory.  
Finally, symmetries in operations, such as measurements, might not be 
preserved for events in Hilbert space. The order of events, such as the order of 




4.2.3 The Quantum System 
Consider a physical experiment with a system. The experimental process 
consists of two steps: the first step involves setting up the system to generate possible 
outcomes, and the second step is to extract the outcome value by performing a 
measurement (with an apparatus for example). The quantum framework provides the 
mathematical tools and objects to model this process. Instead of possible outcomes 
and values, in the quantum framework they are replaced by the probabilities and 
statistical measurements of outcomes.  
A quantum system, therefore, is described by two types of mathematical 
objects. The first one characterizes the various possible configurations for the system 
in terms of probabilities, which is call the state of the system. The second describes 
the parameters and values one can measure about the system in terms of statistical 
outcomes, which are call the observables. A quantum system is characterized by it 
states, observables, and outcomes form measurements, which is call expectation value 
(average value of a measurement). Associated with these properties are operations 
describing the behaviors of them. The dynamic behaviors of these properties are 
described by operations on the state vector. The state vector contains all the 
information (organized facts) and knowledge (relationships and patterns about facts) 
about the possible states of the system. This state vector is a superposition of all the 
possible states the system can be in (the concept of superposition is further discussed 
in section 4.5). At any given time, the state of the system is described by the state 
vector (next section). To determine the state of a quantum system at an instance, a 




4.2.4 State Vector 
The collection of all possible events defines the quantum state space and the 
state of a quantum system is specified by a vector in the system’s state space called 
the state vector. State vectors completely specify the properties of quantum systems. 
Mathematically, a state vector  is expressed as the superposition of the basis 
states , which are the orthonormal basis vectors in the system’s state space, and it 
is expressed as: 
       (4.7) 
where  are the probability amplitudes, and the squares of the amplitudes  gives 
the probability of finding the system in state . Earlier in Chapter 3, the expression 
for the levee system as  represents a system with two basis states, 
 and , and the squared magnitude of   and   represent the intrinsic aleatory 
uncertainty associated with the working and failing states respectively. 
The state vector encapsulates all the information about the probabilities for the 
occurrence of events, what can happen, and how systems evolve. This strikes in 
contrast to classical states, where a state (a scalar) is a probability function connecting 
events to probabilities. Classical event probability is obtained from the linear 
summation of the elementary event probabilities, which has a deterministic outcome, 
and follows the law of total probability. In contrast, since quantum states are Hilbert 
space vectors, event probabilities are captured within the state vectors, and their 
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4.2.5 Measurements and Observables 
A system can be found in any of the possible system states, but the precise 
state of the system is undetermined until a measurement is performed on it. Reality 
becomes real at the occurrence of events and outcomes. After flipping a coin, one 
must look at it to determine which side is facing up, which is a measurement of the 
outcome of an observable.  
A measurement is an operation performed on a system resulting in an 
outcome. The quantities that measurements can be performed on are called the 
physical observables, or observables in short. In the quantum framework, physical 
observables are represented by linear operators. Care must be given to distinguish 
between a measurement of observable O vs. the operator O operating on a state 
vector. A measurement of the observable O will result in a value for the system’s 
state. The operator O operating on a state vector results in a state vector.  Observables 
and operators are connected to each other by probability and expectation values. 
This point was made to distinguish between the measurement of an observable 
O and the operator O operating on a vector. In quantum mechanics, an observable 
does not have a precise value, but a range or a spectrum of values. When a 
measurement is performed on the observable, the results can be any one of the values 
within the range or spectrum belonging to the observable. The result of a 
measurement is essentially random, and the act of performing a measurement 
collapses the system into an eigenvector. If the exact measurement is to perform right 
after the first one, the same result will be observed since the system has already been 




4.2.6 Probabilities and Expectation Values 
The relationship between probability, state, and probability amplitudes is 
given by the Born Rule, which simply states that the probability of finding an 
outcome  is equal to the squared of the probability amplitude , corresponding 
to that outcome: 
        (4.8) 
For a system , the probability of finding it in the “i” state is therefore  
        (4.9) 
 
The total probability for a quantum system, in order to preserve unity, requires 
that the squared sum of the probability amplitudes to be equal to one.  
        (4.10) 
This is equivalent to saying that the state vector is normalized to a unit vector 
         (4.11) 
In the quantum regime, the law of total probability is different in the following way. 
Since the state of a system is defined by the state vector, total probability is thus 
defined by the normalization condition itself. 
In summary, the state of a quantum system is represented by normalized unit 
vector in the state space. The squared values of the probability amplitudes, which 
correspond to the squared magnitude of the components of the basis vectors, give us 
















state vector into a particular state, and the projection is the event occurrence 
probability. 
The expectation value of an observable, meanwhile, can be thought of as the 
average or mean value of the measured outcomes of an observable. If O is an 
observable in a quantum system, then we denote the expectation value of the 
observable with . The expectation, or the average, is therefore define by 
        (4.12) 
and can be expressed in state vector notation as 
     .    (4.13) 
This is essentially the same as the classical definition of expectation in traditional 
statistics. Besides using it to compute averages, the expectation value will have 
important roles in dealing with mixed states system and the quantitative 
representation of risk. 
4.3 Operators 
Earlier, the concept of operators was introduced as an operation that takes an 
input state vector (like the initial state of a system) to another state vector (the system 
at a different state). Mathematically, we define an operator M by its action on a 
vector, where M acts on the vector  to give : 
.    (4.14) 
The operators are essentially “models of the world” that govern how the system states 
can be changed. In the quantum operator framework, there are several types of 
O
O = λiP(λi )
i
∑
O = A O A
A B




operators. This study will focus on a subset of the operators: state transformation 
operators and projectors.  State transformation operators include Unitary operators, 
Projection operators (Projectors), and Density operators, and they are defined below. 
4.3.1 Unitary Operators 
Unitary operators keep the unit vector unchanged in magnitude. In other 
words, while the system might have changed to a new state, the system itself has not, 
keeping the same set of basis vectors and unit magnitude for the state vector. This 
operator can be a useful tool to model evolutionary effects. For example, consider 
again the flood wall. At t = 0, when the system is new, the failure probability could be 
1%. However, as time goes by, materials weaken due to environmental effects: wind, 
rain, erosion, etc., and the probability of finding the system at a failing state (the 
failure probability) would be expected to increase. A unitary operator can be used to 
model the “operations” which in this example would be an environmental effect, 
changing the state from one to another while preserving the total probability and 
hence the system. An example of a unitary operator is the rotation operator, which 
rotate the state vector and hence changing the probability amplitudes but preserving 
the length of the vector.   
4.3.2 Projection Operators or Projectors 
Projectors are operators that can select a certain state or a set of states from the 
system and project them into a subspace, resulting with a state vector with a different 
set of basis. For example, given a state vector  and another vector 




specified by  and return with a vector along .  One can think of the basic 
projector as “asking the question” or “making a query” about a particular state or 
states of the system and returning with a state vector “answering” the question. The 
projector can be used to query a system for information about a particular state, such 
as calculating the probability of observing the system in a particular state. 
The abstract mathematical notation for a projector is denoted by  in the 
bra-ket notation. Examples of projectors that select a subspace:  projects out the 
 component,  projects out the  component, and in general  projects 
out the ith component. The  can be interpreted as asking the question, “what is 
the risk state vector representing the failing state?” This operation projects out the 
failing state vector together with the corresponding probability amplitude. To answer 
the question “What is the risk of failure?” one can then compute the probability of the 
state vector for the failure state, which is . Certainly, one can also directly calculate 
the probability of the failure state by the direction application of 
. Note that it is a projector that is sandwiched 
between the state vector. 
Consider again the levee L (Section 3.2.1). When a builder delivers a levee to 
a customer, the customer can ask the question “what is the expected failure rate of the 
levee,” and that can be recast into the question “what is the probability of finding the 
levee in a failed state.” The manufacturer states that the levee was made to the 
customer’s specifications (the system is in a pure state, since the full knowledge about 
the system is available). Given that the customer has maximum knowledge (their 
ai ai
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specifications) about the system at the time of delivery, the question of what is the 
expected failure rate can be obtained by projecting out the  state vector,  
, and the failure probability is simply the squared of the probability 
amplitude,  . Equivalently, one can arrive at the same result from:  
    .    (4.15) 
The projection operator can also be applied as part of an operation to change 
the system (the mathematical model) into the one as observed (a projective 
measurement). When the projector is applied as a measurement, such as a projective 
measurement, the projector selects the subset of the basis as observed and construct a 
new normalized state vector. For example, when a hurricane destroyed a levee, the 
system is in a 100% failing state. The projective measurement is the application of the 
projector to transition the system from the initial state (before the hurricane hit) to the 
observed state (after the hurricane hit). 
This second use of the projector “reconfigures” the system model, the state 
vector, to match what is measured and observed. In the case where a system changed 
due to some event resulting in the loss of a basis, the projection operation is used to 
transition the system from the “before observation” state to the “after observation” 
state, matching the observed result. The new state vector is normalized to reset the 
total probability to unity for the system. Consider the trivial scenario where there is a 
hurricane, the levee is damaged and is no longer working. Physically, one observed 
that the levee has been leveled, which means the system can only be in the  state. 
To represent the state of the system after the hurricane, one first performs the 
0 0 L = l0 0
l0
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projective measurement to project out the observed state, and subsequently normalize 
the state vector so that it now reflects the final “new” state of a whole system.  
Mathematically, the first step to project out the failure state is done by: 
   ,    (4.16) 
and then follow with the normalization of the state vector for the “new” system, L’: 
     (4.17) 
This is the final state since this is the only real state. The probability of finding the 
system in that state therefore is 1, which one recovers from the renormalization 
process. The state vector   is now the description of the actual observed system. 
4.3.3 Density Operators, a Preview 
The density operator ( ) or matrix ( ) is the equivalent to the state vector 
when use to describe a system, including composite systems such as one formed from 
two or more individual subsystems, or a system formed from a mixed ensemble of 
subsystems (large number of subsystems, but with many of them in similar states and 
configurations). All the information about the composite quantum system is encoded 
in the density matrix (a density operator with a chosen basis).  
The density operator is the counterpart of the observable operator. Recall that 
if O is the observable for state  ( ), the probability of finding a system 
in state  for a given state vector  is given by . In a 
parallel fashion, the density operator, , is formulated to give the statistical average 
of the probability of finding an ensemble system or complex composite systems in a 
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particular state. The trace of the density operator,  , is 1 which corresponds to 
the total probability of the system states. But before going further, a few concepts on 
constructing complex composite systems with tensor operations must first be 
introduced. 
4.4 Tensor Products 
To create composite systems, one needs mathematical operations to connect 
different state vectors, forming new composite state vectors with new states. Tensor 
product is such a tool to create new (bigger) vector spaces from some existing vector 
spaces or to create new linear operators. Earlier, the Inner product was introduced as 
an operation that maps a pair of vectors to a scalar. Tensor product (⊗) is the product 
of tensors (of which vectors are subsets), and the result is an expanded space formed 
from combining vector spaces together. For example, the tensor product of two 
vectors A and B is denoted by: . General tensor product in matrix notation (the 
Kronecker product) is given by: 
 
 
         (4.18) 
Example of the Kronecker (tensor) product ( ) of two 3D vectors, A 







       
  
    (4.19) 
 
4.4.1 Outer Product 
The Outer product is a special case of the tensor product. Outer product is the 
product of two vectors forming an operator. The outer product is a linear operator  
 defines by its operation on another vector : 
       (4.20) 
and following the bra-ket computation rule, 
       (4.21) 
where  is the inner product of   and . Since is simply a scalar 
value, it can be switched to the left side, leading to the following: 
Op ≡ ψ ⊗ φ ⇔ ψ φ
Op A = ψ φ A




      .    (4.22) 
To summarize, outer product is defined by the following linear operation: 
       (4.23) 
In a similar fashion, the operator Op can operate on a bra vector   by taking the 
inner product of  and : 
    .   (4.24) 
Assuming   is a normalized vector, one can construct a special outer 
product , called the projection operator. When applied to another vector, , 
it projects the vector onto the direction of :  
      (4.25) 
 
In matrix notation, an example of the Outer (tensor) product ( ) of 
two 3D vectors, A and B, resulting in an operator (a matrix): 
    
  
         (4.26) 
ψ φ A = φ A ψ
u v( ) w( ) = u v w = v w u
B
B
B ψ φ ≡ Bψ φ
ψ ψ A ≡ ψ ψ A




A useful theorem on how to calculate the expectation value using the outer 
product operator:  
For any observable O, the expectation value of it at a given state  can be 
calculated by finding the trace of the projection of the observable:   
    .   (4.27) 
4.4.2 Density Operators 
The density operator is a linear combination of the different possible states of 
the system, and it is used to construct the mixed state quantum representation. The 
density operator ( ) is the equivalent to the state vector for a describing a system and 
the density matrix is simply a density operator with a chosen basis. Since the density 
operator can be expressed as a matrix with a specified basis, and as such, the term 
density operator and density matrix are often used interchangeably. With tensor 
products, the density operator ( ) or matrix ( ) first mentioned in 4.3.3 can now be 
established. Density operators are constructed from the outer product of state vectors. 
In its most general form, the density operator  is expressed as:  
      ,    (4.28) 
where the set of  are normalized state vectors (yes, state vectors), and  is the 
probability of finding the system described by state vector , with 
. The density operator allows the representation of a system even 
when one does not have full and precise knowledge about the system.  
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What does it mean by having full knowledge about the system? One has full 
knowledge about the system when one can clearly describe the system with precisely 
a single state vector. For example, ten flood walls were built at the same time with the 
same specification, and the flood walls can all be described with the same state 
vector, say . Knowing that, if one randomly walks up to any one of them, one can 
be certain that  represents that flood wall; in other words, the density operator 
only projects onto one state, . The density operator is therefore: 
      ,      (4.29) 
and this is called a pure state. 
One does not have full knowledge about the system when one cannot describe 
the system with a single state vector; alternatively, this can be interpreted as one 
lacking enough knowledge to isolate the state vector to a single one. If the ten flood 
walls earlier were built to not one but two different specifications, seven were built 
according to specification “1” and three were built according to specification “2”. 
Some of them will then be described by the state vector  and some by . Now 
if one randomly walks up to any one of them, the flood wall cannot be purely 
described by  or by , but by a mixture of the two. In other words, the density 
operator must consist of several operators and maps to the two states. This mixed 
state density operator, for this flood wall example, is given by: 




where  and , corresponding to the probabilities of encounter  
and  respectively. 
Expectation Value for Density Operator — The expectation value of an 
observable can be calculated directly with density operators. Recall earlier the 
definition of Expectation Value (or just Expectation), the expectation value  is 
given by the inner product  (equation 4.5), and the 
expectation can also be obtained from taking the trace (equation 4.27):  
. For an observable O of the ensemble system, the 
ensemble average, the expectation , is given by  
   
 
.    (4.31) 
This can be re-expressed as  since: 
  
 
 ∎ (4.32) 
The expectation value of the observable for a composite system with mixed 
states is the weighted sum of the expectation values of O for the mixed states. 
Moreover, there is a handy way to compute the expectation value, which is simply the 
trace of the product of the density matrix and the matrix representation of the 
observable O.  
4.5 Features 
The quantum framework extends the Kolmogorov framework in directions for 
which there are no Kolmogorov analogues. For example: 
O
O = (ψ ,Oψ ) = ψ Oψ
O = ψ Oψ = Tr ψ ψ O
O















1. Non-commutative algebra: operators are matrices in the quantum framework. 
As a result, quantum operators inherit matrix properties, and one of it is the 
non-commutative nature of matrix operations. When applying the sequence of 
operations “A and B” on a state vector, the resulting event might be different 
than those obtained from the sequence of operations “B and A”.  
2. Superposition: when a system is described by a state vector, such as the earlier 
flood wall example, , the vector is formed from the linear 
combination of two states, the working  and non-working states. The 
flood wall  in this case is in a state other than working or not working. Any 
linear combination of  and  is an acceptable state for the system, and 
these states are called superposition states.  
3. Pure & Mixed States: traditional approach to build a description a system and 
its states relies on gaining maximum and complete knowledge about the 
system. A state vector that is constructed with full knowledge is therefore 
pure; the pure state density operator  projects only to a single 
state. In the case where full knowledge is not available, a pure state vector 
cannot be constructed for a system since it cannot be described precisely; 
however, the density operator formalism does allow the construction of a 
quantum model using a mixture of possible states. The mixed state density 
operator  projects onto the number 
of possible states a system can be found in. 
4. Entanglement: quantum entanglement describes the quantum state of a joint 
ρ = S1 S1




system, such as a pair of particles, where the entangled quantum state 
describes joint system completely, but the quantum state of the individual 
particle can be partially or entirely unknown. At maximum entanglement, the 
state of the joint system is completely known, yet the individual states are 
complete unknown. A consequence of the framework is the ability to have full 
knowledge of a composite system, based on the combination of subsystems 
for which we only have partial knowledge.  
5. Taking the concepts of mixed state and entanglement further, the density 
operator introduces the notion of making predictions and with partial 
knowledge and ignorance. Probabilities and expectation values can be 
obtained from the density operator via the diagonal entries of  and  
. 
 
The density operator formalism is effective in describing a wide range of 
system properties and the amount of information one has about the system. The pure 
state is simply a density operator with a single term:  as the system is 
known precisely to be in this state, and the probability of finding the system in that 
state is 1.0. The mixed state system is described as a statistical sum: 
 ,   (4.33) 
which reflects lack of precision and therefore the description is a mixture of possible 
states,  . The number of components can provide a measure of how 
much or how little one knows about the state of the system. The longer the sum, the 
O = Tr(ρO)
ρ = S1 S1
ρ = p1 S1 S1 + p2 S2 S2 + p3 S3 S3 + ...




larger the possible number of states, and the larger the uncertainty. However, if one 
cannot fully establish the completeness of the system states, as in the case of deep 
uncertainty with “unknown-unknowns”, then the expression might take the different 
form:  
 ,  (4.34) 
where  corresponds to the unknown-unknowns. The density operator 
formalism opens up new opportunity to model risk problems. 
The density operator formalism increases the amount of information that can 
be encoded in the system models. In current approaches, uncertainties are encoded in 
a single set of probabilities. In the density operator formalism, uncertainties are 
encoded with two sets of probabilities. State vectors (quantum) contain one set of 
probabilities in the form of probability amplitudes, while a second set of probabilities 
(classical) describes the distribution of the states. This formalism provides additional 
bandwidth in encoding system information and more information can be captured and 
thereby potentially increase fidelity. These features are explored in this research for 
the modeling and analysis of risk scenarios, and they represent a subset of what 
quantum probability adds to the risk modeling toolbox beyond conventional ones.  
4.6 Risk Analysis with Elements of Quantum Probability and Mechanics 
In this section, concepts such as state vectors, operators, density operators, 
and projectors will be introduced in the context to reframe the discussion of the risk 
states and their evolution behaviors for complex dynamic systems. The concept of 





risk will be refined to align with the quantum approach for an engineering system as 
defined next. 
An engineering system is described by state vectors, formed from the linear 
combination of the basis states the system can be found in. The probability of finding 
the system in a particular state is the squared of the scalar component(s) of the basis 
state(s) – the probability amplitudes. Composite systems (with 2 or more subsystems) 
can be assembled from the tensor products of the state vectors. The fidelity of the 
engineering system model with the state vectors is a direct reflection of the amount of 
knowledge and the degree of ignorance (as defined in Aven & Steen, 2010) about the 
system. 
The engineering system evolves according to events, which are represented by 
mathematical operators acting on the state vectors: 
1. The operators contain the physics that change the effective uncertainties about 
the states, such as how a load or other tracer parameters can affect the failure 
probabilities. 
2. The operators can preserve the number of system states, or can fundamentally 
change the system by altering the number of states, resulting in a new system. 
3. Interaction with the environment can alter the operator/system, etc. 
The above properties and characteristics are fully captured by the density operator: 
   
 
,    (4.35) 
and the transition of the system from states to states are given by: 




ρL ' = HρLH
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To summarize, an engineering system can be found in different states, and 
these states are represented by the state vectors. The collection of these state vectors 
forms the engineering system and can be expressed in the form of the density 
operator. Complex system models can be constructed from combining components 
and subsystems together via their tensor products, a process that aligns well with 
basic system engineering principles in the decomposition and construction of an 
engineering system. The engineering system evolves in time, transitioning from states 
to states, and the mathematical abstractions representing the transitions are the event 
operators.  
Risk in the quantum context — Risk is often defined as the probability of the 
risk event multiplied by the magnitude of the consequence or impact: Risk = 
Probability × Consequence. In this definition, risk is an event associated with a 
probability and a consequence. The uncertainty is on the occurrence of the event and 
a probability value is assigned to the event with the specific outcome. 
Mathematically, the consequence term is a quantitative value representing the 
significance of the outcome. The total risk is the expected loss due to the risk event.  
Often, risk assessments start with asking the question: “What is the probability 
of the occurrence of event A?” This question will now be reframed to align with the 
quantum mindset. Instead of asking for the probability of the occurrence of event A, 
we now ask for the probability of finding the system in a particular state. This 





• A risk state is a system state that can potentially impact, positively or 
negatively (risk vs. opportunity), the outcome of a system event.  
• Risks are the probabilities of finding the system in risk states, couple with 
the significance of the consequence associated with those states.  
• The risk system is that collection of possible system states that can have 
impacts (usually negative) to the outcome as specified by the risk analyst, 
who then derives some quantities to represent the degree of severity for 
those states.  
Risk assessment obtains the probability of finding certain risk states (relevant to the 
question) out of all possible states (the complete set of states) and assigns to them 
scalable factors to represent the degree of significance for making decisions. The 
numerical valuation or the magnitude of a risk is contextually driven and can be 
subjective.  
These concepts are mapped to elements of the quantum framework according 
to the following. The system for risk analysis, referred to as the risk system in this 
study, is represented by a state vector, say  (recall the example in 
3.1), formed from the linear combination of the possible states the system can be in. 
To accommodate incomplete knowledge, i.e. uncertainty about the completeness of 
the system state space, the general system will be represented by the density operator, 
which can represent both pure state (the normal state vector) and mixed states. 
Associated with each risk system is an observable called the risk value denoted by the 




• Performing the measurement Ri on a system’s basis state, yields the scalar 
risk value representing the significance of the consequence or impact.   
If  is a failure state, the result of the measurement Ri on the basis state is  
corresponding to a numerical value representing the significance of the consequence, 
then the measurement is denoted by  
   .     (4.37) 
For example, if a risk analyst assigns a value of 5 to the most significant failure state 
and 1 to the least significant state, then for the trivial case of a system with a binary 
working and not working  states,  and . 
The probability of finding a system in a certain state follows the Born Rule:
 
. The probability of the system in a non-working state can be 
obtained with . The value of risk is the expectation 
value of the observable Ri, for a system in state  it is denoted by  which is 
given by  
   .    (4.38) 
Another Trivial Example — Returning to the earlier example in Chapter 3.1, 
where the levee-floodwall risk state vector for the system was denoted by 
. Consider again the flood wall example. Flood walls are built by a 
contractor, and each of the flood walls is made to certain specifications. Let’s say for 
a high quality flood wall A, their failure probability is 0.01, i.e. the fundamental 
Ri λi = λi λi
P(ψ , φ ) = ψ φ
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chance of finding a failing flood wall is 1 in 100. Let’s say there is another class of 
flood wall B, not built as well, with failure probability of 0.02. To represent that:  
 
Flood wall A: , ,  
Flood wall B: , ,    
Probability of finding A in failure state =  
Probability of finding B in failure state =  
 
Assigning a value of 5 to the most significant failure state and 1 to the least 
significant state, the risk of failure for: 
A:  
B:  
On a scale of 1 to 5, the risk of failure is low for both A and B, and B is at a slightly 
higher risk. ∎ 
The density operator represents the system, capturing the combination of 
aleatory, epistemic, and belief uncertainties.  
• Risk analysis is the process of identifying corresponding risk states from 
the density matrix, calculating their chances of occurrence, and associating 
with them values of consequence.  
To obtain the risk value, a measurement Ri can be performed to obtain the 
expectation:  
A = a0 0 + a1 1 a0 = 0.01 a0 = 0.01
A = a0 0 + a1 1 b0 = 0.02 b1 = 0.98




       (4.39) 
in which  is the density operator and the righthand side is simply the trace of the 
product of two matrices  and Ri. 
 
  







Chapter 5:  A Quantum Model: Part 2  
 
Readers probably haven’t heard much about it yet, but they will. 
Quantum technology turns ordinary reality upside down.  
- Michael Crichton 
 
Earlier Chapters have been focused on describing simple single systems, such 
as levee and floodwall. Here, composite engineering systems will be constructed from 
simple single systems.  
5.1 Composite (engineering system) 
Composite systems are formed from component state vectors through the use 
of tensor product (Chapter 4.4). The (Levee + Flood Wall) system, for which we use 
the notion (L+W), consists of an earthen levee and vertical flood wall. Figure 8 is a 
schematic depiction of how the addition of a flood wall to a levee can help increase 







Figure 8: Levee and flood wall system 
 
To describe this system using the quantum framework, one begins with the 
construction of the composite (L+W) system state vector, denoted by , from the 
tensor product of the individual levee and flood wall state vectors. Let the levee state 
vector be  and the flood wall state vector be . The composite state vector is 
found from the tensor product of the state vectors: 
  (5.1) 
In state vector form: 
  (5.2) 
 
This is the generic form of the state vector for the (L+W) system. Contextual 
information from different scenarios are then applied to configure the state vector into 
models for risk analyses. A few scenarios are presented below to serve as examples. 















































5.1.1 Scenario: Levee + Flood wall (L+W) Composite System 
The scenario for the simple (L+W) composite system. 
 
Model 5.M005 Scenario: Levee + Flood wall (L+W) Composite System 
The levee has an intrinsic failure probability of 0.03. An I-wall was built into 
the levee at the same time and its intrinsic failure probability is 0.01. The state 
vector describing this composite system is given by:    
      (5.3) 
      (5.4) 
 
We will drop the index for the system A since we are only considering the 
different states for the composite system in this example. The composite state vector 
is:  
 
∎         (5.5) 
 
The system can also be represented by a density matrix. Starting with the pure 
state density matrices representing the levee and the flood wall:  and 
, the density matrix for , denoted , is: 
L0
A = l0, 0
A 0 + l0,1
A 1 = 0.03 0 + 0.97 1
W0
A = w0, 0
A 0 + w0,1
A 1 = 0.01 0 + 0.99 1















































































ρL = L L




    
∎            (5.6) 
 
Thus, the composite system’s density matrix elements are the products of the 
probability amplitudes. The diagonal elements, , of the density matrix 
correspond to the probabilities of the system states. In this example, the probability of 
the entire system failing, , is 0.0003. The off-diagonal elements,  , when 
interpreted according to quantum principles, correspond to the interference between 
the probability amplitudes contributed from the basis states, the  and . The 
quantum formalism interprets this as coherences between the two states. In the full 
quantum formulation with the full Complex Hilbert space (Section 4.1.1), state 
vectors also contain time dependent components and phase information. The phases 
can evolve over time as the system interacts with the environment. As more and more 













































0.0173 0.1723 0.0985 0.9799( )
=
0.0003 0.0030 0.0017 0.0170
0.0030 0.0297 0.0170 0.1689
0.0017 0.0170 0.0097 0.0965
















mixtures are introduced into the system over time, the phases gradually spread out 
and become decoherent, and the interference terms approach zeros.  
For this work on the experimental application of the quantum framework to 
represent engineering systems, due to the consideration of only the real components 
of the vector space, the interpretation of the off-diagonal terms for the corresponding 
density matrix has not been fully established. If one were to simply consider the edge 
cases, the off-diagonal terms have zero as their values when one of the probability 
amplitudes is zero, and that can only be true if the precise state of the system is 
available. The off-diagonal terms have maximum values when the probability 
amplitudes are equal. The off-diagonal terms can simply be interpreted as a 
quantitative indicator on the uncertainty of the states; it is a measurement of our 
completeness of knowledge about the system, about our ignorance. These concepts 
will be elaborated further in Chapter 7, Section 7.5.2.     
5.1.2 Scenario: Composite system with mixed states  
For the mixed state (Section 4.4.2) density matrices representing the (L+W) 
system, there are two possible forms, where the first one is more restrictive and the 
second one is more general. The more restrictive form applies to composite systems 
where the components or subsystems do not interact; the composite system is formed 
from simple direct product of the component states. In this case, the composite 
system can be factor back into separate subsystem states. The state vector for 
composite system formed from product states takes the form of Equation 5.2 above, 




       (5.7) 
The mixed state density matrix for this case takes the form: 
         (5.8) 
which is a simple weighted sum of the different joint states: 
       (5.9) 
 
In the more general setting, where the levee subsystem and the flood wall 
subsystem can behave separately, with their own separate states such as , , , 
, …, and with the assumption that the individual subsystems are tracked (i.e., full 
knowledge), the density matrix takes the general form: 
         (5.10) 
where  is the statistical weight for the mixed state levee subsystem and is the 
statistical weights for the mixed state flood wall subsystem. The matrix elements of 
the mixed state density matrix are more tedious to compute. The following is the 1-1 
element (top left of the 4×4) of the matrix: 
 
            (5.11) 
While it can be tedious, the numerical computation can be done in a straightforward 
manner with Mathematica™, MatLab™, or in Python.  
To illustrate the concept of building the mixed state density matrix, we 
consider a simple scenario with a composite system formed with two separable 




subsystems with two states each. In this case, the subsystems do not behave in a 
correlated fashion, which is modeled with the general mixed case representation. 
Subsystems that exhibit correlated behaviors will be discussed in next section, with 
further elaboration in Chapter 7. 
 
Model 5.M006 Scenario: Composite system with mixed states  
The levee was built at time  , but the quality of the construction varies, 
resulting in two possible levee states at time t, state 1 and 2. For state 1, the 
intrinsic (aleatory) failure probability is 0.03, and for state 2, the intrinsic 
failure probability is 0.08. The probability (epistemic) of finding the levee in 
state 1 is 0.65, and the probability of finding the levee in state 2 is 0.35. An I-
wall was built into the levee at the same time, and it too suffers from quality 
issues, also resulting in two I-wall states, state 1 and 2 at time t.  For state 1, 
the intrinsic failure probability is 0.01, and for state 2, the intrinsic failure 
probability is 0.04. The probability of finding the levee in state 1 is 0.25. The 
probability of finding the levee in state 2 is 0.75. 
  
The mixed states density matrix describing this system is constructed 
according to the following steps: 
For the levee:  
    (5.12) 
    (5.13) 
L1
A = l1, 0
A 0 + l1,1
A 1 = 0.03 0 + 0.97 1
L2
A = l2, 0
A 0 + l2,1




For the wall: 
   (5.14) 
   (5.15) 
The density matrix for the levee: 
     (5.16) 
The density matrix for the wall: 
     (5.17) 
The composite density matrix constructed with tensor product: 
  (5.18) 
∎	
W1
A = w1, 0
A 0 + w1,1
A 1 = 0.01 0 + 0.99 1
W2
A = w2, 0
A 0 + w2,1
A 1 = 0.04 0 + 0.96 1
ρL = p1 L1 L1 + p2 L2 L2







ρw = q1 W1 W1 + q2 W2 W2





















0.0015 0.0082 0.0067 0.0354
0.0082 0.0460 0.0354 0.1991
0.0067 0.0354 0.0310 0.1637
















5.1.3 Scenario: Composite system with entanglement (subsystems no longer treated 
as separable) 
The composite system above consists of “product states,” where the individual 
components are formed by simple products of the probability amplitudes. The 
composite system with product states can be factored back into the separate 
individual subsystems. The ability to decompose the system can be interpreted as 
having full knowledge of the individual subsystems, their characteristics and 
behaviors. 
The more general form applies to composite systems where the components or 
subsystems exhibit joint or correlated behaviors (statistical correlation and not 
necessarily causal). In this case, the composite system state vector can be generalized 
further. Note that equation:  
  (5.19) 
can have a more generalized form: 
   (5.20) 
What does this general form with represent? One possible interpretation is 
that the two subsystems are connected in such a way that they operate as one, and 
instead of two separate parameters  and , the probability amplitude associated 
with the  state, for example, is represented by a single parameter, . Note that 
 is a single state, a basis state (see 4.4). This represents us as having full 
knowledge of how the composite system operates, with the behaviors of the 
LW = l 0 w0 00 + l 0 w1 01 + l1 w0 10 + l1 w1 11






subsystems correlated and the individual subsystem’s behavior not fully known. A 
system satisfying this general form is in an entangled state, exhibiting correlation 
behaviors.  
Take the (L+W) system as an example, if the levee is weakened by a water-
filled gap, the flood wall will also be weakened due to a weakened foundation and an 
increase in pressure gradient on the flood wall. In this scenario, the exact state of the 
flood wall might not need to be fully characterized, but if the levee’s failure state is 
imminent, the flood wall will probably fail as well (while this is a casual process, the 
model for the operator could be derived from statistics). The independent (or 
separable)  and  are not effective representations for this system. 
 
Model 5.M007 Scenario: Composite system with entanglement (subsystems 
no longer treated as separable, which can be due to correlation or simply 
incompleteness of knowledge about their behaviors) 
For a (L+W) system, the subsystems’ behaviors can be correlated and cannot 
be considered as separable. In this case, something happens to one of the 
subsystems will result in the change of the combined system. If the levee has 
been eroded, the flood wall structure can be weakened as a result. An example 
would be the failure case where the over-topping of the levee resulting in the 
erosion of the inner side of the levee, causing the tilting of the flood wall, 
increasing the probability of the catastrophic failure of the joint system, 





In this scenario, one can no longer model the joint system with separable 
probability amplitudes, as in: 
    (5.21) 
and the system must be represented in the more general form: 
      (5.22) 
In this case, , and the state vector  has four parameters and can be 
relabeled as:  
      (5.23) 
The individual components will need to be determined empirically through 
observations and measurements with similar existing systems or test systems. 
 A note of clarification:  and  are probability amplitudes, and the 
product of probability amplitudes is also a probability amplitude, since the product is 
still a component of the state vector. Only taking the square of the probability 
amplitudes will give probabilities, as prescribed by the Born Rule (see Section 4.1.1, 
Postulate 3a). Chapter 7 will revisit this concept of entanglement. ∎ 
 
The density matrix for more complex systems can also be formed with tensor 
products of the composite subsystems. Using the shorthand,  , the density 
matrix for a composite system with many subsystems can be formed according to: 
      (5.24) 
Since the HPS consisting of many (L+W) systems, the composite representation takes 
the form: 
LW = l 0 w0 00 + l 0 w1 01 + l1 w0 10 + l1 w1 11
α ij ≠ liwj LW











 (5.25)  
The above tensor product form is great if the detail knowledge and specifications 
about the individual systems and states are available, but that is often not the case.  
For example, a system with five subsystems will have 1024 matrix elements. Each 
subsystem can have multiple states. If each subsystem can be in 3 states, the system 
will have  matrix elements, and tracking them, if they are all available, can be 
daunting. Fortunately, an alternative interpretation and usage of the density matrix 
might offer a solution.  
5.1.4 Scenario: Composite systems treated as an ensemble, incorporating ignorance 
and uncertainties 
The density matrix can be interpreted in three different ways:  
• as a fundamental framework (a mathematical construct, section 4.3),  
• as a system of subsystems (subsystems can be similar or different, such as 
a flood protection system consists of a levee and a flood wall, section 
5.1.1), or  
• as an ensemble, which is a large collection of identical or near identical 
systems (e.g. a storm protection system consists of 25 identical levees is 
an ensemble of levees).  
 
Earlier scenarios made use of the first two interpretations. By taking the ensemble 
interpretation, requiring the assumption that the subsystems are in similar states, the 
density matrix representation can be simplified to only capture and track the statistical 
ρHPS = ρLAW A ⊗ ρLBW B ⊗ ρLCWC ⊗!




behaviors of the ensemble. In doing so, we sacrifice the exact knowledge of the 
individual components (no longer keeping track of every states for every subsystem) 
and just track the ensemble states: 
      (5.26) 
where the index “i” tracks not the individual (L+W) system but the state where a 
number of the (L+W) systems can be found in. The term  is the probability of 
finding (L+W) systems in the state. 
This ensemble interpretation also introduces a new perspective into the 
modeling process. Recall that for the earlier models, the composite representation 
(such as equation 5.25) is exact and complete; all available information are 
incorporated into the formulation of the density matrix. With the ensemble view, the 
composite representation is not exact and not all available information or knowledge 
are used in the formulation of the density matrix. By choice, ignorance is introduced 
into the model formulation. The term ignorance is generally referring to the lack of 
information and knowledge, an absence of awareness of missing knowledge, or it can 
also describe the state where information and knowledge are deliberately discarded or 
ignored. The ensemble interpretation leads to an incomplete description of the system, 
and in doing so, introduces uncertainty (a measure of completeness and preciseness) 
into the model. These concepts will be elaborated further in Chapter 7.  
For very complex systems, this alternative interpretation of the density matrix 
can simplify the computational complexity, but at the cost of precision (by the 





Model 5.M008 Scenario: Composite systems treated as an ensemble, 
incorporating ignorance and uncertainties 
There are 138 reaches for the New Orleans HSDRRS. The levees and flood 
walls were constructed under three projects over three different periods. For 
this example, the projects are referred to as Project A, Project B, and Project 
C. x reaches were constructed during Project A. y reaches were constructed 
during Project B. And z reaches were constructed during Project C. For 
simplicity, assume that the contractors built to the specifications and only 
consider pure state composite systems.  
 
The density matrix representing the Project A (L+W) system:  
The density matrix representing the Project B (L+W) system:  
The density matrix representing the Project C (L+W) system:  
 
The density matrix representing the HSDRRS:  
 
 
         (5.27) 







AW A LAW A + pB L
BW B LBW B + pC L
CW C LCW C
= x
138
LAW A LAW A + y
138
LBW B LBW B + z
138





Consider the four density matrices from the above four scenarios, equation 
(5.6, 5.18, 5.25, and 5.27), a trend emerges regarding the structure of the density 
matrix formalism. Statistical data from experiments and observations are collected to 
formulate physical operator models and derive probabilities for making predictions. 
The density matrix contains two sets of probabilities: the probabilities derivable from 
the probability amplitudes, the ,  terms (quantum), and the probabilities 
describing the distribution of possible states, the  terms (conventional). The first 
density matrix (Equation 5.6) utilized the least amount of statistics and probabilities, 
only the aleatory components have probability amplitudes; this is consistent with the 
notion that maximum knowledge about the system is available. As information and 
knowledge about the system became less, statistical structures are mixed in with 
quantum structures (for example, Equation 5.27); pure state representation gradually 
evolved to mixed state representations. Ignorance is incorporated into the model via 
the use of the mixed state density matrix; the risk analyst would need to make a 
conscious choice to use ensembles over tensor products, and hence potentially 
ignoring some available information in the formulation of the density matrix. Later in 
Chapter 7, this concept will be further explored and elaborated.  
Meanwhile, regardless of a density matrix’s status as pure or mixed, one can 
obtain the probabilities of the states and the expectation values of the observables 











The above scenarios illustrate that  
1. The risk states of a composite system can be represented by a density matrix. 
The density operator formalism is capable of capturing both aleatory and 
epistemic uncertainties 
2. When one possesses perfect knowledge about a system, only aleatory 
uncertainty (inherent randomness) remains. Such a system will be described 
with a pure state density matrix: 
    (5.28) 
3. If we know everything about a complex composite system, then the pure state 
density matrix has the form: 
  (5.29) 
4. When our knowledge about the system is incomplete, epistemic uncertainty, 
the uncertainty about the models and parameters, comes into play. Many states 
of incomplete knowledge exist, and they can be described with the mixed state 
density matrix.  A general mixed state composite system is given by: 
    (5.30) 
5. In the case where the subsystems are entangled (correlated), and we have 
knowledge about the composite but not the individual subsystems as they are 
entangled and not separable. The probability amplitudes cannot be expressed 
as separate products: 
ρLW = ρL ⊗ ρW = LW LW
ρHPS = ρLAW A ⊗ ρLBW B ⊗ ρLCWC ⊗!




 , where  
          (5.31) 
The numerical values for the probability amplitudes are derived from 
empirical observations and measurements. 
6. When we have a large ensemble of similar subsystems, we can choose to keep 
track of every subsystems by calculating the tensor products: 
  
         (5.32) 
Or we can choose to “ignore” a portion of our knowledge, and only track the 
ensemble distribution: 
    (5.33) 
Notice that they all share the same fundamental mixed state density matrix 
form. This is precisely the characteristics we are looking for, a coherent 
framework that can incorporate different types of uncertainty into the model. 
Furthermore, taking the ensemble perspective can simplify the computational 
complexity, but at the cost of precision (Chapter 7.1 will elaborate on this 
further).    
 
This current model is at its most rudimentary state. The model incorporated 
basic aleatory uncertainties, plus judgmental uncertainties (incomplete information + 
ensemble statistics). Epistemic uncertainties, contextual information, the physics 
LW =α 00 00 +α 01 01 +α 10 10 +α 11 11 α 00 ≠ l 0
( A)w0
( A)
ρHPS = ρLAW A ⊗ ρLBW B ⊗ ρLCWC ⊗!







models, the evolution models, and knowledge changes have not been fully captured. 
In the next section, we will show how the operator model can be used to represent all 
of these, and how these operators when applied to the state vectors and density 
matrices will alter the system probabilities.  
The epistemic uncertainty can be view as an operation that modifies the 
uncertainty of a system, resulting in a “effective” uncertainty for the system as 
a whole.  
The resulting effective probabilities, we will argue, represent an integrated expression 
of the different types of uncertainties: aleatory, epistemic, and subjective beliefs. 
5.2 Operations — Change of States 
State transitions could be due to the occurrence of external events, and they 
are modeled with operators acting on state vectors, modulating the probability 
amplitudes. In the previous section, the steady-state state vectors for the levee, the 
flood wall, and the (L+W) composite system were developed. The pure state density 
matrix precisely describes the system and portrays the aleatory randomness of the 
system. The mixed state density matrix incorporates epistemic uncertainty at the cost 
of precision but could potentially gain some computational efficiency. This section 
applies the operators to take systems from one state to another similar to conventional 
analysis where a “load” can drive a system to a new state.   
Consider the (L+W) system from the last section again, two different 
evolutionary paths could lead to different configurations. This system could be 
constructed all at once, or it could be constructed over two separate periods. In the 




water level required the increase of the levee’s height to control floods.  Instead of 
increasing the height of the levee, a flood wall was built to increase the system’s 
effective height. While their configurations might look similar, the system models 
could be quite different to account for the different evolutionary pathways they took. 
In reality, a system evolves over time and transitioning from one risk state to another.  
Let U be a unitary operator representing events or system behaviors leading to 
a change of the state vector. The system evolution is described by the operator U 
operating on the initial state vector,  , and transitioning it to a new state,  
(i.e., the “stressed” system). Mathematically, the new state is related to the old state 
according to:  
        (5.34) 
The evolution is also given by: 
   (5.35) 
The operator U contains the physics model describing how events modify the state 
vectors. Taking the ensemble interpretation, different states in the ensemble can have 
different U operators, representing different evolutionary pathways leading to 
different subsequent states. The density operator, when interpreted this way, is a sum 
of different possible outcome states due to different evolutionary paths.  
This operator concept augments how we model a system’s risk and its risk 
states (defined earlier in 4.6). The approach combines the modifications of two 
elements of the risk equation into a single operation using an operator: 1) the 
probability of finding the system in a certain state as a result of some physical 
ρ = pi
i
∑ ψ i ψ i U⎯ →⎯ piU
i




processes and events, and 2) the risk states, which constitute the modified state vector 
.  
5.2.1 Properties of Operators 
Operators represent events that can change a system in two ways.  
• First, an event can change the state of a system, but conserve the total 
number of system states.  
• Second, an event can change the state of system, but not conserve the 
total number of system states.  
The second event fundamentally change the system by collapsing it to a different 
subspace reducing the total number of system states. In such case the number of 
system states after the event is less that the number of system states before; certain 
states are no longer available or permissible for the system to transition into, such as 
the case where a destroyed flood wall for a Levee+Flood Wall (LW) system is 
deemed to be permanently irreparable. As a result, the total probability is not 
conserved with that change in the system. The final system has to be re-normalized to 
re-establish the conservation of total probability before measurements can be 
performed on the system. 
5.2.1.1 Unitary Operators. Events that only change the system states and not 
the system itself are represented by unitary operators. Unitary operators conserve 
total probability. For example, an earthen levee might gradually decompose or 
degrade over time, resulting in an increase of the system failure probability. The levee 
system itself does not change since there is no addition or subtraction of the number 




changes over time (a simple example would be that of an incandescent light bulb; the 
longer it has been on and used, the higher the chance it would fail). Such state 
changes are represented by a unitary operator U that acts on the levee state vector, 
transitioning it to a different state, as given by:  
        (5.36) 
U can be a function of time. For example, one can start with the initial state of a levee 
from the time of construction, t = 0, transitioning it to a different state at a future time 
t:  
       (5.37) 
The operator U operates on the density matrix according to: 
         (5.38) 
If an event causes a fundamental change to the system, then certain states 
might no longer available and the resulting system is therefore described by a 
different state vector. For example, a levee can be damaged by a hurricane and no 
longer work. The system is in a non-working state, , all the time. The working 
state, , is no longer available as a possibility for the levee to be found in. The new 
state vector can be constructed by performing a projection operation on the old 
system, selecting (projecting) the relevant states (in this case only ) and collapsing 
them into the new system (a new subspace) with the single new state . Once it has 
been projected into the new state, the probability amplitudes need to be renormalized 
so that the total probability equals unity.   




An example of a projection operator for the hurricane is the . The 
new state vector is therefore: 
       (5.39) 
And the final system state vector, after normalization with the “length” of , is: 
       (5.40) 
The final density matrix for the system is: 
       (5.41) 
5.2.1.2 Composite Operators. For a composite system, the composite operator 
is formed from the tensor product of the subsystem operators and operates on the 
composite system state vectors. If the operator A operates on the levee, and the 
operator B operates on the flood wall, the operator operating on the composite (L+W) 
system is the tensor product of A and B:  
         (5.42) 
which operates on the (L+W) state vector according to: 
     (5.43) 
The following shorthand notation is used for a single operator operating on one of the 
subsystems: 











A⊗B( ) LW = A⊗B( ) L ⊗ W( )
= A L ⊗BW
A LW = A⊗ I( ) L ⊗ W( )




where I is the identity operator. 
 5.2.1.3 An Example. To illustrate this concept, consider this simple example 
where an event A increased the failure probability of the levee from the initial 0.05 to 
0.10, but the failure probability of the flood wall was not affected.  Let the initial state 
vectors for L and W be: 
   (5.45) 
   (5.46) 
Since event only change the failure probability of the levee, Equation 5.44 applies to 
this case. The process on how to construct the operator A will be detailed in the 
following sections. For this example, to take the levee from the initial failure state 
(failure probability = 0.05) to the new failure state (failure probability = 0.10) 
requires A to be: 
      (5.47) 
The new state for the levee is therefore: 
   (5.48) 
As a check, the square of 0.3159 is 0.10, which corresponds to the increase of the 
failure probability to 0.10 correctly. The new state for the levee and flood wall system 
is therefore: 









































    (5.49) 
∎ 
5.2.2 Operators to Model Evolution of the System Due to Load or Time 
Operators can perform a number of functions such as simple changes to the 
probability amplitudes of the state vectors or select a particular component and 
operate on it. For a composite system, operators can selectively operate on the 
components of the system, such as when a system can function partially with semi-
working components.  
Let M be the physical model expressed with an operator that would change 
the probabilities such that the failure probabilities changes as a function of modeling 
parameters. For example, the model can represent failure probabilities as a function of 
load (akin to a fragility curve); or it can represent failure probabilities as a function of 
time (modeling gradual degradation). The state transition as a function of load is 
expressed as: 
      (5.50) 
The operator model for the HPS levee and flood wall systems assumes the 
following characteristics: 
A LW = A⊗ I( ) L ⊗ W( )

































1) The system has two states,  failure and  no failure. As the scope of this 
study is restricted to real state space (Chapter 3), a system state vector is a unit 
vector on the real plane, and observable results restricted to the first quadrant 
(Figure 9). In general, the state vector can have complex values but not here.  
 
 
Figure 9: Visualization of the system state vector on the real plane. 
 
2) The choice of the functional form of the operator reflects the nature, 
behaviors, and characteristics of the system. For a single system with two 
states, the rotation operator R can be a suitable choice to model the change of 
states. R is a unitary operator and there are other unitary operators one can 




with the unit vector pointing close to the  axis. The rotation operator R can 
rotate the state vector clockwise and counterclockwise, taking the system from 
one state to another state (Figure 10). For example, to model the increase in 
failure probability over time, the state vector rotates from the  axis towards 
the  axis, and a rotation operator R (clockwise rotation) acting on the state 
vector can take the following matrix form: 
      (5.51) 
where  is the function representing the physical behavior. 
At time t, the state of the system is given by:  
       (5.52) 
where  is a function of time.  
0












Figure 10: The operator R transition  to . 
 
3) The rotation angle, , in the rotation operator reflects the physics model and 
how it changes the probability amplitudes of the state vector and the state of 
the system. The rotation angle  encapsulates the physical model into a 
quantitative operation.  models and parametrizes the physical processes 
describing the systems behaviors, and we interpret this to represent epistemic 
uncertainties. When an operator acts on a state vector, it changes the 
probability amplitudes and therefore the probabilities of finding the system in 
the different states. Epistemic uncertainty deals with the uncertainty of the 
model and the uncertainties in the model parameters. We argue that part of the 




vector.  If there are two viable physical models (which also encapsulate 
parametric variances) A and B, each has its  function,  and . The 
difference between the  functions provides a quantitative measurement of 
the model uncertainty. This concept becomes more apparent with the mixed 
density operator formalism (see Equation 5.8, 5.9, and section 5.1.5) where 
the different states are weighted by  and   in 
. 
4) To model the individual physical behaviors and events, the rotation angle  
can take on different functional forms with different parameters (e.g. x, t), 
such as:  a) Linear (e.g. ), b) Cubic (e.g. ), c) Exponential 
(e.g. ), d) Periodic (e.g. ), e) Ratio (e.g. 
), or other functions such as sigmoid.  
5) Expectation values are calculated from the final system state after the 
application of the operator to the state vector or the density matrix (see 
Section 4.1 and 4.2 for discussion on expectation, Section 4.4.2 on expectation 
value for density operator, and 4.6 on expectations and risk values). 
 
The modeling functions for : the  functions — The rotation operator R can 
be thought of as a “dial” that turns the system from the working to the non-working 
state or vice versa. The operators change the probability of finding the system in state 
 and . For a simple 2 states system, since system starts at functioning  state, 
θ A θB
pA pB




measuring from the  axis the   angle will rotate clockwise towards the  axis. 
The physical and logical models and associated parameters, such as the probabilities 
of the physical events, are all encapsulated in the rotation angle, , embedded within 
a rotation operator.  R operates on the state vector (the aleatory part) and arrive at an 
effective uncertainty.  In the case where there are alternative models (different 
functional form of ) that can lead to the same outcome (in the case of uncertainty of 
the model itself, the epistemic part), the treatment of the different alternative models 
can be represented by the probability terms in the density operator which captures and 
represents incomplete knowledge plus expert opinions. The   term, therefore, 
represents the evolutionary profile of the probability amplitudes as a function of some 
characteristics (which the failure probability track and trace) associated with the 
system, capturing the physics driving the behaviors. The functional form of the  
term will be referred to as the  function in the models. The  function is 
constructed to model the expected evolutionary behavior of the failure probability, 
map to the rotation angle  and scale to the corresponding lower and upper bounds or 
0 and  (in Radians).   
The rotation operator in 2-dimension acting on a 2-states system takes the 
form: 
 for clockwise rotation, and 
 for counterclockwise rotation  (5.53) 















where the + and - denote clockwise and counterclockwise rotation respectively. For 
composite systems, higher dimension rotation matrices will be needed to represent the 
extended basis. For example, the (L+W) system has 4 basis states: , , , 
and , and the system can be viewed as “living” in a four-dimensional Euclidean 
space with the four basis vectors. Rotations about a point in such four-dimensional 
space are studied in Group theory, which has rotation matrices applicable for 
developing operators for the (L+W) system. The set of 4-dimensional rotation matrix 
belongs to the Special Orthogonal group of order 4, SO(4), consisting of
 
 
         (5.54) 
can be used to model the operations applicable to the composite system. In this case 
for the (L+W) system, there could be a total of 6 different rotation operators that can 
operate on the state vector. The rotation corresponds to rotating the vector with 
one of the rotating planes fixed.  
Furthermore, two types of 4-dimensional operator can be constructed for the 
composite system formed out of two 2-states subsystems. The first one represents 
operators acting on individual subsystems, and this is applicable to system in product 
R− =
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states. The second one represents operators acting on the composite system as a 
whole, and this is applicable to system in entangled states.  To form the operator for 
the first kind, individual operators for the subsystems will need to be specified, and 
then the composite operator is formed by computing the tensor product of the 
individual operators. 
  




         (5.56) 
To form the operator for the second kind, the operator is a 4-d rotation 
operator acting on the 4 components of the basis vectors with a single function and R 























































































































         (5.57) 
This research work explores the use of the rotation operator R to represent 
events acting on system states. At the simplest basic form, a simple two-dimensional 
rotation (with only two basis vectors), the operation is unitary and thus preserves the 
magnitude of the state vector. In the case with complex composite systems, the 
associated operators acting on the composite systems will be of higher dimensions, 
leading to the possibility of non-commutative operations since higher dimensional 
rotation operators do not necessarily commute with each other. In short, the order of 
application of the operators matters in the determination of the eventual state of the 
system.  
There are a number of possible interpretations for non-commutative 
operations. One can potentially model casually connected activities where the 
sequence of their occurrences can lead to different outcomes. For example, at a levee 
site, flooding before a destructive earthquake (destruction of the levee) and flooding 
after a destructive earthquake can be drastically different. Another interpretative 
application of non-commutative operations can represent incompatible events where 
R LW
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events do not share a common basis, which means the operations will act differently 
on different systems. 
5.2.3 S-curve with sigmoid function 
To construct the operators to describe the physical events and processes that 
change and alter the states of the system, one begins with the selection of the 
functional form of . For the HPS, the following failure events and failure models 
have been identified as the critical failure modes in the IPET report (2007, 2009): 
1. Pressure (P) build up on one side of the wall due to water volume. 
2. Overtopping (O) of the structures as a result of storm surges or seasonal water 
level changes. 
3. Erosion (E) due to water flow forming water fill gaps or wash-aways, both the 
front and back sides of the structure.  
4. Material (M) degradation over time, such as vegetation overgrowth on the levee 
led to the weakening of the structure, and structural degradation over time. 
5. System argumentation and repair (R), such as additional reinforce structure and 
the replacement of older or failing structures. 
6. System level changes (X), such as the catastrophic destruction of the structure 
due to hurricane. 
 
These 6 operations form a basic set for the different failure modes (see 
Figures 11 for some examples), and they can be chained together to form more 




such as erosion by overtopping. In the following discussions, “failure mode” is 
referred to the state of the system and “event” is a mechanism causing failure. 
 
 
Figure 11: Some examples of Levee + I-wall failure mechanisms and modes, adapted from 
ASCE, 2007. 
 
The choice of the functional form reflects how the system behaves. For 
example, consider the case with the pressure build up on one side of the wall due to 
water volume and flow (event). The increase of water volume on the exterior structure 









Flood Wall Failure Mechanism: Overtopping
1. Floodwater overtops the flood wall.
2. Floodwater washes levee fill away.





Flood Wall Failure Mechanism: Water-Filled Gap
Water-filled Gap near the base of the flood wall. 




pressure, which can exert lateral and vertical forces against the structure (IPET 2007, 
2009, FEMA 2012), increasing the system failure probability. Moreover, the pressure 
increase in the foundation materials beyond the soil’s strength can result in the 
shifting or lifting of the materials, displacing the above and surrounding structures, 
which further increase the probability of a foundation failure.  This building up of 
water pressure is found to lag behind the rise of the water level; the pressure effect 
trails behind other effects that trace directly with the water level (IPET, 2007). To 
construct the operator, the proper functional form must be chosen to model the 
behavior of the system. 
For this initial study, the scope will be limited to two functional forms that are 
commonly seen and observed in physical situations. One of the functional forms, the 
sigmoid function or commonly refers to as the S-curve (Figure 12), is observed in 
many physical systems, effects and events, such as dam failure probability as a 
function of external force (load) (see Figure 12 for comparison between the shape of a 
s-curve and fragility curves). Another often used functional form takes the shape of a 
Weibull curve (skewed to the right), a Gumbel curve (skewed to the left), or a 
Gamma distribution ( ), derived from curve fitting data obtained from 
observations and measurements, can be used to model environmental events such 
material degradation or river level as a function of time. Figure 13 and Figure 14 for a 
comparison between Weibull and water level. One should note the similarities of the 
shape of the curves between the hydrography and the Weibull curves, which makes 
Weibull or similar type curves suitable for modeling storm surges. Depending on the 





situation. For example, if one is interested in looking at the working/not-working state 
of a system as a function of load, the sigmoid function can be a viable choice. If one 
is interested in looking at the system’s behavior over time, such as water level, a 
Weibull function could be used.  
 
 





Figure 13: Sample hydrographs from locations surrounding the HSDRSS during a single 






Figure 14: A Weibull or similar type curves can be constructed to model water elevation over 
time. 
 
In the following example, we will illustrate the construction of the  function 
for the operator using the sigmoid function. The objective is to allow us to illustrate 
how we construct operators to model the physical effects, and how the basic concept 
and idea work.  
Recall that, to model the increase in failure probability over time, a rotation 
operator R (clockwise rotation) acting on the state vector can take the following 
matrix form: 
      (5.58) 
where  is the function representing the physical behavior. At time t, the state of the 
system is given by:  
      (5.59) 
where  is a function of time.  Let f(x) be the function modeling the change, and the 
 function for these events will share the basic common form:   











   ,    (5.60) 
where  is interpreted simply as the rotation of the state vector corresponding to the 
change event. This form models the behavior of the failure probability of an event. 
Consider the simple levee state vector , and let  be the angle 
between the state vector and the  axis, then . Recall that the probability is 
compute by taking the squared of the probability amplitude, the failure probability is 
.  If the model function is  corresponding to the failure probability function, 
then: 
   ,     (5.61) 
where  is a function modeling the failure probability of a system driven by an 
event.   
 
Model 5.M009 Scenario: Breaching of a section of I-wall due to foundation 
displacement (IPET 2007, I-45) 
The storm event begins at time t. At time t during the storm, the water level 
surged to height h ~ 10 ft. No overtopping occurred as the height of the levee 
is 15 ft. The water pressure from the surge cause significant lateral movement 
of the flood wall, resulting in catastrophic failure leading to a breach of a 
section of the wall.  
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Technically, this scenario has two operations: 1) the weakening of the 
underneath soil, increasing the failure probability, and then 2) the full hydrostatic 
pressure pushing the foundation structure, resulting in a lateral movement the I-wall 
with catastrophic failure.  The scenario example here focuses on the second stage. 
The increase of water volume on the exterior structure (water facing side) 
during storm and flow events elevate the underneath soil water pressure, which can 
exert lateral and vertical forces against the structure, increasing the system failure 
probability. Moreover, the pressure increase in the foundation materials beyond the 
soil’s strength can result in the shifting or lifting of the materials, displacing the 
above and surrounding structures, which further increase the probability of a 
foundation failure.  This building up of water pressure is found to lag behind the rise 
of the water level; the pressure effect trails behind other effects that trace directly 
with the water level (IPET, 2007, 2009). The function for the pressure operator, 
therefore, must assume a time-dependent functional form that can represent these 
physical system behaviors.  
The curve constructed using the Weibull function, given by 
 where   (5.62) 
is chosen as the function to model the profile for the expected failure probability as a 
function of time describing a system with the front water side facing the hydraulic 
pressure. Since hydrostatic pressure is proportional to the density of the fluid and the 




 The choice of the function is influence by the risk question, which in this case 
is the behavior of the system over time. The choice of using the Weibull function 
reflects how you parameterize the behavior of the system, which in case example we 
choose to parameterize the behavior as a function of the pressure (load) since it is the 
pressure that cause the lateral movement.  
Since we are interested in how the system state transition and evolve over 
time, the operator will need to be a function of time. A corresponding tracer 
parameter will need to be identify, which in this case, would be the elevation (h) of 
the river. The pressure (p) exerted by the water is directly proportional to the 
elevation, since . The time behavior of the system is therefore proportional to 
the water level over time (Figure 15).  
 
Figure 15: Time behavior of the system corresponds to the water level behavior over time. 
 




       (5.63) 
where f(t) is water height as a function of time, and the N is a normalization factor 
reflecting the intensity of the event. In the case of pressure, N could be the maximum 
water pressure the system can handle before failure. 
If one is simply asking the question about the failure probability of the levee 
as a function of pressure (load) then the sigmoid function can be used. The sigmoid 
function might be represented by a logistic function for convenience: 
         (5.64) 
is used to model the behavior of the system. In this case, risk relates to the probability 
of finding the system in a failure state, 
         (5.65) 
 
If one computes all the states corresponding to different loads, compute the 
expectations for the states, and plots out the failure probability vs. load, one 
obtains the fragility curve. ∎ 
 
5.2.4 Different event operators 
Returning to the six key system event types introduced earlier in 5.2.3, this 
section further explores the Pressure (P), Overflow (O), Erosion (E), Material (M), 
Repair (R), and Extreme (X) operators. These six operations form a basic set for the 
different failure modes, and they can be chained together to form more complex 
operations to model the many different failure conditions, such as erosion by 











overtopping. Figure 16, 17, 18, 19 and 20 from the ASCE Hurricane Katrina External 
Review Panel report (ASCE, 2007) are failure mechanisms identified to be the 
contributing factors leading to the failure of the HPS during Katrina. The function for 
these events will share the basic common form:  
   
 
.    (5.66) 
Specific operators for the following failure events and failure models will be 
developed since they are identified as the critical failure modes in the IPET report 
(IPET 2009): 
1) Pressure build up on one side of the wall due to water volume. 
2) Overtopping of the structures as a result of storm surges or seasonal water 
level changes. 
3) Erosion due to water flow forming water fill gaps or wash-aways, both the 
front and back sides of the structure.  
4) Material degradation over time, such as vegetation overgrowth on the levee 
led to the weakening of the structure, and structural degradation over time. 
5) System argumentation and repair, such as additional reinforce structure and 
the replacement of older or failing structures. 
6) System level changes, such as the catastrophic destruction of the structure due 
to hurricane. 





















Flood Wall Failure Mechanism: Soil Condition










Flood Wall Failure Mechanism: Soil Erosion from Water Seepage
Water seeping through the sand layer below the levee, 








Flood Wall Failure Mechanism: Water-Filled Gap
Water-filled Gap near the base of the flood wall. 



















Flood Wall Failure Mechanism: Overtopping
1. Floodwater overtops the flood wall.
2. Floodwater washes levee fill away.




Levee Failure Mechanism: Overtopping
1. Floodwater overtops the levee.
2. Floodwater washes levee fill away.









One should note that operators can be grouped into different types according 
to how they track and trace the temporal behaviors of the system, reflecting the 
physical evolutions over time and the effect timescales. Long timescale operators 
trace the evolution behavior of the system over its lifetime; whereas short timescale 
operators trace the behavior of the systems during short term events with short 
elapsed time. For the purpose of this research, we will focus on operators tracking a 
system’s lifetime behaviors and short timescale (days) elapsed time events.  
 
Pressure (P) - Pressure build up on one side of the wall due to water volume and flow 
(event) — Besides the basic pressure operator introduced in the last section, other 
pressure operators can be constructed to describe different event behaviors, such as 
the pressure changes over a time range. For example, seasonal patterns can be 
modeled with periodic functions, where the failure probabilities will reflect changes 
according to the periodic seasonal conditions, such as increase in failure as water 
pressure increase during rainy seasons and decrease in failure when water pressure 
decrease back to nominal as the season changes.  Furthermore, the repetitive cycles 
over the years as well as the gradual raising sea levels and the subsidence of the 
ground will result in the cumulative increase of the overall baseline failure 
probabilities; the front side water-filled gap for example, will gradually worsen over 
repeated events. As the pressure events repeats over time, one would expect the 
weakening of the physical structure. Therefore, the basal “continuum” profile will 
continue to increase over time, and the profile for the expected failure probability as a 





Figure 21: The function for P over long period of time. 
 
Overtopping (O) - Overtopping of the structures as a result of storm surges or 
seasonal water level changes (event) — Overtopping occurs when water level rises 
above the top of the structure due to some external events. Results from overtopping 
can be as simple as a localized flooding that dissipates at the end of the event, or the 
catastrophic destruction of the levee or the flood wall structure. Overtopping does not 
automatically lead to the destruction of the levee/flood wall structure but can cause 
backside structural erosions. If the height of the wall is , as long as the height of 
the water level is below it, the system will function normally. As the water level rises, 
the probability of finding the system in the not working state, the  state, increases. 
Once the water reach , the system will be in the  state as overflowing occurs 
when . However, it is important to point out that the state vector describing the 






change the system as the physical system is unchanged and still functioning. 
Overtopping changes the state of the system and not the system itself, and the state 
vector for the overtopped system is .  
The Weibull curve, or other appropriate parameterized function, can be used 
to model the profile for the expected failure probability as a function of time 
describing a system with the front side facing the raise in the water level.  The general 
functional form of the  function for the O operator: 
       (5.67) 
where  takes the form of a Weibull curve. The profile of this Weibull curve is 
chosen to trace the height of the water level against the height of the levee and/or 
flood wall structure. The exact physical dimension is not critical, only the ratio is: 
        (5.68) 
where  is the water level and  is the height of the levee and/or flood wall 
structure. This is a powerful statement. The actual physical dimensions of the levee 
and/or flood wall are not the key parameters, but the profile shape of the rise of water 
level over time is.  
The parameter shape parameters will need to be chosen appropriately to 
reflect the behaviors of the event. The parameters are chosen to reflect that: 1) the 
failure probability rise and fall symmetrically, 2) the function trace the water level 
profile, and 3) the effect track the rise of the water level directly without any lags.  















profile of the water level to the height of the structure (levee or the levee-plus-wall). 
The closer the water level to the height of the wall, the more likely that the system 
will fail, which corresponds to a higher probability of finding the system in the  
state.  
For a single overflow event, such as the rise of water level during a storm 
event, the profile would take the general form (Figure 22): 
 
Figure 22: A general profile for the function tracing the change of water level on the water 
facing side of the structure. 
 
Model 5.M010 Scenario: Overtopping of a section of a levee due to storm water 
raising above the top of the structure (IPET 2007, I-45) 
The storm event begins at time .  At time t during the storm, the water level 
surged to height h ~ 10 ft. The ratio , overtopping occurs. The 







In this simple scenario, the state of the system simply reflects the behavior of 
a system that works according to the design specifications. The risk of failure 
increases nominally, tracking the water level. After the passing of the storm, the 
system returns back to the original state.  
      (5.69) 
The O operator takes the following form 
       (5.70) 
for clockwise rotation 
      (5.71) 
∎ 
 
Erosion (E) - Erosion due to water flow forming water fill gaps or wash-aways, both 
the front and back sides of the structure (event) — Environmental erosions can be due 
to many factors and the type of structural design can affect the erosion scenarios and 
erosion rates. This study focuses on the water-filled gap and under-the-structure 
seepage (IPET, 2007, I-45). Erosion events can be the result of the nominal water 
flow on the water facing side, leading to the formation of the water-filled gap, or 
water seepage under the structure resulting in the weakening of the foundation at the 
backside, or the overtopping event, which can lead to the backside erosion of the 
levee. Under certain circumstances the erosion event can be catastrophic resulting in 
the destruction of the entire structure. For this study the seepage ( ), the front side 











( ) and the back side ( ) failure modes are modeled to trace the soil behaviors 
over time. Since the systems are subjected to repeated events over time, the gap 
conditions are modeled to gradually worsen for long term behaviors.  
Front side ( )  — The exponential curve is chosen as the function to model 
the profiles for the erosion event for the front side (water facing side). The initial 
erosion of the levee should be coarsely proportional to the flow volume, flow rate, 
and other factors such as vegetative growth and seasonal weather variations. The 
magnitudes of the front side erosion events are assumed to be smoothed out over a 
long timescale.  The profile to represent erosion would behave initially as simple 
linear growth; however, once substantial erosion occurred to the structure past certain 
threshold, the structural deterioration would accelerate (such as in the case where the 
erosion opens up the foundation, increasing the chance of a structural displacement), 
and the failure probability will grow exponentially (Figure 23).  The adoption of this 
simple function reflects a choice of timescale and the granularity of types of event 
under considerations, including with it a choice of the degree of ignorance. In 
choosing the simple function, the individual short timescale events are ignored, while 
long term systemic events dominate and drive the evolutionary behaviors. This maps 
to the behavior of the water-filled gap which will gradually worsen over time and the 






Figure 23: The function for  . 
The general functional form of the  function for the  operator: 
      (5.72) 
where f(t) is an exponential function. 
Back side ( )  — The basic behavior for the back side erosion event is 
similar to that of the front side, except the fact that the triggering point is not the 
water flow/storm surge, but the overflow event and seepage. One can argue that there 
are two components for this, once is the basal low level small magnitude erosion due 
to seepage, and then a more rapid larger magnitude erosion as a result of the 
overtopping event.  The curve will have a profile of a raised basal level and then a 
rapid exponential rise at the time when overtopping begins. 
The general functional form of the  function for the  operator: 
Time
f(t)











     (5.73) 
where f(t) is a two-stage function, where the first stage reflects the design of the 
drainage condition on the land side, and the second stage is the exponential behavior 
for the erosion event.   
 
 
Figure 24: The function for  . 
Seepage ( )  — Seepage is a long-term event where the land side soil is 
weakened over time as a result of water seeping through below the sand underneath 
the levee, building up pressure on the land side of the structure causing the near 
service earthen structure to crack. Water flows through the cracks resulting in soil 
erosion, gradually weakens the levee. This is being modeled with a simple linear 



















Figure 25: The function for  . 
The general functional form of the  function for the  operator: 
      (5.74) 
where f(t) is a simple linear function.    
The E operator takes the following form: 
       (5.75) 
for clockwise rotation. However, in this case, since erosion is a one way process, the 
 does not represent any real physical operations. 
      (5.76) 
where 























Model 5.M011 Scenario: Front side erosion resulting in seepage and the erosion of 
the back side (IPET 2007, I-45) 
 
This is a simple example of the combination of the 3 erosion operators in this 
order: . More about the construction of multi-steps operation will be 
discussed in section 5.2.4. Note that the order of the operation is significant since 
matrix operations do not necessary commute. In this scenario, the water facing front 
side erodes over time, resulting in cracks in the soil substructure, allowing water to 
seep through to the back side of the structure, resulting in the erosion of the back side. 
Also note that there is a time lag between the front side erosion and the back side. ∎ 
 
General material and structure Fatigue (M) - Material degradation over time, such 
as vegetation overgrowth on the levee led to the weakening of the structure, and 
structural degradation over time (lifetime) — General material fatigue happens when 
a material is subjected to cyclic loading over period of times, resulting in the 
weakening of the materials. Typically, the material fatigue curves are modeled with a 
variety of distribution functions, such as the log-normal, the extreme value, 
Birnbaum-Saunders, and the Weibull distribution. In the present analysis, we are 
interested in modeling how the material fatigue changes the failure probabilities over 
time, and not the failure rate (normally defined as the total number of failures in a 
population over time) and the hazard rate.   
In choosing the  function, the physical system determines the choice of the 




to the first order. For the levee and flood wall systems, the number of systems failing 
over time increase exponentially and a simple exponential function can be considered 
for modeling the change of the failure probability.  In this case, we will use an 
exponential grow function to represent the grow of the failure probability. There 
could be other degradation mechanisms as well, and one would build those models 
into the function. Given that these type of material and structural do not occur 
overnight, this is considered as a lifetime event. 
If the failure probably grows exponentially over time, then the change 
function takes the form of an exponential function: 
        (5.78) 
where t is the time since construction and k is the growth constant, then the general 
functional form of the  function for the M operator can be expressed as: 
      (5.79) 
where the denominator  is the expected failure at the end of life. The ratio 
 is the normalization of the change against the expected end of life rate. 
Figure 26 plotted the  function over time with different growth constants.   
 

















Figure 26: The function for M. 
 
Model 5.M012 Scenario: Vegetation on levee, resulting in structural cracks over time 
(IPET 2007, I-45) 
 
The state of the system simply reflects the material degradation over time as a result 
of vegetative growth. The degradation traces an exponential profile: 
      (5.80) 
The M operator takes the following form: 
       (5.81) 
for clockwise rotation, where 















Similar to the case of erosion, since material degradation is a one-way process, the 
 does not represent any real physical operations. ∎ 
 
Repairs (R) - System argumentation and repair, such as additional reinforce structure 
and the replacement of older or failing structures — The HPS system was 
constructed in multiple phases, with additional reinforce structures (e.g. I-wall) added 
on top of existing structure, and some failed structure replaced with new ones.  These 
types of events can either be a “reset” of the system, which can be modeled with a 
unitary operation, or a fundamental change in the system. If the operation is simply a 
repair of an existing component of a system, the unitary operation acts as “turning the 
dial back” for the system, rotating the particular component of the state vector back to 
the  state. For example, if the I-wall was damaged by a storm and was 
subsequently repaired, since the component was already captured in the state vector, 
the repair operator would reset that component back to the initial working state.  
The R operator takes the following form if there is no fundamental changes to 
the system itself and just a reset to the initial states: 
       (5.83) 
for counterclockwise rotation.  
In our convention, repair operation reverts the system back to the initial 
operational state, which means the operation will rotate the state vector towards the 
 state, a counterclockwise rotation. The  function for the R operator is simply the 





Model 5.M013 Scenario: The repair of a levee. 
Repair work was done to repair a levee.  
 
At time  , the levee is in a failing state, with a 90% chance of failure, 
. Assuming that the initial state of the system is . The 
repair resets the system back to the initial state, corresponding to 
. Note:  is in Radians, and negative sign means the rotation is 
counterclockwise. 
    ∎   (5.84) 
 
For a fundamental change in the system, the events are modeled not with a 
unitary operator but with either a projection operator for a system with a reduction of 
states, or with the tensor product if the event resulted in the construction of a new 
system, such as the addition of a flood wall on top of a levee.  
If the repair results in the fundamental change of the system, such as a) the 
removal of a component, or b) the addition of a component, then the repair operation 
should be represented by:  
a) a projection operator: , or  
b) a tensor product:  
 
Model 5.M014 Scenario: An existing levee is retrofitted with a new flood wall 
sinθt = 0.9( )
1
2 sinθ0 = 0.05( )
1
2




The levee was built at time  , and a flood wall was built on top of the levee 
at a later time .  
 
To model the state of the composite system at time  requires a two stage 
process. The first stage is to bring the state of the levee from  to , and the second 
stage is to perform the tensor product to form the new composite system. Assuming 
that the levee went through a simple material degradation process from  to , the 
state of the levee at  is given by: 
       (5.85) 
Then the final composite system is formed by taking the tensor product of the levee 
and the flood wall: 
   ∎   (5.86) 
 
Extreme events such as earthquake or hurricane (X) - System level changes, such as 
the catastrophic destruction of the structure due to hurricane — Extreme or rare 
events, like hurricanes and earthquakes, can fundamentally alter the state 
compositions of the system. In the case of a catastrophic event, where the system is 
completely destroyed, the probability of finding the system in the  state is zero. 
The general state vector representation of the system will no longer include the  
basis state, since it is no longer a real option. Instead of the rotation operator, the 




possible states.  For events that alter the system itself, we can model them with 
projectors to project the system to the end state (such as the complete destruction of 
the system): . For a single system, it will simply be the 
 projector. For a composite system with 2 subsystems, it could be the , 
, , or I (the identity operator, where nothing changed).  
 
Model 4.3.M015 Scenario: A levee was breached and destroyed. 
For an event that alter a single system, the projector  project the 
system to the end state (such as the complete destruction of the system), and the 
matrix form of it is:  
        (5.87) 
One should also note that X is not unitary as this operation is fundamentally 
changing the system. Unitary matrix preserves the system, and thus preserve the law 
of conservation or total probability. By changing the system, total probability cannot 
be conserved, which account for the fact that we will need to re-normalized the new 
system to re-establish the conservation of total probability.  





5.2.5 Applying the Operators to the Composite System 
The “basic” operators were introduced above as building blocks to support the 
modeling of the HPS. An actual event is often formed out of a combination of these 
basic building blocks, changing the system from one state to another. Consider the 
example of the overtopping of a levee during Katrina. The breaching event is the end 
result corresponding to the end state for the system. A number of events occurred to 
take the system from one state to another, and finally to the end state. In this example, 
the breaching was the result of the following chain of events: (i) gradual degradation 
of the levee structure (E), model with a sigmoid function, and (ii) overtopping (O), 
model with a Weibull function. 
The modeling of an event or a chain of complex events over time with the 
operators, therefore, follows this event chain construction workflow: 
1) Construct the event operator  from the unit operators, such as . 
The grouping rule is that composite operations can be formed only if they are 
occurring during the same time intervals where the state transition occurs. An 
event such as a hurricane can be a collection of different individual events, as 
determined by the periods of occurrence. 
2) Construct other event operators based on various knowledge, including 
historical context: , , , … 
3) Based on historical knowledge, construct event chain , where 
n is the nth event, which describe the change of the system states over time. 
4) Construct risk evaluation scenarios based on the event chain, add knowledge- 




questions can be asked about the system at different times. 
5) Evolve the system to the desired time based on the event chains. Compute 
projectors at the end of the evolution. 
6) Compute the probabilities from the state vector or the density matrix. 
 
Applying operators to a composite system: Pure States — Operators formed from the 
tensor products of individual subsystem operators work great if the system is 
factorable into individual product states. In this case we have maximum knowledge 
about the make-up of the system. To form the tensor product, we need to know the 
individual operations applicable to the individual subsystems. The resulting 
composite operator therefore will track the individual operations. In the case where 
there exist correlations between the subsystems, or that we don’t have full knowledge 
of how the individual subsystem works, tensor product-based operators cannot be 
formed. While it presents limitation as to how much we know about the individual 
states of the subsystems, we can still have operators working on the joint system, 
accepting our ignorance about the system’s inner working.  
The composite operator acting on the pure state vector for the (L+W) system 
can be expressed as: 
         (5.89) 
Recall from earlier that the composite system is constructed from the tensor product 
of the individual subsystems: 
       (5.90) 
and the composite operator is the tensor product of the operators for the subsystems: 
LW2 = HLW LW1




       (5.91) 
The density operator representation for the composite system can be formed from 
tensor product of the subsystems, and the operator acts on the density matrix 
according to: 
       (5.92) 
This pure state representation of the (L+W) composite system require us to 
have all the information about the different subsystems that make up the composite 
system, and furthermore, in order for this model to work all parameters must be 
tracked. The operator acting on this density matrix will be formed also from tensor 
products of all the individual operators acting on the individual subsystems.   
 
Model 5.M017 Scenario: Applying the H operator on the (L+W) composite 
system  
 
A levee was constructed first. After 25 years, the levee was degraded by 
vegetation and has a 50/50 chance of failure. A flood wall was installed then, 
with an intrinsic failure probability of 1%. A storm event resulted in erosion 
on the front side of the levee, creating a water gap. The state vector 
describing this composite system is given by: 
 
    (5.93) 
   (5.94) 





A = l0, 0
A 0 + l0,1
A 1 = 0.5 0 + 0.5 1
W0
A = w0, 0
A 0 + w0,1





Recall that the state vector and the density matrix for the (L+W) composite 
system are given by:  
 
         (5.95) 
  (5.96) 
The above gives the state of the system right before the storm event. After the 
storm event, the levee was eroded and a water gap was formed, resulting in an 
increase of failure probability for the system. The transition operator: 
  


































































































0.0707 0.7036 0.0707 0.7036( )
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0.0049 0.0497 0.0049 0.0497
0.0497 0.4951 0.0497 0.4951
0.0049 0.0497 0.0049 0.0497
















    (5.97) 
 
For this example, we assume that the  function is a simple Weibull function. 
To transition the system to the state after the storm event, the transition operator is 
applied on the density matrix: 
       (5.98) 
The above operation can be generalized to the HPS consist of many different 
(L+W) subsystems, A, B, C, …: 
      (5.99) 
For example, the HPS can be represented as: 
 
         (5.100) 
The corresponding operator is constructed with tensor products of the 
subsystem operators: 
     (5.101) 
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HLW = HL ⊗HW














cosθ 0 sinθ 0
0 cosθ 0 sinθ
−sinθ 0 cosθ 0













ρLW ' = HLWρLWH
†
LW
ρN = ρ A⊗ ρ B ⊗ ρC ⊗!






















Applying operators to a composite system: Mixed States — If there are more than one 
possible state for the composite (L+W) system at a given time, then the system has to 
be represented by the mixed state density operator:  
   
 
   (5.102) 
The density operator representation for the composite system can be formed 
from tensor product of the subsystems, and operator acts on the density matrix 
according to: 
       (5.103) 
 
Model 4.3.M018 Scenario: Applying the H operator on a mixed state (L+W) 
composite system - in the case where the knowledge about the system state is 
limited 
 
Consider the scenario from the previous model. Assuming that we do not have 
full knowledge of the degree of erosion, and there is a 30% chance that the 
erosion is more severe than the standard model.  
 
In this scenario, the system in question has two possible states, but definitive 
knowledge is not available about the exact state the system is in. Hence, the system 
can only be described by a mixed state density matrix. 
  













The state transition equation becomes: 
  
         (5.105) 
∎ 
 
Model 4.3.M019 Scenario: Applying the H operator on a mixed state 
ensemble (L+W) composite system, with 10 (L+W) subsystems forming the 
ensemble 
 
Consider the scenario from the previous model. Assuming that the HPS 
consists of 10 (L+W) subsystems. 3 out of the 10 subsystems were eroded 
more severely than the rest due to the geographic locations. The 3 subsystems 
are found to be in identical erosion state.  
 
In this scenario, the HPS is a single system comprised of 10 subsystems. 
While it is perfectly fine to construct a state vector of the entire system via 10 tensor 
products, we can also treat the system as an ensemble of subsystems. Instead of 
tracking individual states of the subsystems, we can choose to ignore the individual 
characteristics and focus on the statistical characteristics of the ensemble. The system 
can be described by a density matrix: 
	∎ (5.106) 
This has the identical form as the earlier mixed state density matrix. The 
similarity in form is a reflection of the incorporation of ignorance when we chose to 
ρLW ' = 0.7HLW L1W1 L1W1 H
†









ignore individual characteristics and adopt the ensemble viewpoint. The 2 scenarios 
are a reflection of incomplete knowledge. The density matrix can represent two 
different possible system configurations. 
 
Summary — In this and the last sections, the framework to represent the risk states 
with state vectors and density operators was developed, and operators were developed 
to describe the change of states of a system. Complex events can be modeled with 
sequences of operators, and the non-commutative nature of the operation preserves 
the ordering of events. Regardless of the degree of completeness of knowledge, a 
system can be represented by the density matrix framework, in pure state or mixed 
states, incorporating statistical knowledge as well as ignorance into the fold, 
incorporating different types of uncertainties in a unifying structure. 
The density operator is an effective tool to represent system when we do have 
complete knowledge. The density matrix is great to describe: 1) an ensemble, 2) 
system formed from subsystems, 3) fundamental. In the last section, two different 
types of operators that operate on composite systems were presented. Operators 
formed from the tensor products of individual subsystem operators work great if the 
system is factorable into individual product states, since in this case we have 
maximum knowledge about the make-up of the system. To form the tensor product, 
we need to know the individual operations applicable to the individual subsystems. 
The operator therefore can track the individual operations.  
In the case where there exist correlations between the subsystems, or that we 




based operators cannot be formed. While it presents limitation as to how much we 
know about the individual states of the subsystems, we can still have operators 






Chapter 6:  Fragility, Epistemic Probability, and Event Trees 
 
Knowledge about risk is knowledge about lack of knowledge.  
- Hansson 2014 
 
In the previous chapter a basic quantum model was developed for a simple 
storm protection system for the overtopping scenario under environmental conditions 
that change over time. In this chapter we explore this quantum model on how it 
produces two commonly used PRA products: fragility curves and event trees. The 
resulting products will be compared and contrasted with the current risk assessment 
approaches. 
6.1 Fragility Curves from State Vectors 
“Fragility curves are functions that describe the conditional 
probability of system failure over the full range of loads to which 
that system might be exposed. In contrast to nominal failure 
probabilities estimated from reliability indices, fragility curves 
provide a richer, much more comprehensive perspective on system 
reliability because they are functions rather than points and 
because they are interpreted in terms of absolute probabilities 
rather than nominal probabilities, implying knowledge of the 
underlying probability distributions.”  
— Schultz et al. 2010. 
 
The use of fragility curves in representing failure probabilities is common in 
dam safety studies (Schultz et al., 2010). A typical workflow in dam risk evaluation 
begins with the generation of fragility curves to model the engineering system. Often, 
a family of fragility curves is produced for a range of confidence intervals, 




envelope to quantify uncertainties for the different engineering risk model scenarios. 
Here, using the quantum model, the equivalents to fragility curves are produced from 
the overtopping scenario for the system. The resulting products are then compared 
and contrasted with the current approach using fragility curves for risk assessments. 
Generating a fragility curve — a fragility curve usually plots the failure 
probability as a function of some independent variable (or parameter) such as load 
and time. To generate a fragility curve from the quantum models, one starts with the 
initial state vector. Each point on a fragility curve is a projection of a state from a 
state vector. The points for the fragility curve are obtained directly from the 
projections of all system states over the range of the independent parameter. The 
system states are derived from operators acting on the state vector, transitioning it 
from states to states. The operators represent the physics models that alter the state 
vector resulting in a change of the dependent variable, in this case the probability 
amplitudes. The collection of all the failure probabilities from the states forms the 
fragility curve.  
To generate the fragility curve, one begins with the initial state vector, 
projects out the failure probability, transitions the system to the next state with 
operators, projects out the failure probability, and repeats. Let  be the initial state 
vector for a system as before with  and  as the basis states, and H be the load 
operator that is a function of the load parameter, . Consider the simplest scenario 
where the ith state of the system is given by: 




the ith failure probability is obtained from the projector :  
       (6.2) 
Since operators represent the physical models, different fragility curves can be 
constructed with different operators with different underlying physical models. If a 
system has three different failure modes A, B, and C represented by the operators, A, 
B, and C. Each will be described by its own vector equation: 
           (6.3) 
The collection of the failure probabilities from all the possible states for a given mode, 
e.g. A, becomes a fragility curve, and different failure modes (A, B, and C) produce 
different fragility curves (Figure 27). 
 
 
Figure 27: Fragility curves produced by different failure mode operators. Each curve 
corresponds to a different failure mode. 
 
Pi 0( ) = Li 0 0 Li
Lf = A Li
Lf = B Li




On aleatory and epistemic uncertainties — The state vector itself contains the 
aleatory components, the and , intrinsic to the system: 
          (6.4) 
and they are not a function of the independent parameters, such as load and time. 
However, the operators contain the physical models that can alter the probability 
amplitudes of the state vector, and they are functions of the independent parameters. 
Thus, operators play a role in the modeling and representing epistemic uncertainties. 
Whereas in conventional approaches, families of fragility curves corresponding to 
probability distributions (e.g. PDFs) are used to model epistemic uncertainties, the 
quantum framework models epistemic uncertainties directly with the construction of 
operator sets to generate the families of curves. Chapter 7 will further detail and 
explore how epistemic uncertainties are represented by the quantum objects, the state 
vectors, the operators, and the density operator.  
The operator sets can be constructed in a number of ways, depending on the 
availability, the breadth, and depth of contextual knowledge. Contextual knowledge, 
such as how one formulates the risk question, influence the choice of the 
measurement parameters as well as the type of operators. In previous chapter, the 
rotation operator was chosen to model the state transition for the and  basis, but 
other operators can be selected for other problem formulations based on the nature of 
the basis.  An operator set can be based entirely on physics, in which different 
operators represent different or sometimes competing physical processes (e.g. 
different failure modes), or it can be empirically based on observational data and 





measurements via curve fitting functions, or it can be based on expert opinions and 
contextual knowledge. 
The conventional spread of fragility curves for a given loading reflects the 
epistemic characteristics and properties of the problem, where the family of fragility 
curves is produced from statistical distributions or confidence intervals. With the 
quantum approach, the state vectors reflect the understanding of the number of 
possible states the system possesses. The operators replace the conventional statistical 
based approach to produce the family of fragility curves. Each fragility curve is the 
product of the application of models representing physical processes, workflows, or 
system behaviors. The epistemic uncertainty corresponds to the range of the 
operators; the lack of precise knowledge about the states and their behaviors will 
result in a collection of different operator sets. Chapter 7 will provide examples to 
further illustrate and explore this perspective. 
The quantum approach converts the conventional fragility curves into a 
measurement of the different population of states and how those states evolve.  This 
characteristic opens up many new possibilities, such as a different approach in the 
computation of the total failure probability for a complex system with many different 
failure modes; a topic to be developed further in Chapter 9. From a different 
perspective, this can be viewed as another way to measure the number of states and 
track their behaviors, which can potentially lead to other concepts such as entropy, 
which characterize of the microstates of a system. The connection to entropy concepts 




6.2 Event Trees from Tensor Products 
The event tree and other related network tree methodologies are commonly 
used PRA techniques. A description of event tree logic and structure can be found in 
Appendix A.3.2. In brief, an event tree is an inductive logical and chronological 
decomposition of an event into a progressive series of events leading to some 
subsequent outcomes, consequences, or end states. The decomposed events, system 
elements, and steps are represented as a branching tree graph or flowchart, and 
Boolean logic serves as the connectors or nodes between them.  Probabilities for the 
chance of occurrences of the events can be associated with the nodes. Each event tree 
represents different scenarios formulated by the risk analysts to describe the various 
event paths leading to various outcomes. The event tree itself is usually the output 
product from the PRA modeling process and from which numerical values of risk 
events probabilities are computed.  
The quantum framework can also generate event trees. The basic event tree 
leaf nodes can be generated from the tensor products when forming the composite 
system model. Since the output from the tensor product is a state vector, operators can 
act on it to model a variety of scenarios and system behaviors; operators make the 
model a “living” (i.e. dynamic) event tree that can evolve in time.  
Consider the following model for two concurrent failure modes E (erosion) 
and O (overtopping), introduced in Sections 5.2.3, 5.2.4. Failure modes E and O are 
considered as independent from each other: E is a function of time, O is a function of 
the height of the levee.  A system that is subjected to these failure modes, concurrent 




    (6.5) 
    (6.6) 
 
Since E and O are independent, the subsystems are not correlated. The 
probability amplitudes are separable and can be factorized into separate products, and 
the subsystems are not correlated. The state vector  is equivalent to the regular 
binary event tree (Figure 28). 
 
 
Figure 28: The binary event tree a system with independent E and O failure modes. 
 
The probabilities can be obtained via the projection operator P on the density 




from the state vector  (Equation 6.5) or from the density matrix , 
one obtains: 
     (6.7) 
     (6.8) 
     (6.9) 
     (6.10) 
 
The binary event tree outcome is now contained within the state vector ! 
6.3 Discussion 
In the above two case examples — the reproduction of the fragility curves and 
the construction of the leaf results from the event tree — important properties of the 
quantum model emerge: 
1) The quantum state vector becomes the fundamental object for describing risk 
in an engineering system for risk studies.  
The first case example demonstrated how one can generate conventional risk 
analysis diagnostic tools, the fragility curves, from the state vectors. The use of the 
state vector representation recast the problem in a different way, connecting it to a 
new set of tools and opening up new possibilities and perspectives. In the example, 
the fragility curves are products from the application of operators and projectors to 
alter the probabilities based on engineering model; these new tools introduce dynamic 
elements into the modeling process.  
2) The quantum operators model the various behaviors of the system, and by 
operating on the state vectors change the system states.   
P 00( ) = tr ρL 00 00( ) = e0o0( )2 = P E( )P O( )
P 01( ) = tr ρL 01 01( ) = e0o1( )2 = P E( )P !O( )
P 10( ) = tr ρL 10 10( ) = e1o0( )2 = P !E( )P O( )




Using the density operator representation, we can investigate new ways to 
compute the total probability of failure for a complex system with many different 
failure modes, such as independent or concurrent failure modes. Calculating the total 
failure probability for engineering systems with multiple failure modes, especially if 
they can occur simultaneously and not mutually exclusive or not independent, can be 
challenging. Simple linear additive combinations of the failure mode probabilities can 
only be applicable under a restrictive set of conditions. Often assumptions and 
approximations have to be made to combine the probabilities and obtain usable total 
probabilities.  
When the assumptions and approximations no longer hold true, the law of 
probability can be violated, and in certain cases the total probability can be greater 
than 1.  As we approach the limits of the approximations, total probability calculated 
from the application of conventional probability rules can lead to inconsistent and 
incorrect results, such as the value of the total probability exceed unity (>1), violating 
the basic conservation of probability, leading to the mis-estimation of risk. The 
concept of re-normalization was introduced to address this problem. However, the 
validity of this approach has been questioned by some as it is seen more as a 
mathematical manipulation than basing off from sound principles and engineering 
methods. The quantum framework can provide an alternative framework to support 
investigation from a different direction. This topic will be explored further in Chapter 
9. 
3) Various information extract from the state vectors via projections give results 




scenarios for evaluation and investigations, supporting risk-informed 
decisions.  
 In the second example, the event tree, conventional approach has one set up 
and configured the event tree based on available information and knowledge. Once 
the tree is set, only a few operations can be performed on it without requiring a 
revision of the tree; for example, when the environment and properties change, one 
will need to rebuild the tree. For a static world, that approach will be more than 
sufficient. However, the notion of risk analysis and assessment is about looking at 
systems in dynamic settings. Dynamic treatments using event trees can be 
complicated, requiring regular updates and modifications to the tree structures. New 
techniques such as Bayesian updates and dynamic decision/event trees are promising, 
but the quantum framework can potentially offer an alternative starting point. With 
the quantum framework, the event tree can be automatically built from the 
construction of the system state vectors using tensor product. The resulting state 
vector becomes the starting point, packing extensive amount of information within 
the object itself, ready for further operations to evolve the system.  
Both of these rudimentary examples affirm the notion that with the adoption 
of a different probability theory in the representation of an engineering system and the 
associated uncertainties, we are not just changing how the systems are represented, 
but also the types of operation and toolset that can be used to model the problem. 
Before using these new tools to model the HPS, in the next Chapter the density 
operator approach will be examined from the perspective of how the interpretation of 




Chapter 7:  Interpreting the Quantum Framework 
 
 
[…] Willful ignorance is the central concept that underlies 
mathematical probability. In a nutshell, the idea is to deal 
effectively with an uncertain situation, we must filter out, or ignore, 
much of what we know about it. In short, we must simplify our 
conceptions by reducing ambiguity.  
- Herbert Weisberg 2014 
 
Many methodologies, techniques, and frameworks have been developed over 
the years to customize the treatment for the different types of uncertainty. Often, the 
different types of uncertainty require separate and specialized framework to address 
problem specific conditions. Quantum probability with density operator framework 
offers yet another approach; however, using the quantum density operator formalism 
to describe a system, the terms in the density matrix are mapped and interpreted as 
different types of uncertainties, bringing them under a single framework.  The density 
matrix formalism recognizes the reality that these uncertainties are not isolated, and 
they do connect and relate to each other in some ways, changing a system’s uncertain 
states. For example, a system’s intrinsic aleatory uncertainty itself might not change, 
the application of a state transition or transformation operator can alter the system’s 




The density operator formalism is a system model framework that can capture 
the effective uncertainty for the system. The numerical probabilities calculated from 
the density matrix represent effective uncertainties associated with a system, 
reflecting the dynamic changes and evolutions of the system states. The probability 
term,  , provides a mechanism to encode ignorance into the mathematical model. 
Not only does it allow us to reflect incomplete knowledge, the construction of the 
probability term can itself be a process to weight subjective judgement and belief. 
Lastly, since the  term follow conventional statistical probability, conventional 
probability operations can be applied to it, such as Bayesian updates. The robustness 
of the quantum framework can open up new paths to model risks and uncertainties. 
The quantum framework adds the following to the risk analyst’s toolkit: 
• Additional dimensions for capturing contextual information and knowledge are 
incorporated and extend beyond the conventional statistical and probabilistic 
frameworks; contextual information and knowledge are directly captured in the 
mathematical structure. 
• The operator algebra captures knowledge, and particularly information about 
sequential operations, which is possible due to the non-commutative nature of 
the mathematical structure; this, in addition, aids the modeling of event driven 
scenarios. 
• System models can dynamically evolve via projective measurements. Instead of 
building new models or creating time bins, the quantum models have the 
dynamics built into system models. Instead of traditional Boolean logic and 




their sequence of operations can provide more robust means to select and alter 
the timelines. 
• Finally, the quantum framework provides a mechanism to address the notion of 
dealing with unknown-unknowns. The uncertainty about a system model is 
limited by our knowledge. We cannot be totally certain about the validity of a 
model given that we do not know what we do not know! In this framework, we 
acknowledge that we do not truly quantify the uncertainties about the models, 
but only the effective uncertainties. The effective uncertainties, in turn, provide 
a quantitative measure. We can compare the effective uncertainties against 
observations, and while we do not fully quantify the model itself, we can 
quantify its effects on the uncertainties. Analyzing and comparing the effective 
uncertainties against observations, one can potentially yield information that 
can be used to update and refine the model, a Bayesian like approach!  
 
To analyze a problem, a model has to be instantiated with boundary conditions 
and parameters based on the physical situations. The various mathematical elements 
of the model must be interpreted so that they can be mapped to the parameters. This 
rest of this chapter will focus on interpreting the quantum framework in terms of 
uncertainty and risk.  
7.1 The Quantum Engineering System and Risk 
We define a quantum engineering system as one exhibiting properties as 
defined by the following postulates: 




described by quantum probability. 
a. They are “quantum-like” system with characteristics similar to 
physical quantum systems, following similar mathematical structures, 
but they are not quantum mechanical systems as in subatomic particle 
physics. 
2. The states of the system are represented by state vectors, or in a more general 
equivalent formulation, the density operator. 
a. The fundamental aleatory uncertainties about the system states are 
contained within the state vectors in the form of probability amplitudes 
and the superpositions of the basis states. The individual state vector is 
pure. 
b. The system’s epistemic uncertainties from the physics models are 
captured in, quantified by, and modulated with operators acting on the 
state vectors. The resulting uncertainties determined from the system 
model represent effective uncertainties for the system as a whole. 
3. Different forms of epistemic uncertainties are captured by the probability 
terms  in the density matrix, interpreted as statistical ensemble of possible 
system states, a mixture formed from pure states. 
4. Subjective beliefs and expert opinions can be incorporated into the density 
matrix, using the probabilities as weighting functions.  
 
As stated in Section 4.6, an engineering system can be found in different 




combination of the basis states the system can be found in. The collection of these 
state vectors forms the engineering system and can be expressed in the form of the 
density operator: 
   .    (7.1) 
Composite systems are assembled from the tensor products of the state vectors 
or density operators. The probability of finding the system in a particular state is the 
squared of the probability amplitudes of the state vectors or from the trace of the 
density matrix. The engineering system evolves according to events, which are 
represented by mathematical operators acting on the state vectors, and the transition 
of the system from states to states are given by: 
     (7.2) 
Complex system models can be constructed from combining components and 
subsystems together via their tensor products, a process that aligns well with basic 
system engineering principles in the decomposition and construction of an 
engineering system. The engineering system evolves in time, transitioning from states 
to states, and the mathematical abstractions representing the transitions are the event 
operators.   
The operator representation allows the tracking of the order of the events, 
since matrix operations are non-commutative. The sequence of operations and their 
ordering matters, which is a property of changing to the matrix mathematical 
representations. The operator can change the state of the system without modifying 
the system, or the operator can change the state of the system by changing the system 
ρ = pi
i
∑ ψ i ψ i
ρS ' = UρSU
† = piU
i




itself. Since the density operator represent the system, different operations on it can 
also extract different information about the system. The projection operator or the 
reduced density operator (a “subarray” of the density operator), for example, “selects” 
particular properties of the system and can be interpreted as making a measurement to 
“obtain the answer to the question.” These characteristics align well with what are 
observed in real systems. The density operator provides a general purpose 
mathematical framework to model and extract information from complex interacting 
systems, whether one possess full knowledge or partial knowledge about the system. 
The density operator provides a quantitative representation of knowledge, 
ignorance, and uncertainty for a system. When full knowledge about a system is 
available, the full tensor product can be formed. The density operator from the full 
tensor product is an exact representation of the system, a pure state density operator 
(more on this in the next section). Achieving this precision requires the incurring of 
high computational cost associated with the tracking of large data volume and the 
increase in computation complexity. The purity of the state comes at the cost of the 
need for deep knowledge acquisition, which may or may not be possible depending 
on the situation. A trade off can be made where, by ignoring some of the knowledge 
(either do not have them or choose not to incorporate them), computation efficiency 
can be reclaimed at the cost of introducing or increasing uncertainties, which leads to 
the mixed states representation of the system. Pure states and mixed states are 
indications of the degree knowledge and uncertainty we have about the system.  The 
different formulations of the density matrix allow the adaptation of this mathematical 




7.2 The Interpretation of the Pure and Mixed States 
In the context of this study, whether a system is in a pure state or a mixed state 
is a function of how much knowledge and how precisely does one know about the 
system at a given time.  
A system is in a pure state when complete and precise knowledge about it is 
available and known, such as right after the preparation and construction of a levee 
system, or after an observation and measurement. At that time, knowledge about the 
system is complete to the degree limited by the aleatory uncertainty. We have 
maximum knowledge on the states of the system, and the uncertainties about its 
performance and reliability are strictly based on the intrinsic stochastic uncertainties. 
If a levee has an intrinsic failure probability of 0.1 due to craftsmanship, materials, 
etc, then there is a 10% chance of finding the system in a failing state based on just 
this intrinsic failure probability. 
A pure state system is one that we possess full knowledge about the system, 
and we can continue to track and trace the changes of the system going forward. As 
long as the evolution of the system can be measured and tracked, the system stays 
pure over time. For example, the density matrix  where  
  is the pure state representation of the levee system. 
A mixed state system is when we do not know precisely the exact makeup 
of the system, which means we only have knowledge about the states the system can 
be in. We only have statistical information about the makeup; in other words, we are 
uncertain about the precise and exact state of the system at a given time. Mixed state 
in this context can include different types of uncertainties. For example, when one 




comes across a (L+W) system, one cannot be totally sure of its history.  A composite 
system could be formed out of 2 subsystems with different evolutionary paths, and we 
might not know all the precise information necessary to build a pure state density 
matrix.  There could be x% chance that the system is original, or there could be y% 
chance that the system is one with an updated flood wall at a later time. In such 
scenario, the density matrix   is a mixed state 
representation of the system, where   is the pure state representation of the 
original L+W system, and  is the state representation of the system with 
updated flood wall. 
7.3 Switching Views between Subsystem and Ensemble 
A system is pure when one knows and can track everything, and it is mixed 
when one cannot. The density operator is particularly useful in this regard since the 
flexible framework allows different views and representations of a system. The 
subsystem view (e.g. the individual levees and flood walls) aligns with systems with 
known characteristics and states, and the ensemble view aligns with systems with 
uncertain characteristics and states, or when the subsystems are treated as a statistical 
ensemble. The ability to treat subsystems as a statistical ensemble becomes a critical 
asset as the tracking of the states become more complicated and difficult when you 
have sizable composite systems, especially when the subsystems themselves exhibit 
correlated behaviors 




A Principle of Equivalence:   
The ensemble view and the subsystem view are equivalent but of two 
different perspectives. 
Three cases below illustrate how the different views share the same 
underlying mathematical underpinnings. The first one illustrates the subsystem view, 
where we construct and track everything. The second one is the ensemble view, where 
we choose not to track everything or cannot track everything, and it captures 
uncertainties with the probability terms. The third is the case where we really don’t 
know what’s going on.  
7.3.1 Case 1: Full Knowledge of all Subsystem States 
Composite System evolution scenario 1a: all built at the same time. The Levee 
+ Flood Wall (L+W) subsystems were built together at the same time, and that 
all the subsystems were built together at the same time and they were identical 
to each other. 
 
The system is described by a pure state density matrix with full knowledge of 
the subsystem states: 
 (7.3) 
Composite System evolution scenario 1b:  individual (L+W) subsystem built 
at the same time, but the system of (L+W) were built at different times. The 
subsystems have identical specifications and follow the same time evolution 
behaviors. 

















The density matrix (eq. 7.3) is also applicable to subsystems built at different 
times if precise knowledge about the subsystems and their histories are known. For 
example, if system A was built at t = 0, system B was built at t = 5, system C was 
built at t = 10. Let M(t) be the operator that transition the systems from t = 0 to t = 10.  
The state vectors for the systems are given by: 
   (7.4) 
and the density matrix will have the same functional form as equation (7.3):  
 (7.5) 
For systems with full knowledge, all the elements of the density matrix can be 
computed without any uncertainty and unknowns besides the irreducible aleatory 
uncertainty. In this case, the state vector is pure, the density matrix is pure and fully 
represents the subsystems. 
7.3.2 Case 2: Partial Knowledge (As Given or By Choice) 
Composite System evolution scenario 2: groups of subsystems were built 
together, and different groups were built at different times. The (L+W) 
subsystems were built together and subsystems built at the same period shared 
the same specifications. The evolution histories were incomplete.  
Case #2a: HPS is a merge of 3 projects, built over different times. 
Assuming that all subsystems built in the same project are similar, we have 3 
groups of (L+W) structures. In this case, the setup is very similar to case #1, 
including the same computational and tracking efficiency issues. One can take 
advantage of the grouping and instead of tracking individual subsystems, 
L1
A(10) = M (10) L1
A(0) ,   W1
A = M (10)W1
A(0)
L1
B(10) = M (5) L1
B(0) ,   W1
B = M (5)W1
B(0)
L1
C (10) = M (0) L1
C (0) ,   W1
C = M (0)W1
C (0)

















groups of subsystems will be tracked. The loss of precisions results in the gain 
of computational efficiency.  
Case #2b: Instead of grouping by projects, the subsystems can be 
grouped together according to the state vector; instead of grouping according 
to projects, the subsystems are group together according to population type. 
This is more suitable for system where a large number of subsystems were 
built at around similar times, but can be in various groups of states due to 
external factors such as environmental, geographical, etc.  
 
When the subsystems are constructed at different times and have different 
histories, tracking them individually, while possible, can be a massive undertaking. If 
the subsystems can be grouped according to system characteristics and the groupings 
can be described statistically, then a mixed state density matrix can be used to 
represent the system. This approach is only possible if the system can be treated as an 
ensemble, which then allows the adoption of statistical representations. One can 
consider this as a form of approximation, introduced to simplify the computational 
requirements. By choosing to use group properties and ignoring individual 
characteristics, uncertainties are introduced into the system.  In the ensemble view, 
the  provides the statistical distribution for the ensembles and the uncertainties are 
captured in the probability terms, , in the density matrix. The only condition is that 
the sum of the probabilities have to be unity.  
Consider the HPS with (L+W) subsystems that fall into certain statistical 
distribution. Instead of tracking individual (L+W) subsystem, (L+W) subsystems of 




a general state where a subsystem can be found in. Individual subsystems, such as A, 
B, C, … as in  
 
 (7.6) 
are not tracked. Instead, the different group states and their distributions are 
differentiated and tracked: 
    (7.7) 
For example, consider the following configurations:  
 Subsystem A can be in state 1 and 2. 
 Subsystem B can be in state 2 and 3. 
 Subsystem C can only be in state 3. 
The density matrix for this composite system formed out of subsystem A, B, and C 
becomes 
  
         (7.8) 
 
These types of situation are often encountered in real life. The HPS is such a 
scenario.  The HPS was a combination of 3 different projects over 3 different time 
periods; the first project finished building a set of (L+W) subsystems, then the second 


































project built another set at a later time, and finally the third project built the last one at 
a much later time.  
7.3.3 Known-Unknowns and Unknown-Unknowns 
Composite System evolution scenario 3: different histories, information, and 
opinions from experts’ knowledge.  
 
Face with insufficient knowledge, the comprehensive modeling of a system 
using state vectors alone becomes impossible, and thus the use of the density matrix 
formulation is required. The density matrix can be constructed by filling knowledge 
gaps through various means, from the use of statistics to expert opinions. The bigger 
the knowledge gap, the more subjective beliefs will have to be injected into making 
educated guesses about the statistics and the probability distributions. Expert 
opinions, analogous cases, historical data, and subjective beliefs are introduced at the 
price of increased uncertainties. Nonetheless, this is often how reality presents itself. 
Even in this case, the mathematical form of the density matrix is still the 
same, except that the interpretation of the probabilities is now associated with 
subjective beliefs, moving away from the ensemble viewpoint. 
    (7.9) 
The system is now represented by a completely mixed state density matrix, and the 
probability terms, , are no longer population statistics but weight functions 








7.4 The Interpretation of the Density Operator Formalism: An Integrated 
Representation of Three Types of Uncertainties 
The density operator formalism provides a robust framework that can be 
adapted to model different situations. The previous section illustrated how the 
framework can handle scenarios with different degree of availability and 
completeness of knowledge. The density operator can also support other 
interpretations that can potentially offer a combined description of the three types of 
uncertainties: aleatory, epistemic, and subjective belief. 
7.4.1 Integrated Representation of Uncertainties 
Composite 
In earlier chapters, three types of uncertainties were introduced: aleatory, 
epistemic, and human judgement and belief.  Aleatory uncertainty deals with the 
inherent, intrinsic random stochastic variations associated with a physical system. 
Epistemic uncertainty reflects the lack of knowledge and information about some 
properties and characteristics of a system, and it often reflects by the fidelity of the 
model or the model uncertainties for a system. Finally, human judgement and belief 
reflect the use of subjective knowledge and judgement (or bias) in the formulation of 
designs, opinions, and decisions, which can increase or decrease the accuracy 
regarding the “true” representation of a system. How does the density operator 
formalism unify these three uncertainties? 
The general form of the density operator is expressed as: 
      (7.10) ρ = pi
i




The right-hand side terms in this expression can be mapped to the three types of 
uncertainties according to the following interpretations: 
 — The state vector for the system in the i-th state; this state vector 
contains the probability amplitudes of the basis state vectors. This is 
interpreted as representing the aleatory uncertainties associated with the 
individual basis component state vectors, in the form of probability 
amplitudes intrinsic to the basis states. This corresponds to the inherent, 
intrinsic random stochastic variations associated with a physical system’s 
states. 
 
 — The operator operating on the state vectors, changing the states of the 
system. This is interpreted as representing the moderator or modulators of the 
epistemic uncertainties. The operator itself is a model representing some 
physical processes, e.g., erosion, material fatigue, etc. The operator acts on the 
state vector, resulting in a change of state in the form of a change of the 
probability amplitudes; the probabilities derive from the state vectors post 
operation encapsulate both the aleatory uncertainties and the model based 
epistemic uncertainties.  
 
Furthermore, the operator itself can be formed from a sequence of operators, 
i.e.,  , for which their order of application matters. The 
operators are non-commutative, and their operations on the state vector 








on. With this mechanism, the contextual knowledge about the sequential 
behaviors of the system can be incorporated into a coherent mathematical 
framework. For example, different ordering of event sequence can lead to 
different outcome. An earthquake can damage a flood wall and the subsequent 
hurricane will result in flooding; whereas the same hurricane will not cause 
any flooding if it happens before the damaging earthquake. The operator 
sequence facilitates the representation of such sequential events.  
 
 — The statistical probability of finding the system in the i-th state. If we 
have full knowledge of the system, then there is only one system state vector. 
The system is in a pure state, and the statistical probability term will be unity 
( ) for the density matrix formed by the single state vector. In the case 
where we only have partial knowledge about the system, or that we are 
uncertain as to what states the system can be in, either from the system model 
or subjective reasoning (such as expert opinions and beliefs), then the  will 
be a probability distribution satisfying the conservation of total probability 
( ). This term is interpreted as another part of the epistemic 
uncertainties about the lack of precise knowledge and information about the 





Finally, the human subjective bias and factors can also be incorporated into 
this expression via a statistical interpretation of  as the subjective weighted 
distribution of expert beliefs. The algorithm to perform the weighted summation: 
1) collect different experts’ density operator, 
2) if all opinions agree, then the normalized sum will be identical to the 
individual, an indication of minimal human subjective uncertainty introduced 
into the process, 
3) if opinions differ, then perform a weighted sum (if the opinions have different 
weights) or an average. This will quantify the human based uncertainties. 
 
Table 4: Quantum representations for the different types of uncertainty. 
Uncertainty Quantum Representation 
Aleatory  ⇔  
Aleatory + Epistemic (physics)  ⇔  
Aleatory + Epistemic (physics)  
+ Epistemic (beliefs) 
 
 
7.4.2 Revisiting the Flood Wall example 
To model subjective or non-fully probabilistic situations, consider again a 
flood wall scenario:  
Flood wall A: , ,  
Flood wall B: , ,    
A = a0 0 + a1 1 a0 = 0.01 a1 = 0.99




Probability of finding A in failure state =  
Probability of finding B in failure state =  
 
The probability of encountering a type A floor wall is 60% and a type B floor 
wall is 40%. The density matrix can be expressed as: 
   (7.11) 
Now another experienced engineer indicates that there should be more type B than 
type A. The mix should be 40/60. Then based on the engineer’s information, the 
density matrix should be. 
   (7.12) 
As the subject expert, I think both of our opinions weight the same. The 
effective  and would be the average of the 2 opinions, which have an 
average value: (0.4 + 0.6)/2. The subjective beliefs from different experts are now 
parameterized and captured. Since the  terms are just conventional probabilities, as 
long as the sum of the probabilities is kept to unity, conventional probability tools 
such as Bayesian methods can be applied to update them!  
7.4.3 Analyzing Risk: The Projector and Expectation Values 
The density operator represents the system capturing the aleatory, epistemic, 
and subjective uncertainties. Risk analysis is the process to identify the corresponding 
risk states in question from the density matrix, calculate their chances of occurrence, 
and associate with them values of consequence. The general process to obtain a risk 
value is to start with the initial system at the initial state S (t = 0) and apply operators 
ρ = pA A A + pB B B = 0.6 A A + 0.4 B B




 to transition the system to the target state S’ at some later time (t > 0) as specify 
by the assessment scenario. The density operator for S’ is calculated from: 
       (7.13) 
where  is the target state of the system. To obtain the risk value, a measurement Ri 
(recall Chapter 4.6) can be performed to obtain the expectation value:  
       (7.14) 
which is simply the trace of the product of two matrices. 
7.5 Exploring the Density Operator as a System Modeler for Risk and Uncertainty 
Modeling an engineering system with density operator allows us to capture 
and reflect the state of knowledge about the system. With full knowledge, a system 
can be described with a pure state density operator or density matrix (in a given 
basis), and only aleatory uncertainties are encoded in it. Otherwise, a system will be 
described by a mixed state density matrix, and both aleatory and epistemic 
uncertainties are encoded in it. The type of mixed state mixture provides a measure of 
how much knowledge one possesses for the system, or how much ignorance one can 
incorporate into the model. Even with full knowledge, one can choose to improve 
computational efficiency at the expense of precision by ignoring some of the 
available information and knowledge. Moving from tracking information about 
individual systems to tracking information about an ensemble is one form of 




The density operator comes with properties that are capable to encode 
additional information in ways different than conventional methods, allowing the 
different density matrix elements to encapsulate and represent different information 
about the system.  To fully develop and appreciate what the density operator offers, 
additional mathematical tools and concepts will need to be introduced beyond those 
established in earlier chapters. While a full comprehensive treatment is beyond the 
scope of this dissertation, this section will touch on additional concepts to lay down 
the foundation for future research.   
7.5.1 Additional Properties of the Density Operator 
The density operator has several additional properties which offer information 
encoding capabilities beyond those introduced thus far, making it a strong modeling 
tool candidate for a variety of situations. Recall the definitions of the basis states  
and . In the most basic form, these two basis states correspond to the classical 
states for a system. The classical approach in representing a system is that it can 
either be in one of the two basis states; whereas, in the quantum approach, the system 
can either be in one of the two basis states, or that the system can be in a 
superposition of the two states, leading to the state vector  
   ,     (7.15) 
or in a more general form  
   .     (7.16) 
These are pure states.  
0
1







The concept of superposition is a cornerstone for the quantum theory, and it 
simply states that a system is defined by the “sum” of all the possible basis states. The 
state vector is the quantum superposition of the basis states. Up to now, the decision 
was made to model the systems in earlier chapters within a single quadrant of the real 
number space  to demonstrate how the quantum theory can be used to model risk 
and uncertainty. If one relaxes the restrictions, additional properties and 
characteristics become available. Consider again the state vector , 
which we will relabel it as 
   .     (7.17) 
The probabilities for the states are given by the usual  and . 
However, one can construct a different state vector  
        (7.18)  
and the probabilities for the states are also  and .  and 
 are related by a relative phase, and the  signs indicate that phase. This phase 
factor is internal to the state vector and affects how the state vector evolves internally. 
Other additional mathematical structures come into play when the full complex  
space is considered since the state vector can be expressed in a different coordinate 
representation, and in complex space the vector can be written as:  
   .    (7.19) 
!( )
L = l0 0 + l1 1
L+ = l0 0 + l1 1
P 0( ) = l02 P 1( ) = l12
L− = l0 0 − l1 1
P 0( ) = l02 P 1( ) = l12 L+
L− ±
!( )
Ψ = eiγ cosω
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Additional mathematical tools and interpretations will need to be developed in order 
to fully examine this property in terms of risk and uncertainty. Nonetheless, taking at 
face value, several interesting properties and characteristics with bearings towards the 
interpretation of the density matrix elements can be derived. 
7.5.1.1 Pure States vs. Mixed States and Superposition vs. Mixtures. The basis 
states  and , and the superposition state vector  are pure 
states, which are used to describe fully isolated systems that we have full knowledge 
of. A mixture of different pure states is a mixed state. Mixed states are simply systems 
where their states are less than certain and the systems are described by the collection 
of the quantum superpositions related by probabilistic uncertainty, which can be 
thought of as probability distributions of the quantum superpositions ensemble: 
. Pure and mixed states can be represented by the 
density operator  or the density matrix which is simply the matrix 
form of the density operator with a given basis. For example, the pure state density 
matrix for the basis states are  and . One can also 
construct the density matrix for the superposition states, such as 
, as 
    (7.20) 
and  
0 1 L ± = l0 0 ± l1 1
pi ,Li{ } = p1, L1( ),!, pi , Li( )
ρ = pi Li
i
∑ Li
















































 .  (7.21) 
For mixed states, things can become a bit tricky as we are describing a mixture 
of states, which can sometimes be confused with superpositions. Consider the density 
matrix . This represents an equal mixture of two pure 
basis states  and . The density matrix 
  ,   (7.22) 
which is a mixture of two superposition states, gives the same density matrix of the 
mixture of the two basis states. Mixtures are different from superpositions.  
7.5.1.2 Test for Purity. A density matrix can be tested to determine if it is pure, 
mixed, or somewhere in between. The tests for purity are stated below without proof; 
the proofs can be found in the references mentioned in the beginning of Chapter 4, 
such as Nielsen & Chuang (2011).  
 
Purity Test #1:  
If the density matrix is pure, it has exactly one non-zero diagonal 
element (one non-zero eigenvalue) equal to 1. A pure state satisfies 
 and , and a mixed state satisfies  and 
. 
























































a) The pure state satisfies the relation: . 
b) A partially mixed state satisfies: . 
c) A totally mixed state satisfies:  and . 
 
They are illustrated by the following examples. 
 
•  passed Test #1. The density matrix is pure. 
•  passed Test #1 and #2a. The 
density matrix is pure. 
• passed Test #2c. The density is totally mixed. 
• passed Test #2c. The density is maximally 
mixed. 
• passed Test #2b. The density is partially 
mixed. 
 
A few subtle points here about the different mixed states: partially, totally, and 
maximally mixed. The maximally mixed state corresponds to the system behaving 
ρmnρnm = ρmmρnn
0 < ρmnρnm < ρmmρnn
ρmn = ρnm = 0 ρmmρnn ≠ 0














































































classically, essentially going back to conventional probability, going back to the 
classical coin toss. The partially mixed state corresponds to the system possessing 
quantum superposition behaviors. The pure state is the ultimate full coherent state, 
with everything determined up to the non-reducible aleatory uncertainties. The fully 
mixed state is the ultimate incoherent state, which means the system is totally 
described by a statistical distribution, and our knowledge about the state is at 
minimum. 
7.5.1.3 The Elements of the Density Matrix. From the examples, one can see 
that the elements of the density matrix encode different type information about the 
system. The diagonal matrix elements give the probabilities of finding a certain state 
of the system. They are the probability distribution of the states with a chosen basis 
and the probabilities represent the uncertainties associated with the states. The 
diagonal elements encode information about the probabilities, but it can also be used 
with other elements to determine the degree of mixing.  
The off-diagonal density matrix elements correspond to the interference 
between the probability amplitudes from the basis states due to superpositions. The 
elements are products of different probability amplitudes, and these are the non-
classical superposition states. The off-diagonal elements alone might not be sufficient 
in determining the state of the system; as seen from the examples, both pure state and 
mixed state can have zero as values for the off diagonal elements ( ). These 
elements encode the system’s “quantumness” - degree of exhibiting quantum 







with composite systems, such as , the off-diagonal elements encode the 
“interference” between the subsystems’ four basis states: .  
The off-diagonal elements do not have classical counterparts and do not 
directly correspond to classical outcomes. In the case of composite systems, their 
“existences” reflect the possibility of quantum correlation (“entanglement”) between 
the states, which is further discussed in Section 7.5.5 below.  Interactions with 
external events and elements over time alter the “purity” of the quantum 
superpositions as mixtures are introduced into the system, resulting in losing 
precisions. As we start losing information due to system interactions within and with 
the external environment, the off-diagonal elements will start approaching zero, 
moving more and more towards classical statistical distributions, and more into 
product states (losing correlation and coherence).  From the ensemble interpretation 
(Section 7.3), a completely random ensemble is considered incoherent and 
maximally mixed, and a pure state is a completely coherent state. As seen earlier, an 
example of a pure state density matrix has the following diagonal form: 
     (7.23) 
and . On the other extreme, the completely random ensemble will have a 
density matrix of the following form:  
LW LW
00 , 01 , 10 , 11
ρ =
0 ! 0 0 0
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    (7.24) 
where N is the number of basis states (the dimension of the matrix) and all the states 
are equally populated. Section 7.5.4 will return to this topic and further explore how 
these properties will enable a different type of modeling approach.  
For this research, the interpretation of the off-diagonal terms cannot be fully 
established without going beyond the restriction of focusing only in the Real number 
space ( ) and without introducing additional mathematical tools; additional 
properties, such as phase information, require the consideration of the full complex 
Hilbert space. The full quantum treatment is needed for a comprehensive 
investigation; further development and research will be required to establish proper 
interpretations in the context of uncertainty and risk. While it is premature at this time 
to offer any definitive interpretations regarding the off-diagonal elements, even with 
our current limited understanding about the properties, there are several potential 
applications of the density matrix in the modeling of uncertainty and risk, which we 
shall explore for the remaining of this chapter. 
7.5.2 Density Operator as Tool to Model Uncertainty 
Earlier section in this chapter (Section 7.4.1) presents the idea that the 
quantum state vector and the density operator can provide an integrated framework to 
represent different types of uncertainties. This ability is the result of the additional 
ρ = 1
N
1 ! 0 0 0
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encoding capacity provided by the quantum framework. The encoding capabilities do 
not simply capture knowledge and information, but also how they evolve over time. 
The inclusion of the time dimension offers another interpretative pathway to connect 
the different types of uncertainties. 
The quantum state vector  or , via the concept of 
superposition, encodes the aleatory uncertainties associated with the system in terms 
of the probability amplitudes and the basis states at the start of the model 
construction. Any composite systems formed from the tensor products of the different 
subsystem state vectors are themselves state vectors, encoding with them aleatory 
uncertainties. The product of the probability amplitudes are themselves probability 
amplitudes, and thus the composite state vectors encode aleatory uncertainties 
associated with the composite system. The off-diagonal elements of the density 
matrix are the superpositions of the probability amplitudes. The initial state vector at 
time t = 0, which we label , encodes only the aleatory uncertainties 
associated with the system. This is a pure state, knowledge is at maximum, and state 
is purely quantum. However, the states are not static and will change unless the 
system is complete isolated from everything. 
Different types of epistemic uncertainties enter into the expression according 
to the following scheme. As the system interacts with the external environment the 
state vector representing the system (which is the state of the system) changes. The 
unitary operator of an event U, for example, transitions the system from one state to 
another: . The probability amplitudes associated with  are 
Ψ = ci
i
∑ ψ i Ψ Ψ
Ψ t0 = ci
i
∑ ψ i




different, and the probabilities obtain from  are no longer purely aleatory. The 
system is still pure and quantum, continues to reflect all the knowledge available for 
describing the system. At this stage, while the contains both aleatory and 
elements of epistemic uncertainties (primarily parametric and physical model based), 
all available information have been incorporated.  
The next stage introduces additional epistemic uncertainties due to the 
forming of mixtures as a consequence of partial knowledge. The mixed state density 
matrix  is the mixture of pure basis states and pure superposition 
states. The mixture is necessary when one only has partial information about what 
states the system can be found in but does not know of the exact system state 
precisely. Certain quantum properties and characteristics begin to change over to 
classical behaviors as knowledge and information precisions reduced due to 
interactions or the lack of knowledge, information, or data. The density matrix can 
represent such system in a range of states, and the purity tests (Section 7.5.1.2) on the 
density matrix help to measure the degree of mixing.  
A system will retain certain quantum characteristics if it is partially mixed, 
minimal quantum characteristics when it is totally mixed, and practically no quantum 
characteristics when it is maximally mixed. The density matrix becomes simply a 
fancy expression for conventional probability in the case of the maximally mixed 
system. This progression reflects the decrease of knowledge, or the increase of 
ignorance about the system; this corresponds to the increase of the epistemic 














based, interaction based, and subjective beliefs. At the extreme end of the spectrum, 
when the system is maximally mixed, the density matrix is still a valid quantum 
expression. As a consequence, additional quantum structures are available for density 
matrices to measure other properties and characteristics. 
7.5.3 Density Operator as Tool to Model Ambiguity 
The density operator provides an alternative way to represent uncertainties, in 
terms of pure states where one has exact knowledge and mixed states where one only 
has knowledge about the mixture. While the pure state density matrices derive from 
the basis states, such as  and , are the quantum analog of the classical 
states, the density operator approach can also support the development of alternative 
models and representations of problems, such as ambiguity, for further explorations. 
The construction of a density matrix starts with the combination of different 
pure and mixed states. Recall that the trace of the square of the density matrix 
indicates whether a system is in a pure state or mixed state (Test #1 in Section 
7.5.1.2). A value less than 1 indicates that it is a mixed state system. The numerical 
value provides a quantification of how much “mixing” is in the system, reflecting the 
completeness of knowledge and the epistemic uncertainty associated with the model. 
It is possible that the same density matrix can be formed from different initial mixed 
states. To illustrate this, consider the notion that there are two competing models, M1 
and M2, for describing a physical system, and they both arrive at similar (or identical) 
results. If one believes only M1 is true, then the density operator is written as: 
. However, if one is uncertain about the models, and thinks that there 
0 0 1 1




is a 50/50 chance that either models can be true, then the density operator is written 
as: . Since in this example, M1 and M2 give the 
same results, will be identical to . This describes a process leading to ambiguity 
from modeling uncertainty, a form of epistemic uncertainty! 
One cannot distinguish between the mixed states if their density matrices are 
the same. In other words, if the different models with different mixed states have 
identical density matrix, one cannot differentiate between the models, which is a form 
of ambiguity and a model representation of epistemic uncertainty. As another 
example, consider the earlier discussion of a system with several possible failure 
modes, A, B, and C in Section 6.1. Let us further assume that failure modes A and B 
only occur in spring, and modes A, B, and C occur in summer. In spring, the 
probability of A is 0.3, and 0.7 for B. In summer, the probability of A is 0.15, 0.7 for 
B, and 0.15 for C, with A and C having the same failure characteristics tracing out the 
same fragility curves. While artificial, this configuration is chosen to provide 
conceptual demonstration of the inability to differentiate different density matrixes 
under certain situations. To model the two scenarios, one constructs the following 
density matrices:  
Let the levee be , and the different failure modes for the levee 
be . The density matrix for spring:  
     (7.25) 
The density matrix for summer:  
   (7.26) 




= l0 0 + l1 1
LA = A Li , LB = B Li , LC = C Li
ρspring = 0.3 LA LA + 0.7 LB LB




Since A and C have the same failure characteristics, the “numerical” values for the 
density matrix components for A and C are the same: . 
This leads to the numerical equivalence of the density matrices:  . 
If one were to take this further, taking into considerations the range between 
aleatory and epistemic uncertainties from last section, transition and time evolution 
operations will drive the density matrix from the ambiguous mixed state to other 
mixed state where tests such as those discussed in 7.5.1 or other forms of 
measurements can be used to separate the ambiguity.  
7.5.4 Density Operator as Measurement of Disorder 
Measurements play a major role in establishing the proper interpretation of the 
density matrix, in determining of the type of information encoded by it, and in 
deciding what information can be extracted out of it. Information extracted from the 
density matrix has to correspond to real world observations where measurements can 
be performed to gather data for comparing to the model predictions in order to 
establish the soundness of the model. This notion has bearings in terms of how one 
treats the interpretations of the different elements of the density matrix, particularly in 
the distinction between quantum superposition and quantum mixture.  
The density matrix encodes information for both quantum superposition and 
mixture states. The interpretations of the density matrix focus primarily on what can 
be directly observed and measured, which are the probabilities, the squared of the 
probability amplitudes, and the expectation value for observables. The quantum 
superpositions, for example, are indirectly measured as results from the interference 








interactions between the quantum states transitions via the measurement of transition 
probabilities. The coherence and incoherence of the superpositions (Section 7.5.1.3) 
reflect the degree of quantumness one can expect the system to behave. The encoded 
information in the density matrix elements (e.g. the inequality ) 
can be extracted to tell whether the system behaves as a classical or quantum system. 
The encoded information that can be directly compared to reality would be the 
diagonal elements, corresponding to probabilities that can be compared to 
measurements on actual physical systems. 
The diagonal elements of the density matrix correspond to real probabilities 
one can measure from experiments and observations, and the Born Rule is directly 
encoded in the density matrix itself. As a result, the trace of the density matrix has 
been the primary route to extract information regarding the states of the system. It 
connects the mathematical concepts to things we can physically measure.  
Information can be extracted from the density matrix in a different approach. 
From the ensemble perspectives, one can construct a quantity that can further 
characterize the different density matrices by measuring disorder. This was pioneered 
by von Neumann, where a value is associated to a system, described by a density 
matrix , that correspond to the uncertainty of the states as reflected by the degree of 
disorder. The following derivation is based on Sakura (1993).  
The von Neumann Entropy, S, is defined as: 
       (7.27) 
and  is expressed in terms of the basis vectors where  is diagonal: 
0 < ρmnρnm < ρmmρnn
ρ





       (7.28) 
S can be rewritten as: 
     (7.29) 
 
From Equation 7.23 the pure state density matrix,  since  or 
. For the completely random mixed state density matrix (Equation 
7.24), where N is the dimension of the state space, 
   (7.30) 
Without going into the detail proofs, von Neumann entropy has the following 
properties: 
•  is pure if S = 0 
•  is a maximally mixed state if , where N is the dimension of the 
state space (dimension of the density matrix) 
•  
•  
The density matrix, in the form of von Neumann entropy, can provide a 
quantitative measure of the statistical disorder associated with a system, similar to the 
notion in statistical mechanics that the larger entropy, the larger the uncertainty, 
reflecting the number of microstates a system has. The von Neumann entropy and its 
ρ = ak ek
k
∑ ek
S = − ρii lnρii
i
∑ = − ak lnak
k
∑
S = 0 ρii = 0
lnρii = ln(1) = 0
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application are under active research, particularly in the field of quantum information 
theory.  
7.5.5 Entanglement 
The concept of entanglement was first introduced in Chapter 5 (Section 5.1.3). 
Recall the consideration of the composite system formed from subsystem A and 
subsystem B. Both have the  and  as the basis vectors. The composite system 
AB will have four basis states, , , , and . When the system AB is 
entangled, it simply means that A and B do not function separately but as a correlated 
system, and measurements perform a subsystem can provide information about the 
other. Entanglement is a generalization of the concept of correlation in the quantum 
sense. To illustrate this concept, consider the following non-entangled state for the 
composite system : 
      (7.31) 
and when expressed in the full basis: 
    (7.32) 
If one measures A, and gets  for 100% of the time, what does that tell us 
about B? If , in order to get the composite state above, 
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 .  One can check that this is true by calculating 
, which is equal to Equation 7.31. The 
probability of getting 0 is the same as getting 1, which is 0.5. In this example, 
knowledge about A does not tell us anything about B.  
Now consider the state vector:  
  (7.33) 
One cannot construct the composite state from two separate state vectors and . 
However, the state vector does give a 50% probability of getting  and a 50% 
probability of getting . Furthermore, if one observes A to be zero, B will also be 
zero! There is a correlation between A and B! 
The product state, as the name implies, refers to a system where the state can 
be factored into individual subsystem states, and operators can operate on each 
individual subsystem individual and independently.  An example of such: a system 
formed from two separate subsystems, which can be two different levees. Together, 
they work to provide protections to the area, but a failure of one does not necessarily 
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Correlated subsystems can be interpreted as entangled states. For example, an 
I-wall with an earthen levee. If the earthen levee is weakened by erosion, it can also 
weaken the I-wall foundation, which can increase the chance of failure for the 
combined system. On the opposite end, the I-wall can be weakened in some way, for 
example, the top portion of the flood wall was damaged, and the height of the flood 
wall has been effectively reduced by 3 feet. The system failure probability increases 
as a result, but it does not affect the earthen levee. An application of this concept of 
entanglement will be presented in Section 9.4.  
The density matrix offers a mechanism to determine the states of the 
composite system, similar to the earlier purity test discussion in Section 7.5.1. In this 
case, the test with the density matrix help to identify the system states, whether it is a 
product state (no entanglement), maximum or partial entanglement. In brief, for a 
product state the density matrix for A will have only one nonzero eigenvalue that 
equals to 1, and the density matrix for B will also have only one nonzero eigenvalue 
that equals to 1. Maximum entanglement is when the density matrix of the composite 
system satisfies  and , and the subsystem density matrix satisfies 
, , and proportional to the diagonal unit matrix (Section 7.5.1.3), 
where the measurement outcomes are equally likely. Finally, partial entanglement is 
when the density matrix of the composite system satisfies  and , and 
the subsystem density matrix satisfies  and . Since the density 
matrix can play a role in deciphering the entanglement states of a system, the von 
Neumann entropy can also serve that purpose as well.  
tr ρ2( )=1 ρ2 = ρ
tr ρ2( )<1 ρ2 ≠ ρ
tr ρ2( )=1 ρ2 = ρ




7.6 Incorporating the Questions to Shape the Observables, the Risks, and the Results 
The quantum framework is proposed as an alternative to investigate risk 
problems so that more comprehensive data and information can be provided for risk 
analyses and assessments, leading to better evaluations. In the conventional 
framework, the priors play little or no role in shaping the line of risk questioning. In 
the quantum framework, due to how operators and quantum operations can change 
not only the states but also the system itself, the priors play some roles in the shaping 
and evolution of the risk questions. The lines of queries form the basis for identifying 
the observables, which also affects the construction of the model. 
This also means that the questions we ask will also shape the outcome of the 
analysis. The right question has to be asked (the right set of risk states need to be 
identified) in order to get the right answers. This is coherently stated by Ray (2009) 
as: “Questions elicit answers (data), and together with prior expectation lead to 
conclusion.” In the example of a levee system, the observables would correspond to 
the working and non-working states, derive from the question: “Is the levee system 
working?” and “Is the levee system non-working?” For the basic system, the main 
observables are the projectors: and ; the observables represent the 
questions we are trying to ask. For this study, the questions we are trying to ask would 
be related to risks. Questions such as “What is the risk of something?” is translated 
into the question “What is the chance of finding the engineering system in a <certain> 
states that can have <certain> impacts?” The corresponding mathematical expression 
for this question with answers expressed in terms of risk values is therefore (recalling 




        (7.34) 
where Ri is the risk observable:  for the risk of system failing and  for the 
risk of the system working. 
The question we are attempting to answer is the risk associated to a particular 
engineering system for a specific condition or event. While in general a system can 
have many states, the question framed the approach on how to represent the states of 
the system in question, namely the selection of the basis of  and , the non-
working and working states. Under this consideration, the risk system consists of the 
collection of the possible system states related to the risk conditions, and a risk state 
is defined as:  
1. Certain states of the system that when occur can have material impacts. 
2. The system states are defined by the “question” which help shape and define 
the basis states needed to describe the system, how to construct the system 
from these basis states, what type of evolutionary processes applicable to the 
problem, and what makes the target states that answer the question.   
3. For a simple engineering system, the system in a working state is defined by 
the  basis-vector, and the non-working state is defined by the  basis 
vector. The  and  basis vectors form the complete set for the risk 
engineering system. 
 
The quantum risk model modifies the tradition risk equation by replacing the 
standard probability term with the quantum probability terms and expectation values, 
which derives from a very rich theoretical framework incorporating several forms of 
Ri = pi λi
i




uncertainties, information, knowledge, and physics models. Furthermore, the concept 
of ignorance can be incorporated into the framework in terms of the different states of 
the density matrix, and subjective beliefs are now quantified in the form of the 
statistical distribution of the states. As a consequence, information densities in the 
quantum models are higher than the conventional counterparts.  
7.7 New Tools in the Toolbox 
For challenges that conventional formalism does not address, the quantum 
framework provides some new insights:  
• The challenge of combining the epistemic and aleatory probabilities: should 
the two types of uncertainties be combined into a single measure of risk? Yes, 
they can be combined with the density matrix. The risk states are mapped into 
state vectors, and the resulting density matrix representation combines both 
types of uncertainties into a single expression. 
• The subjectivity regarding the division between aleatory and epistemic 
components can be reduced into the problem of the representation of the 
effective uncertainty in an operator algebra based mathematical framework. 
Specific uncertainty representations are built into the density matrix to 
represent the two type of distinct but interconnected parts. 
• The need to utilize probability envelops of epistemic uncertainty has been 
reduced. The terms in the density matrix can be adjusted based on both 
objective and subjective (weighted statistical methods) information and 
knowledge. In other words, the probability envelops are built into the density 




• The concept on probability of probabilities, of specifying probability 
distributions over model parameters which are themselves probabilities, is 
now built into the density matrix construct. The various probabilistic terms in 
the construction of the state vectors and the density matrix can take on various 
probability distributions, drawing parallels to the quantum wave function 
formalism.  
• Risk states can now change dynamically with operators. Unitary 
transformation for changes preserving the system, or projective measurements 
resulting in an updated system. Conditional statements of risk are now 
incorporated into the framework using operators and projective 
measurements.  
• We define expert knowledge as subjective beliefs. The weighted expert 
assessments are reflections of the degree of expert agreement of uncertainties 
and certainties. 
• Lastly, this formalism is based on a well-established scientific platform, 
namely quantum physics. The platform provides a sound and rich framework 
for future research and development. 
 
With quantum probability, two probability frameworks are combined within a 
single mathematical construct — the density operator — where epistemic 
uncertainties are treated as the result of a mixture of states characterizing the 
aleatory uncertainties. Conventional Kolmogorov probability is used to represent 




(not direct probabilities) associated with the vector object. The system is modeled 
as a whole with this combined framework, which offers a number of advantages. 
Operators modeling event and interaction scenarios act on both types of system 
uncertainties together. This recognizes that events can affect both types of 
uncertainty simultaneously, and the framework aligns well with scenarios where 
external events can affect both type of uncertainties often seen in the case of 
dynamic systems. Propagation of uncertainties is handled within the integrated 
model. Furthermore, the quantum framework allows the mixing of both aleatory 
and epistemic uncertainties, and yet it maintains the distinctions between them that 
analysts can identify their separate contributions to the overall uncertainty of the 
integrated system.  
This combined framework offers an alternative mathematical platform for risk 
analysts to use as a theoretical research tool and as a computational tool to 
investigate the different coupling of aleatory and epistemic uncertainties. The 
quantum framework also offers an alternative investigative and experimental 
platform to explore different ways to incorporate additional contextual information 
into the mathematical models.  
The quantum framework is also future forward looking. As some have pointed 
out that composite quantum models might encounter scalability issues when 
modeling systems with many components. The size of the model, as a result of the 
tensor products of the components, grows exponentially. Current computational 
platforms might have significantly difficulty in handling the computational 




the recent rapid advancements in quantum computing might alter this landscape. 
Quantum computation has the potential to significantly reduce the computational 
time and resource to perform complex calculations for problems properly 
formulated for computation with quantum computers (see for example Arute et al., 
2019; Wright et al., 2019). Further exploration in the application of quantum 






Chapter 8:  Modeling with the Density Operator for 
Heterogeneous System Evolving Over Time 
 
 
The ideal engineer is a composite… He is not a scientist, he is not a 
mathematician, he is not a sociologist or a writer, but he may use the knowledge and 
techniques of any or all of these disciplines in solving engineering problems. 
- N. W. Dougherty 1955 
 
 
Up to this point, the quantum approach has been applied to single and simple 
composite engineering systems. In real world applications, complex engineering 
systems, or system of systems, are constructed out of heterogeneous components, 
subsystems, and systems of various states. In such context, the notion of a 
heterogeneous system can have broad meanings. In this chapter, the quantum 
framework is applied to model a simplified configuration of a heterogeneous system 
of subsystems to demonstrate the modeling workflow. The demonstration system 
comprises many similar subsystems, and these subsystems are in groupings according 
to their different states. For example, a system can comprise 30 subsystems that were 
all built to the same specifications; however, the 30 subsystems were not all built at 
the same time. Ten of them were built initially, an additional ten were built two years 
later, and the final ten were built another two years later. This example is in essence a 




A model suitable for the investigation of this type of complex heterogeneous 
engineering system is constructed in this chapter using the density operator quantum 
framework. The HPS (before Katrina) and not the HSDRSS (post Katrina) serves as a 
reference system for the model since analyses done by IPET and others are readily 
available for comparison. Given the scope of this dissertation, a direct one-to-one 
comparison between the quantum model with the HPS studies by IPET is not feasible. 
Nonetheless, using a simplified HPS baseline and focusing on key attributes and 
properties, comparisons at the macroscopic level will highlight differences between 
the techniques.  The main objectives are to illustrate how to model a heterogeneous 
system using the density operator formalism, to demonstrate how the quantum 
approach offers additional information about system risks over conventional methods, 
and to compare and evaluate how the two approaches assess risks.  
8.1 The Quantum Model for a Heterogeneous System Over Time  
The HPS is a collection of different subsystems acting like an ensemble, and 
precise information and knowledge about the subsystems are in general incomplete. 
The mixed state ensemble density operator formalism is well match for modeling 
these classes of problems. The modeling workflow begins with the development of a 
density operator representation for the heterogeneous states of the HPS. Stepping 
through time, the model incrementally incorporates different evolutionary event 
scenarios together to represent what the system is like at the time instance where one 
would like to evaluate risks. In order to derive useful risk information out of these 
models, such as to assess the risk of flooding as a result of the failure of the system 




be characterized, prioritized, simplified with approximation (thus introducing 
ignorance), and sequenced to build out the model from the past to the present.  
8.1.1 The Characteristics of the Models 
The HPS model scenario — assumptions, approximations, simplifications, 
generalizations, properties, and characteristics: 
• Knowledge about the system and its history can be limited.  This study 
focuses on the “present day” HPS, with the initial construction dating back to 
1965 under the Flood Control Act of 1965. The construction of the HPS 
spanned many years, and this model will break it down to three periods: 1965-
1985 (Period I), 1985-2005 (Period II), and 2005-2015 (Period III). The three 
periods correspond to the initial project from the Flood Control Act of 1965, 
the construction period after the 1984 Re-Evaluation Study by USACE, and 
post-Katrina. Given the vast time span, construction and change histories for 
the HPS are considered to be incomplete (ASCE, 2007). As such, a random 
pick of a “levee + flood wall” subsystem from the HPS system collective can 
be from any of these periods. For a more computationally manageable 
modeling exercise, this model makes the simple assumption that the 
subsystems deteriorate over time and the probability of failure increased as the 
subsystems aged. 
• A key historical note for the subsystems built during Period 2: they were built 
using outdated design specification, and the height of the flood walls were 1 to 
5 feet below the updated specifications.  




characteristics: The hurricane protection system current has 138 similar levee-
flood wall subsystems (the reaches). Some of the subsystems were not built to 
the specifications, with a slightly higher failure probability. 
• Changes in the system happen over different time scales. Some, such as 
erosion due to vegetative growth, happen over long periods of time. Others, 
such as overflow events, happen over short durations. 
• Over the time spans of these systems, there are both long term and short term 
events. Given the long timescale and event granularity of the system, the time 
dependency will be considered as discrete. 
• The temporal timeline for this exercise is divided into three periods. Figure 29 
highlight the key system configurations considered for this model at the 
different time periods. 
• The model scenario must incorporate different types of uncertainties.   
• Expert assessments and opinions on the states of the system can be different. 
Different experts can arrive at different event occurrence probabilities for 
different system states. These subjective uncertainties will be incorporated as 





Figure 29. Schematic representation of the HPS configuration evolution over time. The color 
of the flood walls indicates different build generations and specifications. The degree of tilt of 
the floor walls indicates degree of damage. 
 
As before, the following notation will be used: the state vector for a levee is 
denoted by or  (a notation shorthand). A levee system A in the initial 
state 0, is represented as: . A general mixed 
state composite system is, for example, represent as: 
   .    (8.1) 
Using the density operator, the state transition is:  
 (8.2) 
8.1.2 Description of the System States and Their Evolutions Over Time 
The HPS is modeled as an ensemble collection of (L+W) structures with 
various configurations and manufacturing deviations. To construct the model, several 
simplifications and assumptions have to be introduced to simplify the calculations in 






∑ LiAWiA LiAWiA U⎯ →⎯ piU
i




working, and a flood wall can either be working or not working; hence, a subsystem 
is modeled to have 2 possible states, working  and not working . It is further 
assumed that a levee-flood wall subsystem was constructed together at the same time. 
The (L+W) subsystems are similar to each other and the subsystems collectively can 
be treated as an ensemble. The system transition from one state to another when 
triggered by an event. The modeling process will follow the state transitions of the 
HPS over the three different time periods, according to their applicable timescales 
(Figure 29). 
 
Period I — Period I saw the initial construction of the levees and flood walls. The 
systematic construction of the model will start with defining the initial state vectors 
for the levees and flood walls, the construction of the composite levee-flood wall 
subsystems, their individual changes and collective changes due to events over time: 
• The construction of the initial set of levees L at time  and they gradually 
degrade over time. For the individual levee ; for the 
individual flood wall . The ensemble collection of 
these levees making up the HPS, assuming that they are all identical, is a pure 
state density matrix:  
    .   (8.3) 
• The system index is changed to I to stand for Period I. Corresponding to the 
simplifications and assumptions, subsystems initially with only a levee require 


















should model separately.  
• The composite (L+W) system is represented by 
      (8.4) 
if it is a product state, or  
     (8.5) 
if it is not. In general, it is assumed that the subsystems are correlated, and the 
entangled state (eq. 8.5) will be the focus. For example, if the earthen levee is 
weakened, the failure probability for the combined levee and flood wall 
system will increase.  The corresponding density matrix is:  
        (8.6) 
for product state, or in shorthand . The entangled states 
will be further discussed in Section 9.4. 
• The (L+W) system was constructed at time  (t = 0) and the structures 
(materials) gradually degraded over time. The degradation is modeled with the 
M operator.  The state of the system at time t is given by:  
           (8.7) 
and the HPS system density matrix becomes:  
      .   (8.8) 
• Some (L+W) subsystems have modified flood walls with new specifications 
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exist as a result. The modified subsystems will have a different state vector:  
      .    (8.9) 
The density matrix has to be updated to take the split populations into 
account: 
      ,  (8.10) 
where  is the percentage of the subsystems that are with the original 
population, and  is the percentage of the subsystems that are with the new 
population. 
• There may be periodic flooding events resulting in erosion. The number of 
storms per year and the severity that can result in over flooding and backside 
erosion are needed to compute the full history; the following illustrate the 
construction of a sequence. 
⁃ The water pressure during increase in flow volume changes the failure 
probability according to: , where  and  denote 
the initial and final states for this event. 
⁃ The (L+W) structure undergoing regular seasonal events, front side 
erosion, and flooding events: . We will denote 
the composite operator as . 
⁃ The (L+W) structure going through an overtopping event, with 






























.We will denote the composite operator as 
. 
 
The operator H belongs to the class of operators reflecting our collection of 
knowledge and understanding of the evolutionary history of the system. We shall call 
this class of operator knowledge operators as they encapsulate historical and 
contextual knowledge about the system. The general density matrix describing a 
system can therefore be expressed as:  
   (8.11) 
where H is a knowledge operator and it is acting on all the possible states for the 
combined system. Over time, the system can undergo n-times these periodic events, 
and in terms of the operators acting on the density matrix, the expression can be 
written as: 
  .    (8.12) 
The density matrix for the system as described is “complete” at this point, 
which means all the information and knowledge about the systems are incorporated 
into the state vectors and the density matrix. The physics about the individual event is 
encapsulated in the corresponding  function (Chapter 5.2). 
While it is possible to perform all the operations with H, tracking the 
individual data element and performing computations on them can be cumbersome. In 
this case where the time span between the event types can be of many orders of 
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magnitude differences, the concept of ignorance, in which selective knowledge and 
information are ignored and not used, can be of help. A single operator, , can be 
chosen to represent the product of the operators.   
        (8.13) 
One can think of this as the application of a smoothing function to smooth out 
the resolution to match the timescale. With this approximation, the HPS at the end of 
period will be given by:  
       (8.14) 
Further studies should be carried out to investigate how the level of granularity, time 
scale and range can affect the validity of this approximation.   
 
Period II  — Period II events resulting in the following state transitions and system 
changes: 
• Additional levees and flood walls systems were built, but they were built with 
outdated specifications.  
§ The Period II initial system states were carried over from Period I first 
generation (L+W) subsystems. These subsystems continued to evolve 
during Period II. 
§ The Period II or the second generation (L+W) systems were built around 
the same time (this assumption could be wrong since the subsystems were 
built over a time spread; this is where the time resolution consideration is 


















systems were built to the same failure probability specifications as the first 
generation. However, the re-analysis of the system design led to the update 
of the design specifications since the height of the (L+W) system needs to 
be 1-5 feet higher. As a consequence, the Period II systems do not meet the 
new specification which increase the system failure probabilities. This re-
baseline of the failure probabilities is represented by an operator denoted as 
.   
     .     (8.15) 
§ The knowledge operator  quantifies the fact that the systems now fall 
“under specification”.  The  operator is a simple rotation operator 
(Chapter 5.2.2), and the function captures the change of probabilities due to 
the change of specification. 
§ The density matrix for the system, , will need to be modified to 
account for the 2 different ensembles, with the probability  associated 
with the first generation systems and   associated with the second 
generation systems. The summation is over the probabilities from Period I 
and II. 
• Further material and structural degradation  
  
          (8.16) 
• Periodic flooding events resulting in erosion. The general operators will be 




due to the changing environment, such as the increase of storm frequency due 
to the warming of sea water. As before, the following illustrate the 
construction of a sequence. 
§ The water pressure during increase in flow volume changes the failure 
probability according to: , where  and  denote the 
initial and final states for this event. 
§ The (L+W) structure undergoing regular seasonal events, front side erosion, 
and flooding events: . We will denote the 
composite operator as  
§ The (L+W) structure going through an overtopping event, with backside 
erosion, with and without subsequent repair. . 
We will denote the composite operator as  
• Katrina: The (L+W) structure going through a catastrophic overtopping event 
as a result of the weakening of the backside due to prior overtopping event. 
§ The Post-Katrina system is derived from the application of knowledge 
operators on the various systems. These operations will either change the 
systems states or completely alter the systems, such as the application of the 
X operator; the population distributions might change as a result. A practical 
approach to derive the new population distributions would be to rely on 
observed data to simply write out the statistical ensemble.  This approach 
draws heavily on the use of field data and observations. While we can 




results must be reconciled with the observed data since there are other 
conditions that might not be built into the model. 
§ Given the current systems are modeled with binary states, an alternative 
way to model changed systems could simply be “putting” the system into a 
constant state, such as a constant failing state, a simple 
 , for a failed/destroyed system.  
 
Period II consists of 2 sub-periods: 2a) the period leading up to Hurricane 
Katrina, and 2b) the period during and through Hurricane Katrina. For Period 2a, the 
initial states are inherited from Period I, and the Period 2a starting density matrix will 
be: . Since new (L+W) structures were built, a new density matrix 
incorporating Period I subsystems and the new Period II subsystems would need to be 
constructed. The mixing of the subsystems from the two periods introduces 
uncertainties into the integrated system, shifting the model to resemble further as a 
statistical distribution.  Let the density matrix for the system for period I be denoted 
by   and period II be denoted by , the combined system is given by: 
  (8.17) 
where ,  are percentages of the (L+W) subsystems from the periods with respect 
to the total number of (L+W) subsystems and  .  The combined system is 
then evolved to the point where Katrina was about to hit the region:  




During Katrina, the higher time resolution operators  are 
applied. Each discrete time step will need to be checked to see if the backside erosion,
 , might actually cause a catastrophic failure during the overflow condition. The 
evolution of the system during the storm is described by the sequence of events that 
occurred from the beginning of the storm to the end of it, and the evolutionary 
histories are modeled with sequences of knowledge operators. Each application of an 
operator transitions the system from one state to another in a discrete manner. At each 
transition the system states can be evaluated against operational parameters and 
constraints. If certain constraints are reached, a different operator sequence can be 
applied. In other words, historical information and knowledge are turned into a 
computational algorithm consisting of operator sequences, which are applied to 
transition the system from states to states.  
An example of a sequence can be as follow: during a hurricane, a system can 
undergo both short-term and long-term changes. Some operations, such as the 
overflow operator, might not directly result in a long-term system change. The 
overflow operator, by itself, only reflects the conditions where water is overtopping 
the structure, a short-term event, and the structure remains intact. However, the same 
overflow operation can lead to backside erosion, resulting in the weakening of the 
system. This sequence of operation is , but the operator  only acts on the 
system when O occurs and not before that.  is a time-delayed operation that only 
applies when the system is at a failure state. To model such behavior requires the 
adoption of an algorithmic approach where one projects the component states of the 




amplitudes), and then choose the right operation sequence. In the case with a 
Hurricane Katrina level events, both  and  can leave long term effects. The 
model simulation will need to check for the failure of the levee by performing a 
projection operation, , to obtain the failure probability of the levee. If the failure 
probability is 1, then the entire (L+W) system fails catastrophically, and the X 
operator will need to be applied. 
The application of the X operation changes the population distribution for the 
system. Such operation fundamentally changes the density matrix; as a result, 
conservation rules no longer apply. The application of the X operator throws the 
system into a different ensemble configuration, and in algorithmic terms one can 
equate this to the throwing of an exception, resulting in the need to take a different 
algorithmic pathways, moving into Period 2b. Depending on the sequence 
combinations, a different system will emerge after the storm, and a new set of density 
matrices reflecting the new ensemble populations will take shape. 
 
Period 3 — After Katrina, the HPS/HDRSS became a more fragmented system. 
Period III events resulting in the following state transitions and system changes: 
  
a) Damaged systems fully or partially repaired, or completely replaced  
In the case of damaged (L+W) systems, there are several possible 
configurations: (1) only L damaged, (2) only W damaged, (3) both L & W damaged. 
Repairs can be done on one component, both components, or some other 




Repairs can be done in several ways. A partial repair would use the  
operator to rotate the vector back towards the  state. Or a projector can be utilized 
to extract the working component out, and then apply the tensor product with a new 
component: . After the repair, the system is restored back to the 
initial condition; the resulting state vector will be in the form of a separable system, 
  for configuration (1), 
  for configuration (2). 
These are pure state vectors comprised with mixtures of old and new parts. For 
configuration (3), the state vector  is completely replaced with a new one. In 
essence, the ensemble population is altered with some of the members shift back to 
the initial state!   
b) Un-repaired damaged systems 
For these systems, the previous Period II operations already and correctly put 
the them in the proper “damaged” states. No further operations on them is required 
and they should be left to evolve! Besides repairing old systems from Period I and II, 
additional levees and flood walls systems were built during Period III. Together with 
these three possible repaired configurations, the un-repaired components further 
increase the complexity of the system. The density operator formalism can handle this 
in a systematic, consistent and effective manner.  
 The density matrix for the system,  , are modified to account for the 4 or 
more different ensembles, with the probability  associated with different ensemble 




populations. The summation is over the population probabilities from all ensembles 
and not the subsystems. The construction of the state transition operators follows the 
same logic as before: 
• Further material and structural degradation 
         (8.19) 
• Periodic flooding events resulting in erosion. The general operators will be 
similar to those of Period I and Period II. However, the frequency and 
intensity might vary due to the changing environment, such as the increase of 
storm frequency due to the warming of sea water. 
§ The water pressure during increase in flow volume changes the failure 
probability according to: , where  and  denote the 
initial and final states for this event. 
§ The (L+W) structure undergoing regular seasonal events, front side erosion, 
and flooding events: . We will denote the 
composite operator as . 
§ The (L+W) structure going through an overtopping event, with backside 
erosion, with and without subsequent repair: . 
We will denote the composite operator as . 
 
One interesting conclusion can be drawn from the process of constructing the 




which leads to divergence of the system states, and the system becomes more of a 
statistical mixture of different possible states. System uncertainties increase as a result.  
8.1.3 The Integrated Model 
At any given time, the integrated HPS is described by a density operator of the 
form:  , with the knowledge operators representing the evolutionary 
history of the system. The density operator itself captures and reflects the degree of 
ignorance one chose to accept in the construction of the model; the density operator 
model is the result of making trade-offs between precision and computability. 
Furthermore, the questions one asks of the quantum model shape the system 
construction and influence the paths taken to arrive at the outcome.    
Following this line of thinking, there can be families of HPS models one can 
build based on the many different possible questioning scenarios. The questions 
determine what specific approach to take, what parameters to use, what operator 
sequences to construct. This initial attempt to apply the quantum approach to model 
an engineering system uses a highly simplified scenario to focus on illustrating 
general concepts.   
In this analysis, the time scale parameter affects the construction of the 
integrated system models. The granularity of the time scale parameter determines 
what specific event operations to model. The HPS is constantly subjected to different 
weather events; storms of different magnitudes move through the area at different 
times, with different frequencies and characteristics. While in principle the highest 
fidelity models should track every weather event, some simplifications can be made 













studies a frequency parameter reflecting the statistical averages over the years might 
be sufficient. 
The construction of the integrated model begins with the question: “What is 
the risk of catastrophic system failure when the 2005 HPS is impacted by a 200-year 
storm?” To answer this question, the HPS system model will have to evolve from the 
initial 1965 state to the 2005 state, right before Hurricane Katrina hits the region. This 
time span, from 1965 to 2005, spread over 40 years. Two time-scale ranges will need 
to be considered in the construction of the operators: 1) long term in years, and 2) 
short term in range of days. The evolutionary process will need to follow the 
algorithmic approach below to perform discrete transition steps to take the system 
from one time to another, until it reaches 2005.   
The algorithm — the process begins with the initial HPS system with only 
levees. The density matrix is given by . The system goes 
through slow long-term degradation, and the system at a given elapsed year is given 
by . Short-term events considered for this scenario focus on the 
flooding events, and the event operator, F, is defined as . The number of 
significant flooding event between 1965 and 1985 is eight, five from the Mississippi 
River and three from Hurricanes (Rogers 2008). The density matrix, therefore, will be 
operated on five times to account for the river flooding events,  
.   




Significant flooding events due to major hurricanes, are defined by the event 
operators  corresponding to the three hurricane related flooding events, and these 
operators will need to sandwich between the operators from the river flooding events.  
During Period I, the system went through significant upgrade, with two 
system level changes. First, some existing levees were enhanced with the addition of 
flood walls. Second, additional (L+W) systems were built. The system, therefore, has 
to be divided into two populations, one with only levees, and the other one consists of 
(L+W) systems. The density matrices for the 2 populations are constructed by taking 
the  above and splitting it into the  and the .   
The second population consists of a statistical mixture of old and new (L+W) 
subsystems, one population consists of totally new subsystems, and the other 
population consists of subsystems of old levees with new flood walls.  The statistical 
element is captured by the probability, , for the totally new system states and the 
hybrid system states. Recall from equation 8.10, the density matrix has the form 
  .   (8.21) 
For Period II, the same algorithmic logic continues to apply. The levee 
population continues to evolve based on the density matrix , and the  
population from Period II continue to evolve. Additional (L+W) systems built during 
Period II will be incorporated into the density matrix,  
 . (8.22) 
ρL = pi
i
∑ Li Li ρLW = ρL ⊗ ρW












To continue to the next computational steps, the specific values associated 
with the various system configurations will need to be instantiated into the model. For 
example, the various system populations are defined by the system configuration at 
specific instances of time. There are 35 polders in the New Orleans region, and each 
has many (L+W) sections/subsystems (IPET Ch VIII 2009). These numbers changes 
over time tracing the completion of different projects. These numerical values will 
need to be compiled and entered into the model in order to arrive at the state of the 
HPS system right about the time when Hurricane Katrina hit the region. The risk 
values, in turn, can be obtained from computing the expectation values (Chapter 4.6) 
associated with the observables driven by the original question: “What is the risk of 
catastrophic system failure when the 2005 HPS is impacted by a 200-year storm?”  
Figure 30 summarizes the general algorithmic flow to take a system from the 
initial state to the target state, ready for provide answers to the risk question. 
 
 





8.1.4 Determining Risks 
The determination of risks is a context driven process. The quantum density 
matrix approach changes the process of risk valuation. The conventional static event 
occurrence probability scaled with an impact value to compute a risk measure is now 
replaced with a knowledge based dynamic system model. Contextual information is 
an active participant in the shaping of the risk states and the process of extracting 
information out of the system model. In this case, the “risk measurements” depend on 
both the histories of the systems as well as the configuration of the systems. 
The present risk question focuses on establishing the failure probabilities for 
the HPS due to various type of flood events, from seasonal to extreme ones. What 
constitutes a failure mode for a system must be defined so that the proper observable 
and measurement can be established. The flooding failure modes for a single levee 
system can be the overflow of the river or the breaching of the levee. The flooding 
failure modes for a (L+W) system could be river overtopping above the composite 
structure, the breaching of the flood wall, the breaching of the levee including 
seepage, and the breaching of the entire (L+W) structure; however, in the case of the 
composite system there is no overflow operation on the levee component. Note that 
the overflow for the single levee is different than the overflow of the (L+W) system; 
the overflow operators are different. This is also precisely why the operators are 
referred to as knowledge operators as they reflect the contextual knowledge 
associated with the event and cannot be blindly applied to a situation without the 




The determination of risk is therefore a process of making discrete time step 
measurements, transitioning the system into different states over time. A classical 
analogy would be a decision tree, where one calculates the probabilities by going 
down different branches, but with one key difference: the states of the system are not 
pre-determined but continuously evolve for the quantum framework. In other words, 
the quantum state transition is not necessarily a Markov process as operator can be 
function of time, making the transition probabilities a dynamic quantity.   
To obtain quantitative risk values, one would calculate the expectation values 
of finding the system in a particular risk state or states. For the single levee systems, 
there are two possible states: the non-working state and the working state. For 
the composite (L+W) subsystems, there are two possible configurations, one for 
“separable” subsystems and one for “correlated/entangled” subsystems. For separable 
subsystems, there are eight distinct states: , , , and  
. For correlated/entangled subsystems, there are four possible states: , , 
, and . The scenario where the composite (L+W) are separable subsystems is 
rare since they are often subjected to event conditions together. For composite 
systems, we are more interested in the joint states than the separable states. In the 
case of the (L+W) systems,  can be interpreted as the catastrophic failure of the 
system, where both the levee and the flood wall failed. The  state represents the 
case of overtopping and with no breaching. The state could correspond to 
flooding due to erosion seepage through the levee foundation. In the case of Katrina, 




means we are interested in finding the system in the , , and states.  The 
numerical values can be obtained by performing a projective measurement (a von 
Neumann measurement) with the following projectors (measurable): ,
 , . To determine the probability of finding the (L+W) system in a 
breaching failure state, the projector B = , can be used to calculate 
. The expectation value of the measurable 
Ri,    or , gives you a measure of the risk of the 
system.    
 In principle one can also ask to quantify the risk of one of the subsystems. 
The notion of retrieving the state of a subsystem from the composite system joint 
states is not a simple concept, since it is not a mere projection of states due to the 
possibility of correlated states. One can extract the information about the joint state 
with projectors, but one cannot simply project out the individual component states for 
a subsystem. To determine the state of a subsystem (for example, the Ri for 
subsystem L) requires the extraction of the density matrix of the particular subsystem 
from the composite density matrix, using the partial trace operation over a 
subsystem.  
For the composite system formed from the tensor product of subsystems A and 
B, the density matrix is given by: . To obtain the density matrix of 
subsystem B, one performs the “partial trace” over subsystem A: 
          (8.23) 
P( 00 ) = LW 00 00 LW = LW 00
2




where  is called the reduced density matrix for subsystem B, and the partial trace 
of an operator (e.g. the density operator) is given by: 
          (8.24) 
For the scope of this investigation, the focus is on the risk considerations for the joint 
states at the system level, so we will simply state the above mathematical formalism 
but not discuss further in this dissertation.  
 In the next section, we will take a look at what this process tells us about the 
state of the HPS right before Hurricane Katrina hits the New Orleans area in 2005. 
The results from the quantum analysis will be compared to results from conventional 
risk analysis methods.  
8.2 Comparisons 
The algorithmic integrated model framework developed in the previous 
section represents many possible HPS configuration scenarios.  In this section, the 
integrated model scenarios and system states are compared to risk analysis results 
from the IPET, 2007, 2009 reports, which serve as the reference representing current 
standard assessment methods. This section will focus on highlighting the differences 
between the conventional and quantum approaches, and arguments are presented on 
why the new approach adds value to the risk analysis process and why further 
research on this new approach can be beneficial to the risk community.  
8.2.1 The Risk Scenario Before Katrina from Conventional Methods 
A comprehensive risk analysis and assessment was performed on the New 
Orleans HPS by IPET. Details from the analysis can be found in Volume I and VIII of 




description of vulnerability to flooding and risk for New Orleans and Vicinity: Past, 
Present, and Future.” A sophisticated modeling framework available at the time 
(2009) was utilized for the IPET study. In the reports, the team acknowledged the 
challenging nature of the problem: 1) the complexity of the physical costal region 
with substantial area below sea level, 2) the engineering system with many different 
interacting elements and structures increase problem complexity, and 3) known 
limitations of the analysis framework resulting in unresolved uncertainties. Below 
highlight several key aspects of the IPET analysis methodology and conclusions. 
The IPET study focused on assessing the flooding vulnerability of the New 
Orleans area in terms of how often and how severe flooding can be. The flooding 
events are classified into 3 groups according to severity and occurrence probability: 
2% chance of occurrence per year (average of once in 50 years or a 50-year event) 
resulting in significant flooding and losses, 1% chance of occurrence (average of once 
in 100 years or a 100-year event) resulting in extensive flooding and losses (typically 
due to rainfall, with minimal or no overtopping or breaching), and 0.2% chance of 
occurrence (average of once in 500 years or a 500-year event) resulting in major 
devastation to the area (hurricane). The 100-year event serves a standard engineering 
benchmark.  
The water level from storm surges and waves, causing flooding events and in 
extreme cases overtop and breach the system, was identified as the main hazard. A 
flooding event can be the result of a combination of several interacting factors, such 
as the water volume, the intensity of the flow, the surge levels, the surge frequency, 




events.  Other key parameters include the height of the water level, the storm 
frequency, the size of storms and hurricanes, and the speed of the storm moving 
across the region (affecting frequency of surges and wave impacts). Storm surge 
levels by hurricane can be difficult to model since they can vary significantly due to 
the many different possible storm configurations and parameters, from wind speed to 
the storm paths in relation to the geographic location. The probability of flooding 
depends on how these parameters interconnect with each other. Hence, the model to 
compute the probabilities for the risk analysis demands careful considerations of the 
interactions between the complex engineering system with the geographic 
environment.   
Sophisticated hurricane modeling programs and best practices for risk analysis 
were utilized in the IPET study.  The Joint Probability Method - Optimal Sampling 
(JPM-OS) was used, incorporating historical storm information from 1940 to 2006, 
including storm sizes, surge strengths, storm intensity and duration. Timing 
information, such as event frequency, was critical since storm surges develop over the 
life of the storm, the conditions before, during, and after the storm must be 
incorporated into the model. Two different frequency parameters were included; the 
frequency of storm surge during a storm, and the frequency of storm events hitting 
the region. Figure 31 is a compilation of different temporal profiles of storm surges 





Figure 31: Temporal profile example of storm surges used in the IPET (2009) study (Figure 
39 in Volume 1 of the IPET 2009 report). 
 
To assess the probability of flooding, the geographic region was decomposed 
into drainage basins and sub-basins, and each was further divided into reaches, which 
were levees or flood walls with uniform properties (strength, elevation, etc.). 135 
reaches were defined for the Pre-Katrina HPS. A system model for the engineering 
system, consists of levees, flood walls, gates, and pumps were systematically 
constructed by first analyzing the individual component’s reliability and 
performances, which were then integrated into subsystems taking into account of the 
component to component dependencies and interactions. The reliability and 
performance of the systems (reach, subsystem, component) were captured in fragility 
curves. The subsystems within a reach were evaluated against the storm water volume 
and flow, and flows between the basins were evaluated as well. The performances of 
the reaches were evaluated against storm surges and waves computed from the 




that can potentially flow into protected areas in the case where the engineering system 
fails (overtopping or breaching).  
Event trees were developed from the reliability information from fragility 
curves (Figure 32), the hurricane storm surge and wave models from 76 JPM-OS 
hypothetical hurricanes. The probabilities of flooding within the reaches were 
estimated from the event tree model (Figure 33). 
 
Figure 32: Fragility curves from IPET 2009 (Figure 41 in Volume 1 of the IPET 2009 report). 
 
Figure 33: Event tree from IPET 2009 (Figure 42 in Volume 1 of the IPET 2009 report). 




“Bottom line, the 100-year (or any chance flood) flood is dependent 
on the combined changes of experiencing a specific surge level, the 
chance of overtopping or breaching due to that surge, and the 
volume of water entering an area.” (IPET 2009) 
 
The conventional approach identified the various parameters and dependencies that 
could contribute and affect the risk assessment conclusions, and it is a snapshot of 
what are the knowns and known-unknowns. Time behaviors of how the events could 
have impacted the system were not fully explored. 
8.2.2 The Risk Scenario from the Quantum Framework 
The objective of the quantum approach is not simply to reproduce the results 
from the conventional method. As the last steps of the conventional techniques rely 
on the use of fragility curves and event trees, this comparison will focus at the 
macroscopic level and highlight differences between the conventional and the 
quantum outputs for fragility curves. 
The basic process to generate fragility curves from the quantum models was 
introduced in Chapter 6. Before generating the fragility curves, the density matrix 
representing the various possible states for the system has to be instantiated. This has 
the equivalent effect of generating the event tree for the HPS scenario. The “leaf 
nodes” are all elements of the density matrix. The different operators, overtopping, 
erosion, etc., are then applied to the density matrix, taking the system from one state 
to another. For example, to model temporal profile of storm surges (Figure 33), the 
Weibull profile is chosen to model the shape of the profile in the construction of the 
overflow operator.  The fragility curves are obtained by projecting out the various 




transition steps are compiled into curves to produce the quantum versions of the 
fragility curves. Fragility curves for various parameters can be constructed for a 
single structure, or for a system of systems such as a heterogeneous group of 
levees/flood walls consisting of systems of different states. Fragility curves can also 
be constructed for system of systems over time, such as the HPS system over the 
three development periods.  
To illustrate this point, a simplified version of the model developed earlier 
will be used to create two curves. For computational and illustrative purposes, we will 
assume a simple system consists of 20 identical levees.  The first curve models the 
entire levee system going through simple degradation over a period of time, and the 
degradation operator is a sigmoid function. The second curve models the same system 
but with half of the levees affected by some events (such as storm erosion) resulting 
in an increase of failure probability for that half of the population. The density matrix 
for the first system is given by: 
          (8.25) 
The density matrix for the second system is given by: 
 
            (8.26) 
where , as a short-hand. Essentially, the two curves reflect the time 
behaviors of two populations of levee. The first one is a homogeneous population and 
the second one is a heterogeneous population.  
Figure 34 plots the fragility curves for a single state system and a mixed state 




density matrices, with the system first subjected to the events and conditions first. 
The density matrices tracked the system states over time; the system was transitioned 
to the different “states” at different times, and the failure probabilities were projected 
out after each transition. The fragility curves produced as a result are only conveying 
a subset of information contained within the density matrices. The quantum 
framework extends the conventional framework by capturing and modeling temporal 
events, which were not performed in the IPET models. 
 
 
Figure 34: The curves for a homogeneous and a heterogeneous population levee system. 
 
The curve for the heterogeneous population (the blue curve) rises faster than 
the curve for the homogeneous population, which indicates the system fails sooner 
and earlier. Certainly, if instead the second population are repaired and enhanced 
levees with lower failure probabilities, then one would expect the curve to shift to the 
right, indicating that the system will fail later. Information about the system evolution 
over time and the composition of the population can affect the total system failure 




probability for this scenario, as expected. The curves are essentially comparisons 
between pure (homogeneous population) and mixed (heterogeneous) states system. 
Conventional methods are similar to the modeling of a pure state. In reality, 
however, most of the system are in mixed state. When the different populations of 
states are fully taken into account, the mixed state model, as expected, has a higher 
failure probability and the failure probability rise earlier and faster. The incorporation 
of the historical events, earlier failure states, shifts the curves to the left or to the 
right, depending on the behaviors of the population. As the system evolves over time, 
uncertainty increases as the system move further and further away from pure state; 
the system ensemble population changes over time, turning more and more into a 
statistical ensemble.  
 
Further thoughts… Often there is more than one way to refine the quantum 
models based on contextual information and subjective interpretations of system 
behaviors. For example, how does one handle the different types of event spanning 
different timescales for the HPS scenario? What constitute system failure in one class 
of event could be quite different from another class. On one end, one can treat every 
single event as a “unit” event, and one can interpret system failure probability as the 
product of all “unit” probabilities. This interpretation takes the perspective that every 
event contributes to the failure of the system and they cannot be separated or isolated. 
On the other end, one can treat the system failure probability as the statistical sum of 
all “unit” probabilities. This interpretation takes the perspective that all events are 




in this case, each event has a statistical “unit” average and the total probability is the 
combination of all the contributing event at a given instance. For the HPS quantum 
model scenario, the system event timeline has to be deconstructed to separate two 
classes of risk event based on timescale, one for short timescale and the other for long 
timescale.  
Short timescale events — The risk of the system is the cumulative product of 
the events. For example, the increase of water pressure increases the probability that a 
flood wall will collapse. The increase of flow volume also increases the probability 
that an overflow can occur. Further, the increase of flow volume also increases the 
front side erosion, which can also cause structural failure for the flood wall. The 
outcome can be a product of all the probabilities. This is applicable to events that 
happen within the same time window, such as during a hurricane. 
Long timescale events — Over a longer timescale, for events are not 
“casually” connected, i.e., the events are all separable, the failure probability of the 
system is simply the combination of the individual event. Since each failure event is 
disconnected from each other, the system will have “settled” down in a stable 
configuration in between the events. These separable, discretized system events in 
time behaves like the aforementioned “unit” events. A statistical average probability 
can be derived and used to represent these similar discrete events, and the total 
probability is the sum of these “unit” probabilities associated with all the contributing 
events at a given instance. Typically, this can describe events with large temporal 




requires more “statistical” input, such as historical trending data, and “subjective” 
inputs from expert opinions.  
The quantum risk analysis performed on the HPS is in essence an extended 
form of system dynamics simulation with non-Markovian elements that compute the 
risk states of the system at discrete time steps, with the choice of time scale 
granularity based on the event type. Larger time units are used for events that are not 
“casually” connected, and shorter time units for events that occur within the same 
time window. The simulation runs for the duration that takes the system from the 
initial state (the past) to the target state (the prediction). The quantum framework is 
capable to adapt to the different needs according to the problem situations. 
The quantum framework takes the conclusions from the conventional 
techniques as the starting point and take steps further by refining the risk questions 
and drilling further down beyond the system parameters and configurations. The 
refinements drill deeper into the system behaviors and time evolution scenarios, and 
further explore areas where the contextual questions can actively re-shape the 
modeling processes. The quantum models are sensitive to the amount of information 
and knowledge available, and how much one would like to apply to formulate the 
model at a sufficient level of details to arrive at the answers one seeks. Such 
framework that has the flexibility to handle both precise and imprecise scenarios 
helps to extend the risk analysis and assessment process on the HPS. The density 
operator formalism has shown to be a very capable framework that can be utilized to 




complex engineering systems. This research work only scratches the surface of a 











Probability is expectation founded upon partial knowledge. A 
perfect acquaintance with all the circumstances affecting the 
occurrence of an event would change expectation into certainty, 
and leave neither room nor demand for a theory of probabilities.  
- George Boole 1854, in An Investigation of the Law of Thought 
 
 
Previous chapters introduced the basic formalism on how to obtain 
probabilities from the quantum models of the complex engineering systems. This 
chapter explores the quantum framework’s additional capabilities to shed light onto 
the computation of probabilities for concurrent failure modes of engineering systems. 
One of the many current challenges in risk assessment is the computation of 
the total failure probability for a complex system with many different failure modes 
(Hill et al., 2003; Baecher, 2012; Collier et al., 2017). In previous chapters (Ch. 5, 7, 
and 8), specific scenarios of multiple events sequence were explored with the use of 
different operator sequences. Calculating the total probability of failure for 
engineering systems with multiple failure modes, especially if they can occur 
simultaneously and not be mutually exclusive or independent, can be challenging. 
Simple linear additive combinations of the failure mode probabilities can only be 




approximations have to be made to combine the probabilities and obtain valid total 
probabilities.  
When the assumptions and approximations no longer hold true, the law of 
probability can be violated.  As we approach the limits of the approximations, total 
probability calculated from approximations to probability rules can lead to 
inconsistent and incorrect results, such as the value of the total probability exceeding 
unity (>1), violating the basic conservation of probability and lead to the mis-
estimation of risk. While the conservation of probability principle is not an absolute 
concept, it can be applicable as a constraint for certain types of engineering problem 
and questions. For example, if the question asks whether a system is working or not, 
then the principle of conservation of probability is applicable due to the binary nature 
of the problem (like flipping a coin). The notion of re-mapping or re-normalizing the 
individual probabilities such that the sum of the probabilities equals to 1 has been 
suggested to address this problem (USBR/USACE, 2015). However, the validity of 
this approach was debated as it is seen as more a mathematical manipulation than 
based on sound principles probability (Hill, 2001, 2002, 2003; Baecher, 2012). 
Many decisions rely on the total failure probability as a decision point. The 
search for new methods and techniques to obtain total failure probability from 
concurrent events is an active and important area of investigation as present 
techniques to handle concurrent events have room for improvement. Concurrent 
events can significantly increase the chance of failure (Collier et al., 2017), especially 




modeling approaches to deal with the increase of systems complexity.  Castillo-
Rodrigues et al. 2017 states that  
Addressing and analyzing such complexity is one of the identified 
main concerns in the field of critical infrastructure governance, 
where complexity refers to the difficulty of identifying and 
quantifying casual links between multiple potential and specific 
adverse events. In this field, it is recognized the need to extend 
modeling in order to cope with the increasing complexity of 
systems.  
 
While others, such as the late Gary Salmon of BCHydro (NNCold 1997) expressed 
reservation on the ability of fault trees and event trees to treat time-dependent 
problems. New techniques that can handle engineering systems with complex and 
concurrent failure modes can play an important role in further advance the risk 
modeling of complex engineering systems. 
9.1 The Problem: Calculating Total Probability of All-modes Failure 
In engineering risk analysis, frequently we are working with systems with 
more than a single failure mode. An example of systems with different failure modes 
for a single event: seismic activities can subject a spillway monolith to lateral forces 
of various magnitudes, leading to structural failures such as cracking, sliding, or 
overturning (Baecher, 2012). For complex integrated systems, individual subsystems 
can have several different failure modes, and when subsystems are coupled together 
as an integrate systems, different failure mode permutations are possible.  
Further complications arise when the subsystem or component failure modes 
for complex engineering systems are not mutually exclusive and are not independent. 




addition to arrive at the total probability of failure. In addition, changes in the system 
as a result of repairs, upgrades, and modifications can also result in changes in the 
total failure probability. The case with the HPS in earlier chapters is an example 
where a system, the HPS, underwent three different construction phases, leading to 
drastic changes to the system configurations and states.  
One controversial treatment of the calculation of total probability has to deal 
with situations where the summation of the individual probabilities results in the total 
probability exceeding 1. Some treatments advocate the re-normalization of the total 
probability to unity, while another approach involves adjustments to the grouping or 
remapping of probabilities so that the final probability will not exceed unity (Hill, 
2001, 2002, 2003). In these treatments, the methods are guided by algebra rather than 
physical principles.  
Concurrent events, systems complexity, and time-dependent phenomena have 
posted significant challenges to risk analyses (Baecher, 2012; Collier et al., 2017; 
Castillo-Rodriguez et al., 2017; Salmon, 1997, USBR/USACE, 2015), and can lead to 
poor risk guidelines being issued by decision makers (Hill et al., 2003). Inappropriate 
treatment to combine probabilities can often to assessment bias, resulting in poor risk 
policy and decisions, and determining the proper way to combine probabilities has 
been identified as an important risk assessment challenge (Hill et al., 2003; Baecher, 
2012; Collier et al., 2017). 
9.2 Current Approaches 
Two methodologies commonly utilized for calculating total probability of 




are Event Trees and Fragility Curves. Their effectiveness and limitations in handling 
systems with non-mutually exclusive failure modes are assessed in this section. 
To calculate failure probabilities, these methods rely on the assumption that 
failure modes are independent or mutually exclusive. With those assumptions, the 
total probability is simply the products or sums of the probabilities.  In certain cases, 
if the magnitudes are small and the probabilities of the modes are almost mutually 
exclusive, the total probability can be “approximated” by the sum. In the case where 
this approximation or the assumptions are no longer valid (such as when the failure 
modes are not mutually exclusive), the total probability cannot be obtained from 
simply performing a summation of marginal probabilities.  
9.2.1 Event Tree 
An event tree is an inductive logical decomposition of an event, represented as 
a branching tree graph, into a progressive series of sub-events represented by event 
nodes, leading to some subsequent outcomes, consequences, or end states. An event 
tree is a representation of Sample Space and need not represent a chronology, 
although it is often used that way in engineering system safety studies (Hartford and 
Baecher, 2003). Boolean logic serves as the connectors for event nodes.  Event 
occurrence probabilities are associated with the nodes, and these probabilities 
facilitate the computation of risk. The event tree represents an exhaustive 
enumeration and combinations of all “known” mutually exclusive events (the 
collection of all the branches). Each event tree represents a scenario that describes the 
various event paths leading to various outcomes. Figure 35 is an event tree 




of a space mission. Figure 36 is another example of an event tree with each level 
corresponding to conditions that can be non-binary. 
 
Figure 35: An example of an event tree with binary states (ET for Hydrazine Leak, Figure 3-7 
in Stamatelatos & Dezfuli, 2011). 
 
 
Figure 36: An example of an Event Tree (Salmon & Hartford, 1995). 
 
The tree nodes by definition are meant to represent mutually exclusive events. 
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Figure 3-6. ESD for the Hydrazine Leak. 
 
 
Figure 3-7. ET for the Hydrazine Leak. 
 
spillway uplift, creek erosion, spillway overtopping and stilling basin undermining
(Figure 8-30).
A problem noted by Salmon and Hartford (Salmon and Hartford, 1995) is that as a
cha  of eve ts is d co posed into an ever-increasing number of sub-ev nts, the number
of individual probabilities within the chain becomes ever larger, and since these
probabilities are each less than one, their product has a tendency – in practice at least
– to become ever smaller.
A good deal of work has been done in this literature on the effectiveness of
desegregation in estimating subjective probabilities of poorly known quantities. It is
somewhat a matter of faith in engineering and reliability circles that disaggregating a
problem into its smaller component parts both increases understanding and improves
estimation accuracy. Yet, results in the literature are mixed (Morgan et al., 1990).
Several studies in the psychology literature (Armstrong et al., 1975; Gettys et al., 1973,
Henrion and Fischhoff, 1986) appear to support the contention that desegregation leads
to better calibrated probability estimates, But only if subjects know at least as much
about the smaller components to be estimated as they do about the aggregated quantity
itself.
Poorly understood mechanisms
The increasing use of probabilistic risk analysis in dam engineering has led to a
Figure 8-30. Partial event tree for hydrologic failure at Alouette Dam (Salmon and Hartford,
1995)
Note: s/py clps=slipway collapse
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the occurrence probability for the leaf event, which is separate from other leaf events. 
The collection of all the leaf probabilities represents all the possible system event 
states. To obtain the total probability of a particular set of events (a particular set of 
branch pathways), the probabilities of the leaf nodes corresponding to the set of 
events (the branch probabilities) are summed (additive sum of probabilities). 
In the case of concurrent multiple failure modes, a single event requires 
tracing down several branching pathways. The total probability for failure would 
require the summing of the probabilities from these different paths, which 
corresponds to the summing of the probabilities for failure modes that occur 
concurrently under a particular event scenario.  In the case where the fundamental 
assumption about non-mutually exclusive events is no longer valid, an event tree 
cannot be properly constructed since the branches might be “connected” at some of 
the nodes (Figure 37), which is not permissible due to the possibility of over counting 
or under counting with simple additive sum, leading to inconsistent results.  
 
Figure 37: An example for a tree with non-mutually exclusive events. 
 
In summary, besides the fact that the full enumeration of all possible events in 





branches and summing leaf node probabilities can lead to inconsistent results and the 
mis-estimate of risk (see Chapter 5, USBR/USACE, 2015 for further details). 
9.2.2 Fragility Curves 
For systems like the spillway monolith of a dam, sliding, cracking, or 
overturning can occur when subjected to lateral seismic loads of different magnitudes. 
A single hazard can cause the system to fail in more than one mode. In cases like this, 
the use of fragility curves is a common treatment for representing and characterizing 
the different conditions and the conditional failure probabilities (Schultz et al., 2010).  
Fragility curves are graphical plots of conditional probability of failure against 
the hazard condition or parameter such as the system load. Often, different probability 
curves corresponding to different failure modes are plotted on the same graph to show 
the range of failure probabilities a system can be found in due to the hazard. Figure 
38 is an example of levee fragility curves from NRC, 2013, Figure I-2. Figure 39 is a 
set of hypothetical fragility curves from three failure modes, A, B, and C, to be used 
later in the chapter. 
 
Figure 38. Examples of fragility curves, Figure I-2 from NRC (2013). 
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assessment of flood risks requires a system-level analysis where the system includes the watershed (the hydrologic 
system), the hydraulic system (river channels, flo dpl in), and the flood protection syst m. 
As part of a risk analysis, a systems modeling approach that considers the physical and operational elements of 
a flood protection system that are required to prevent flooding needs to be used. The system performance (system 
reliability) over a wide range of flood events is considered in order to estimate the risk in the floodplain, in the 
protected as well nonprotected, waterside areas of the system. The performance of the system of structures and 
other components that make up the system is integral to the hydraulic response – whether the protection system 
is breached or not. 
Structure, Component, and Operational Reliability
A key eleme t of the risk analysis is the assessment of the reliability of structures as well as other elements of 
the flood protection system to perform their intended function. This includes the integrity of the structures (levees, 
floodwalls, interface between structures, etc.) and operational reliability (actions of personnel) to close gates or 
other closures, operation drainage systems, etc. For purposes of the risk analysis, the reliability of structures is 
characterized in terms of the conditional probability of failure expressed as a function of an appropriate metric of 
the flood hazard (i.e., peak flood elevation) (USACE, 1996; URS/JBA, 2008; IPET, 2009; Schultz et al., 2010) 
(see Figure I-2). In addition to the assessment of fragility for structures in which the reliability depends on the 
loading level, there are other elements of the flood protection system whose reliability is independent of the level 
of flooding. Examples include the reliability of mechanical and electrical equipment (e.g., pump systems), actions 
of personnel (installation of closures, pump system operations, etc.).
A critical part of the reliability assessment is the collection of information about the various system components 
so that an understanding of system interactions, potential modes of failure (see Figure I-3 for a view of different 
levee failure modes) and performance can be developed. With respect to the assessment of fragility curves for 
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Figure 39: Fragility curves for different modes of failure A, B, C. 
 
From the fragility curves, one can obtain several probability measures 
corresponding to: 1) the probability of the occurrence of one failure mode irrespective 
of the occurrence of other failure modes (i.e., the marginal probability), 2) the 
probability of occurrence of multiple failure modes simultaneously (i.e., their joint 
probability), and 3) the probability of the occurrence of at least one failure mode. For 
(1), the probability comes directly from the curve corresponding to the particular 
failure mode. For (2), the probability is the product of the probabilities corresponding 
to different (independent) events at the same load or hazard condition. But for (3), the 
probability is more complicated. 
If the failure probabilities of the different modes are not independent, the law 
of total probability relating the marginal probabilities to conditional probabilities 
might not hold true, and that the total probability might not sum to unity. In the case 
where the failure modes are mutually independent, the total probability for the 




For independent modes, the probability for the occurrence of at least one of the 
failure modes is given by: 
     (9.1) 
Expanding: 
 
          (9.2) 
If we assume that the magnitudes for the probabilities of failure for the 
individual independent modes are small, we can drop the higher order terms and the 
probability can be approximate by this expression: 
     (9.3) 
This approximation is only true if the failure probabilities of the different 
modes are small. However, in the case where the probabilities of the modes are not 
small, the small magnitude approximation no longer applies, and the additive sum of 
the probabilities can be greater than unity, violating the law of total probability. 
9.2.3 Challenges with the Approaches 
The event tree and fragility curves methods work well when the independence 
assumption is applicable. Both fail when the individual failure probabilities are not 




basic question: how often do we encounter engineering systems where these 
assumptions are not applicable?   
For simple systems and rare events, which includes many types of concurrent 
events, such as mutually exclusive events, probabilistically independent events, 
correlated events, and conditional probability events, the mutually exclusive 
assumption are only approximations for the majority of these cases (USBR/USACE, 
2015; Hill et al., 2003; Collier et al., 2017). The use of event trees and fragility curves 
is therefore “approximation of approximation” at best.  When the assumptions no 
longer apply, such as when systems and the associated physical processes interact 
with each other (Collier et al., 2017), the approximations are no longer valid and 
probabilities cannot be combined via simple addition, and the methodologies will fail. 
As technology continues to advance and the complexity of engineering system 
interactions continue to grow, situations where those assumptions no longer applies 
are anticipated to be more of the norm than exceptions.  
Researchers have been exploring ways to augment and extend the current 
approaches to allow them to handle situations for which the failure modes are non-
mutually exclusive. Some have proposed modifications to the algorithms and logics 
for the construction and reconfiguration of the event tree branches to make them 
compatible and consistent with the rule of probability in terms of the computation of 
the final total probability (USBR/USACE, 2015). After the initial development of the 
event tree, the algorithm requires the analyst to look for common causes, then group, 
adjust, and reconfigure the tree branches; branches that share common cause events 




can contain multiple branches) are required to be reallocated to the remaining 
branches associated with the failure modes. In other words, common cause events are 
assigned to individual potential failure modes, and the associated probabilities are 
adjusted such that the total probability can be computed via the additive sum of the 
probabilities. This method is often illustrated using the Venn diagrams, where the 
algorithm reallocates overlapping regions so that the modes can be approximated to 
be mutually exclusive and therefore simple additive sum can be applied (Figure 40).   
 
 
Figure 40: Allocating multiple breaches to individual potential failure modes. From 
USBR/USACE, 2015, Figure I-5-10. 
 
While this approach can result in a structure conforming to , the 
adjustment of the structure and the relocation of probabilities are approximations at 
best, and thus the process introduces uncertainties into the model. With this approach, 
expert knowledge and information of risk analysts are used to modify the model’s 
knowledge structure which is separated from the probabilities. As presented in 
Chapter 2, this separation between probabilities and structures reduces knowledge 
about the process. When coupled with the introduction of expert assessments, which 




are themselves inherently subjective processes, this approach introduces additional 
new uncertainties into the model. Such methodologies are constantly evolving, and 
can be superseded by different approaches. At the time of writing of this dissertation 
(2018-2020), the above approach has been revised and the methodology has been 
modified in the latest release (USBR, 2018).  
In the case of fragility curves, one technique calls for the renormalization of 
the probabilities such that the total probability sums to unity. This approach was 
challenged from several fronts, from the lack of physical and engineering rationales 
in justifying the renormalization process, to the possibility of double counting the 
probabilities (Baecher, 2012). By treating the events as independent Bernoulli events, 
one can show that the process of performing the additive sum through enumeration 
can lead to the double counting of probabilities. Re-normalization of the probabilities 
will introduce additional weights and biases, resulting in a logical breakdown of the 
process.  
A key conclusion, therefore, is that methodologies involving the enumeration 
of the various probabilities, such as event trees and fragility curves, will lead to 
inconsistency when the fundamental assumption about independence and mutual 
exclusivity are not valid. Renormalization can only work when the assumptions about 
independence and mutual exclusivity are true; one cannot “renormalize” when the 
starting point, the independent Bernoulli events assumption, is not true. The issue 
with additive sums and maximum consequences are examples of the breakdown of 





Recalling that in Chapter 2, an argument was put forth that if the logical 
structures are detached from the fundamental probability, no matter how one changes 
the structure, those changes cannot directly address the underlying issue with the 
probabilities. During the process of enumeration, knowledge and information are 
systematically reduced at each level of decomposition without being captured and 
reflected in the probabilities. While the process will result with the allocation scalar 
probabilities at each node, without a measure of the uncertainty arises from the 
knowledge degradation, the probabilities at the leaf nodes do not reflect all available 
information. When one computes the total probability by summing the leaf nodes, the 
summation only accounts for the scalar probabilities but not the missing knowledge. 
In essence, we are only summing partial knowledge, and the missing knowledge can 
result in the over or under counting the probabilities. 
In closing, these modifications and adjustments of the knowledge structure 
can potentially introduce new problem elements. Adjustment of the knowledge 
structures and the reallocation probabilities based on expert assessments are 
inherently subjective processes. Selective adjustments of the tree structure are 
themselves approximations, which introduces additional uncertainties. Lacking 
physical and engineering justifications at times, the re-normalization of probabilities 
might lead to double counting probabilities, introducing additional biases and 
uncertainties. Risk can be mis-estimated as a result. 
9.3 Quantum Model 
Can the quantum framework provide an alternative approach to address the 




approach is different from the conventional approach: the enumeration of the 
probability sets and pathways (conventional) vs. the tracking of the states of the 
system (quantum). In this section, the differences between the conventional and the 
quantum approaches, the difference in the formulation of the problem, and the 
difference in the questioning and querying for the answer to the questions are 
explored. The challenge with the combination of probabilities with non-exclusive 
multiple fault modes will be examined using the quantum modeling framework.  
 
9.3.1 From Conventional to Quantum 
Conventional methods focus on the enumeration and tracking of event 
probabilities. Different engineering systems, under different conditions, require 
different ways to combine event probabilities. Assumptions and approximations have 
to be made in order to compute the total probabilities in a consistent manner under 
various conditions, which can be a daunting task. 
In the cases of event trees and fragility curves, the probabilities of the failure 
modes reflect conditions of the system, but information about the relationships 
between the modes are not fully captured. All other relational knowledge and 
contextual information are captured by structures connecting the probabilities. Since 
answers are derived mostly from the structures that map to scalar probabilities, if the 
structure is wrong, or the questions used to construct the structure are wrong, the 
answers will be wrong.  
Conventional probability and quantum probability have several conceptual 




events. In conventional approach, two events A and B are independent if these three 
conditions are true:  
1) P(A and B) = P(A)P(B),  
2) P(A|B) = P(A), and  
3) P(B|A) = P(B). Events A and B are mutually exclusive if P(A and B) = 0.  
In quantum probability, one can find concepts analogous to the above. 
However, the application of these analogous concepts does not necessarily 
correspond in equivalent fashions to traditional probability and risk questions. The 
quantum models capture and represent system states information. The state vectors 
are constructed from the superposition (section 4.2) of orthogonal basis vectors, with 
the basis vectors representing orthogonal states that are distinct and mutually 
exclusive from each other. This notion of superposition enables the incorporation of 
all possibilities in which dependent, independent, and mutually exclusive states are 
represented in the initial system state vector.  
Consider the state vector representing a composite system such as those 
discussed in Chapter 5. A composite system formed from the tensor product of 
components A and B are represented by:  
   (9.4) 
 This describes the system and the associated state space, and not events or 
probabilities. The basis state  represents the state where both components A and 
B are working, but the term does not represent the probability P(A and B). The terms 
in equation (AB) are interpreted in this work as follows:  





1) If A, B are independent, the probability amplitudes are separable (Chapter 
5),  and  are independent from each other 
2) If A, B are dependent, the probability amplitudes are not separable, i.e. 
 (also Chapter 5) 
3) If A, B are mutually exclusive, certain composite basis states are not 
permissible.  is not a permissible state since it corresponds to failures 
due to both A and B, which is not possible if they are mutually exclusive.  
Note that this is not the mutual exclusivity of the orthogonality of the states 
mentioned above. This mutual exclusivity is a constraint applied to the system, 
projecting it to a subspace. 
Additional information is incorporated into the construction of the system 
model. As discussed in earlier chapters (Chapter 7.6), the problem and questions 
shape the development and construction of the quantum model representing the 
system. 
The quantum approach focuses on describing the total states of a system 
directly with a probability framework that has the capacity to incorporate meta-
information. The process starts with the identification of all the possible states of the 
system. The system is then defined according to the collection of states or as 
ensembles of states. Changes to the system is permissible since we are tracking the 
total number of states. If certain states are no longer permissible for a system or new 
states are introduced into a system, then the quantum representation of the system will 







properly normalized (or renormalized). The ad hoc renormalization protocol 
associated with other conventional methodologies is no longer necessary.  
In the quantum framework, normalization and renormalization are part of the 
system creation, configuration, and evolution processes (Section 5.2): 
          (9.5) 
This, for example, is used to project a system into a subspace, implement constraints 
such as mutual exclusivity into the model. Instead of updating the probabilities, the 
quantum approach uses knowledge to update the number of states and the statistical 
distributions for finding those states by adjusting the statistical distributions ( ) in 
the mixed state density matrix, 
   .    (9.6) 
The quantum approach focuses on the representation of the system in states. 
The system representation is based on the amount of knowledge we possess. In 
addition, as the system changes and evolves over time, additional states can be added 
or removed from the system model to reflect the system configuration changes over 
time:  
1) When we have full knowledge, the system is a pure state system. With 
only partial knowledge, the system will be in mixed states, which also 
allows the incorporation of ignorance.  
2) Instead of updating probabilities, the quantum approach directly updates 




9.3.2 The Quantum Model for the Engineering System 
The system with three modes of failure, A, B, and C, used in the fragility 
curves discussion in the previous section will serve as the engineering system to be 
modeled here with the quantum framework. First, the problem statement (the 
question) will need to be reframed and recast: 
 
Original problem statement: What is the total failure probability of the system 
with multiple failure modes, given a particular (hazard) event (e.g. load)? 
 
New problem statement: Given a particular event (e.g. load), what is the 
probability of finding the engineering system in the specific state (e.g. failure 
state) corresponding to the event?  
 
The new problem statement reframes the question. The analysis will not focus 
on the probability of individual events, but on the probability of finding the system in 
a certain state or states. The system is considered together as an integrated whole and 
the system as a whole is working or the system is failing. From this perspective, by 
definition and by construction, the total failure probability of the system will be 
between 0 and 1, with the sum of the total failure probability always less than or 
equal to 1, following the law of probability. 
There is a subtle philosophical change in thinking here. The original statement 
asks: what is the probability of finding the particular outcomes (conditions) based on 




event, the probability for the occurrence of events. The quantum thinking is that we 
do not necessarily know everything about the system, so we focus on tracking the 
system states. Without knowledge certainty, one describes the system by enumerating 
all known possible states, and the system is described by the superposition (Section 
4.2) of these states. Information and knowledge serve as conditions and constraints 
that shape the quantum state vector (the model). Some states are eliminated as a result 
of the application of these knowledge constraints, and the process are done via 
operators and projectors (such as projection into a subspace).  Therefore, the 
construction of the system model takes into account our lack of knowledge and our 
ignorance; the new problem statement simply asks for the chance for finding the 
system in a not working state (the outcome condition) under those conditions. This 
drives how one construct the quantum model where the model state space consists of 
states from various failure modes, A, B, and C for this exercise. The state vector 
represents the possible states the system can be found. 
The quantum model construction process generally follows these steps: 
1. Define the questions and identify the type of system states that can provide 
answers. 
2. Describe the system in terms of states, with a focus of finding what type of 
states the system can be found in. 
3. Build the initial system state vector from the superposition of the system 




4. Identify the various modes, events, and physical processes that can change 
the system states. This is the knowledge base, the known-knowns and the 
known-unknowns.  
5. Apply appropriate knowledge to configure the system model to the initial 
state. For example, if certain basis states are not permissible due to a 
physical condition, those states are removed via projections. 
6. Build out the system to the appropriate initial configuration for the 
independent variable such as load or time. The system states are then 
evolved from the initial state to the desired target state with operators. 
7. Construct the desire projector according to the questions (step 1). The 
probabilities of the relevant states can then be projected out, if one would 
like to determine the probabilities of finding the system in those states. 
8. To perform quantitative risk measurements, one would follow the process 
discussed in Section 4.6. First, associate the quantitative values to 
consequences or impacts; they correspond to the “eigenvalues” for 
. The risk value can then be computed from . 
 
The initial representation for the quantum system — The starting point for the 
construction of the quantum model begins with the construction of a normalized 
engineering system, describing all the possible system states. The system can 
comprise independent states or a composite of states, and the individual modes are 
treated as components of the system. While there could be different ways to choose 
the basis vectors, such as choosing failure modes as basis vectors, the problem with 




finding the total failure probability aligns with treating the system as an ensemble of 
possible failure modes for a system that has two states — working and not 
working — as we are interested in the functional state of the system and not the state 
of the system failure modes. This choice of the ensemble approach aligns with the 
independent and mutually exclusive assumptions, plus the option to extend to address 
other scenarios beyond those assumptions.  
Consider a system with three possible failure modes, A, B, C. In the fragility 
curve approach, the three modes are described by three different fragility curves with 
their own distributions. In the quantum approach, each fragility curve is represented 
by a state vector with an associated operator that changes the state vector from one 
state to another (Chapter 6.1).  The initial state vector, , represents the basic 
system:  
       (9.7) 
 
A system, such as a levee (L), corresponding to the initial condition is denoted 
by : . The state vectors , , and  represent the initial 
system states subject to failure modes A, B, and C, given by:  
 
        (9.8) 
        (9.9) 
        (9.10) 
in which A, B, and C function as operators on the system state . 
ψ B = Bψ S




The state of the levee system corresponding to the particular failure mode at a 
particular condition (e.g. the load parameter l) is denoted by  where  
for mutually exclusive independent events. This is the state vector operated on by the 
load. The operators that change the states of the system corresponding to the failure 
modes are denoted by A, B, and C, which correspond to the physical processes 
governing the probability of finding the system in failure modes, A, B, and C as a 
function of the load parameter (l). The operators act on the corresponding state vector 
to reflect the state of the system: 
 
  is the state vector at a given load subjected to failure mode A. 
  is the state vector at a given load subjected to failure mode B. 
  is the state vector at a given load subjected to failure mode C. 
 
The probability of failure can be obtained by projecting out the  state with 
the projector  on the state vector . This corresponds to the extraction of the 
event subspace. Plotting out the results from the projection as a function of “Load” 
will give the fragility curves corresponding to the modes of failure A, B, and C. At 
this point, the state vectors represent a system with a single failure mode, A, B, or C. 
A system that can have more than one failure modes will need to be constructed. The 





The construction of a system with more than one mode of failure  — When a system 
is a composite of several failure modes, the state vector representing the system will 
need to be constructed out of the possible states using the tensor products to build up 
the system, or if certain failure mode component states are not applicable, projectors 
are used to eliminate those states from the system.  If we know which specific mode 
is occurring, say mode A, then the system is represented by the pure state: 
   (Aleatory)    (9.11) 
   (Aleatory + Epistemic)  (9.12) 
A and the state vector can represent both aleatory and epistemic uncertainties. 
For a system that can have both failure modes A and B, and if we know of the 
specific occurrences of the multi failure modes, then the system can be represented by 
the pure state composite constructed from the tensor product: 
       (9.13) 
In general, for a system with multiple failure modes A, B, C, …, the state vector is 
constructed from the tensor products of all the failure mode states: 
        (9.14) 
The properties of the resulting composite state vector reflect the relationships 
between the failure modes, whether they are independent, mutually exclusive, or 
correlated.  
Up to this point the state vector is the superposition of all possible states. 
Additional knowledge and constraints are then applied to configure the system. 
Consider the simple system with 2 failure modes A and B. 
 




Case 1: A and B are independent (therefore not mutually exclusive)  
If A and B are independent, then the tensor product will result in a state vector 
with separable probability densities. They are separable because they do not affect 
each other, and operator apply to one does not affect the other. The state vector is 
given by: 
   (9.15) 
This product state represents a composite system with two totally independent 
subsystems. The composite probability can be factorized into separate products, and 
the subsystems are not correlated. 
 
Case 2: A and B are not independent or mutually exclusive (therefore dependent) 
But if A and B are not independent, then the state vector is given by the more 
general form: 
    (9.16) 
This product state represents a composite system where the subsystems are correlated 
in some way, that the subsystems are “entangled” (Section 5.1, Section 7.5.5) to some 
degree. Changes due to A or B will affect the whole system. 
 
Case 3: A and B are mutually exclusive 
If A and B are mutually exclusive, then the state is not a permissible state 
for this system since both failure state A and B cannot occur simultaneously. 




     (9.17) 
Note that this is a subspace. The mutual exclusivity information about A and B acts as 
a constraint and change the configuration of the system. One can only consider the 
subspace and the target system is represented by a projection of the system into a 
subspace. 
At this point, these are pure states. Exact information and knowledge have 
been used to configure the system. Additional configuration might be necessary based 
on the amount of knowledge one has. 
 
The amount of knowledge determines how we model the problem and how we 
construct the density matrix — Depending on how much we know about the system, 
the above pure state representation might not be a comprehensive representation since 
the probability amplitudes might not be specified precisely. In such case, a mixed 
state system representing might be necessary. Consider a system with 2 failure modes 
A and B where the density matrix is given by .   
In the case where knowledge is insufficient to build out the model as 
prescribed above, such as for a system where we do not know precisely the 
occurrences of the failure modes A & B, the mixed state density matrix can be utilized 
to model the mixture of system states. The density matrix for this example is given by: 
     (9.18) 
where  and  are the probabilities for the occurrences of A and B. 
 




For example, consider the following problem statement:  
There is a 30% chance that the system can encounter failure mode A, 30% 
chance that the system can encounter failure mode B, and 40% chance that 
the system can encounter failure mode C. 
The system will in the form of a mixed state density matrix: 
   (9.19) 
We can construct other variants of the density matrix corresponding to the amount of 
knowledge we know about the system. In the case where we do not have all the 
information, a mixed state density matrix will need to be used to represent the system. 
If we only know of the distribution of the states, then a simple density matrix with the 
probability distribution will be sufficient to represent the system: 
          (9.20) 
As before, additional knowledge can be applied to constrain the system via operators 
acting on the density matrix (Section 4.3, 4.4, 7.5). The logic is the same as before, 
but instead of applying the operations on the state vector, one applies the operation on 
the density matrix following the established algebraic rules. The failure probability 
can be obtained with the usual means using projection, depending on the 
characteristics of the system and the question. 
9.4 Quantum System Model Scenario: Concurrent Failure Modes 
This section provides examples to illustrate the concepts developed thus far. A 
levee system (L) with state vector  will be used in this section as a scenario case 




uncertainty:  . The levee system corresponding to the initial 
condition is denoted by . The density matrix is given by: . 
 
For a single levee, , the density matrix is given by: 
        (9.21) 
The probabilities can be obtained via the trace of the density matrix, ,  
and for the particular state or states using projectors (P). For example, the failing state 
probability is: 
           (9.22) 
 
If A is a failure mode applicable to a single simple system, such as a levee, the 
operator is represented as follow: 
  
          (9.23) 
 (9.24) 
 
To simplify, the state vectors modeling failure modes (e.g. mode A, mode B) 




       (9.25) 
       (9.26) 
 
To illustrate the concepts, several failure mode scenarios are explored, 
including: 
1) Foundation failure due to water pressure due to flow event - Pressure (P), a 
function of water level h and the height of the levee 
2) Overtopping due to storm surges or seasonal water changes – Overtopping 
(O), a function of water level h and the height of the levee 
3) Erosion due to nominal material degradation over time due to environmental 
effects – Erosion (E), a function of time 
4) General material and structural fatigue – Material (M) degradation over time 
such as vegetation overgrowth  
 
Three scenarios are presented: 1) Single failure mode, 2) Concurrent 
independent failure modes – A & B Separable, and 3) Concurrent dependent failure 





9.4.1 Scenario: Single Failure Mode – Individual Overtopping, Pressure, and Erosion 
Events 
Before discussing the concurrent states, we first model the basic single failure 
mode. At a given time, only a single operator representing the failure mode is 
changing the state of the system. To model the overtopping event for example, recall 
from Section 5.2, the operator O is constructed from parameters that track and trace 
the behavior of the failure probability, and in this case the water level is a parameter 
of the operator, : 
 (9.27) 
where  are functions of water level. The density matrix is given by: 
   (9.28) 
A fragility curve for the levee, defined as the conditional probability of failure 
at a given value of water level, is a plot of the water level, h, against the probability of 
failure, , Figure 41.  
 





In the event of a storm, the failure probability for the levee can also be 
represented with a different curve that plots the probability of failure against time. 
With the case of a storm, the water level (elevations) changes as a function of time 
(see Figure 13), and to model the overtopping event in this case, the operator O can 
be constructed from a different parameter that tracks the time behavior of failure 
probability. In this case the water level is a function of time, and in turn, a parameter 
of the operator, . With this parameterization, the plot for the failure 
probability becomes (Figure 42): 
 
 
Figure 42: Failure probability for a levee as a function of time, which traces the water 
elevation as a storm event occurs over time. 
 
Likewise, the state vectors for the other scenarios and the time evolution 
behaviors of their states are expressed with physical parameters that track and trace 
the failure conditions. For Pressure events, since hydrostatic pressure is proportional 




water height profile. For a single cycle, such as the rise of water level during a storm 
event, the water level is a parameter for the pressure operator, :  
      (9.29) 
 
Similar to the overflow event, as the water level is a function of time, h(t), the 
profile would take the general form of a bell-shaped curve (Figure 43): 
 
 
Figure 43: A general profile for the function tracing the change of pressure on the water 
facing side of the structure. 
 
For Erosion event: 
       (9.30) 
From these state vectors (Equation 9.27, 9.29, 9.30), fragility curves can be 






samples of curves showing the failure probability as a function of time for three 
different failure events. 
 
Figure 44: Examples of failure probabilities for different events. 
 
Thus far, we are simply modeling individual events. If we know of the 
occurrence of an individual event, the above models will provide you with 
information about the system states. What about the case where we do not know 
precisely which failure mode can occur? Can we model this type of situations? 
The limitations on the availability of information and knowledge led to the use 
of statistics (data, information, and knowledge) to represent the chance of the 
concurrent occurrence of the failure modes. Consider the case where vegetative 
growth on a levee is a possibility, but the precise condition varies according to the 
environment. While material degradation due to vegetation (M) and erosion due to 
flow (E) can result in failures, it is difficult to define precisely their relationships. To 
determine all the correlations between M & E can be a challenge. One possible 
approach is to choose to ignore the details and express the system as a mixed states 




If we do not know precisely the occurrences of the failure modes, M & E, we 
can model the system as a mixture of both modes, and we have a mixed state system: 
, where ,   are the probabilities for the 
occurrences of M & E 
   (9.31) 
This formulation can be interpreted as a weighted (statistical) addition of 
probabilities, in the form of a mixed states density matrix. Here, the difference is that 
we are weighting the probability of finding the system in certain states that can still 
be evolving, and not simply a weighted sum of scalar values; we are weighting the 
states and not the probability. To obtain the probabilities, one performs the usual trace 
of the density matrix  for the state or states in question. With the 
density matrix model for the basic single failure mode formulated, we can now turn to 
constructing models for systems with multiple failure modes.  
9.4.2 Scenario: Concurrent Independent Failure Modes – A & B Separable 
For a system that can have both failure modes A and B, the system state vector 
is constructed from the tensor product of the single failure mode state vectors: 
 
    (9.32) 




     (9.33) 
 
 
If A and B are independent from each other, then the probability amplitudes 
are separable. This product state represents a composite system with two totally 
independent subsystems. The composite probability density can be factorized into 
two separate components, and the subsystems are not correlated. In this case, 
operators act on the subsystems independently and separately. 
Conventional approach in analyzing the concurrent independent failure modes 
(this scenario) calls for the use of event trees. For this scenario of a two states system, 
the model will be a binary event tree (Figure 45). Looking at the state vector 
, the probability amplitudes associated 
with the basis vectors correspond to the square root of the probabilities at the leaf 
nodes for the binary event tree. Probabilities obtain from performing the normal 
projection of the subspace(s) yield the same probabilities found at the leaf nodes. The 
state vector is equivalent to the regular binary event tree. Tensor product of the 
failure mode state vectors creates an event tree. This is expected as the tensor product 






Figure 45: A generic binary event tree. 
 
Scenario: Concurrent non-mutually exclusive but independent failure modes for a 
levee.  
The overtopping (O) failure mode and the erosion (E) failure mode can be 
considered as independent from each other. Erosion is a function of time and 
overtopping is a function of the height of the levee. A levee can be subjected to both 
of these events simultaneously. The general state vector for a system that can be 
subjected to E and O can be constructed from the tensor product: 
    (9.34) 
   





Since E and O are independent, the probability amplitudes are separable 
which can be factorized into separate products, and the subsystems are not correlated. 
The state vector  is equivalent to the regular binary event tree (Figure 46).  
 
 
Figure 46: The binary event tree a system with independent E and O failure modes. 
 
If one computes the outcome of the states from the state vector/density matrix, 
one obtains: 
     (9.36) 
     (9.37) 
     (9.38) 
     (9.39) 
 
For this scenario, the key assumption is that the failure modes are separable, 




simply obtained by summing the corresponding states that deemed to be contributing 
to the failure of the system.   
This summation is different than those from other techniques (e.g., event tree) 
in a number of ways. First, no approximation has been made regarding the 
magnitudes of the probabilities — no small magnitude approximation. Second, the 
probabilities are not just failure probabilities associated with a single event isolated to 
a single component or subsystem. The probabilities at the leaf nodes are probabilities 
associated with finding the system in a particular state. Contextual information and 
knowledge are used in the model construction process to build the composite state 
vectors. Third, the construction of the system model using tensor products ensures 
that the total probability of all possible events sums to unity, and thus preserving the 
law of total probability. Lastly, the problem with over counting can be avoided since 
we are not performing summations of event probabilities. Rather, we are summing the 
probabilities for finding the system in certain states specified by the initial question 
asked. 
While state vectors contain information that can be used to derive outcomes 
similar to those of an event tree, they are not equivalent to them. The probabilities 
derived from the state vectors are by products of the construction of the initial system 
state model. The model then undergoes various configurations (such as the 
application of constraints based on information and knowledge) and reconfigurations 
(change of the system parameters, changes from event occurrences, and changes over 
time). The changes in the probabilities correspond to the changes in the system. To 




finding a system in certain failure states, project measurements are performed on the 
model. The projective measurements (Section 4.3.2) extracts different type of 
information embedded in the state vector for answers. This circles back to the notion 
that the question shapes the formulation of the model and determines the type of 
results to be extracted from the system mode. 
 
9.4.3 Scenario: Concurrent Dependent Failure Modes – A & B Correlated/Entangled 
If A and B are not independent, then the failure modes (the subsystems) are 
correlated in some way and the subsystems are “entangled”. With the state vector 
representation, the probability amplitudes are now represented by joint probability 
amplitudes in contrast to separable amplitudes. The state vector now takes the more 
general form: 
     (9.40) 
 
From this perspective, it is no longer relevant to talk about failure mode A and 
failure mode B as separate entities; rather, it is a composite failure mode, AB, where 
the composite behaviors dictate the evolutionary behavior of the system states. Event 
operators now reflect how the composite failure mode AB changes the states. The 
physics of the system is captured by the operators; the relationships between A and B 
are embedded within the operators which modify the joint probability amplitudes. 
The degree of correlation can be represented and coarsely measured by the density 
matrix properties: ,  (Section 7.5). Instead of tracking 8 states 




states, . We are losing details about individual component behaviors but 
retain the ability to make forecast on the composite system. This further support the 
notion that the concept of operators can be part of the theoretical structure that 
represent epistemic uncertainty (Section 7.4).  
 
Scenario: Concurrent not-mutually exclusive and not independent failure modes for a 
levee 
The Pressure (P) and Overtopping (O) failure modes are not independent 
since they are both functions of the height of water levels. The probability amplitudes 
for the failure modes are not separable:  
, with  (9.41) 
In this case, the individual P and O operators will need to be replaced by a new 
composite operator, acting on , which will take on different functional form. The 
composite operator, in this case, corresponds to the physical model that describe the 
behavior (change of state) of the system as a whole.  
Operators act on the composite state vectors,  and not on 
the sub-component failure modes. We are ignoring the individual component 
behaviors (e.g. failure mode A, failure mode B) and focus on the composite 
behaviors. From the mathematical perspectives, the required conservation of total 
probability helps to constraint the how the operators act on and alter the probability 
amplitudes for the joint states. The modeling efforts focus on the characterization of 




efficiency with fewer states to track. In addition, risk assessments can be performed 
without exact detailed knowledge of the component behaviors. In certain cases, actual 
observation/measurement of one of the components can specify the other part if the 
correlations are fully characterized. Decomposition into individual components might 
not actually add additional meaningful insights and values. 
But what is the meaning of the state vector ? It is the superposition of 
four different possible composite states ( ) corresponding to the 
different possible combinations of failure or not-failure modes. Consider this scenario 
where a levee is subjected to a high flow volume on one side. At a given time, the 
levee with two failure modes P & O is described by : 
1) The system is working with no failure  —  e.g. water level below the 
top of the levee and no seepage (Figure 47). Both failure modes are not occurring. 
Water is kept on one side of the levee and there is no flooding on the other side. 
 
 















2) Failing with mode P,  — e.g. water pressure creates a structural gap 
with water seepage (Figure 48). Increase in water pressure leads to a higher 
probability of water seepage for the levee structure. While water is flowing into the 
other side, the water level is not high enough to overtop the levee and will not lead to 
the overtopping condition.  
 
 
Figure 48: One failure mode, P, is occurring. 
 
3) Failing with mode O, — e.g. the levee structure is intact, but water 
overtopping occurs (Figure 49). Increase in water flow volume leads to a higher 
probability of water overtopping the levee. However, the structure of the levee is 















Figure 49: One failure mode, O, is occurring. 
 
4) Failing with both modes P & O, — e.g. both structural failure and 
overtopping occurs (Figure 50). This is true concurrent failure modes when both 
modes are actively acting on the system.  
 
Figure 50: Both failure modes, P & O, are occurring. 
 
The composite system states shifted our perspectives to focus on the modeling 
























modes. The composite failure mode (AB) becomes the focus and not the individual 
modes (A and/or B). This has significant implication on how one approach answering 
questions about risks. 
Previously, the risk question has been redefined as the probability of finding 
the system in the joint states and not the individual states. In conventional 
approaches, individual failure modes are considered and evaluated separately (e.g. 
event tree). In the quantum framework, the behaviors of the joint states take the center 
stage. Switching from the components to the composite aspect of the systems, the 
framework points to the possibility that risk assessments can be performed if we have 
full knowledge of the behaviors of the composite states, even without detailed 
knowledge of the individual components. In cases where risk assessments on the 
composite system behaviors are needed, it is the integrated behaviors of the 
composite system and the composite failure mode that counts.  
The quantum approach introduces a different way of thinking: all failure and 
non-failure modes are considered together as different superposition composite states 
of a system. The composite states can be in a product state (separable) or entangled 
state (correlated) (Chapter 5.1). Contextual information and knowledge constrain and 
configure the system model. The risk analyses focus on tracking the various 
composite states and their evolutionary behaviors. How much information and 
knowledge we possess about the system, the components, and their behaviors shape 
the risk question and determine how the system model configures and evolves over 
time. In some cases, questions at the component level could be irrelevant and not 




perform the analyses based on the component states. In the case of entangled systems, 
only the composite states and behaviors are meaningful. In modeling the joint states, 
the precise behaviors of the components might be ignored. For these scenarios, 
modeling the joint states behaviors might be sufficient to answer risk questions.  
The loss of precision as a result of ignoring the component state behaviors is 
counterbalanced by a gain of computational efficiency. Instead of tracking 8 states, 
the composite model only tracks 4 states. To obtain the total failure probability, one 
calculates the summation of the three failure states  , ,  probabilities, 
obtain by extracting the subspace via projections. This is a philosophical change of 
the mindset on how we formulate the question: instead of focusing on the parts, we 
focus on modeling the sum of the joint states. 
9.4.4 The Calculation of the Total Probability 
At this stage, system information and knowledge have been applied to 
configure the system, and they served as constraints to shape the system model to 
reflect realistic physical and logical conditions. Additional contextual information and 
knowledge, such as temporal events and environmental changes, are then applied to 
bring the system model to the state in time relevant to the question at hand. Changes 
that happened to the HPS over time are examples of such kinds of contextual 
information and knowledge. Depending on the nature of these information and 
knowledge, they are incorporated into the model in a number of ways. Specific events 
can be modeled as an operator that alter the states of the system (hence changing the 




might be incorporated into the model to reflect the physical reality of the situation and 
condition.  
This is an iterative process and the objective is to bring the system model to 
match the system parameters in the state space and in time, in alignment with the 
problem statement and questions. For example, a typical risk analysis scenario might 
ask for finding a levee failing 25 years from initial construction. The levee scenario 
models developed earlier can be advanced in the time dimension, and projective 
measurements such as  can be performed on the model to extract suitable 
information to answer the question. 
9.4.5 The Calculation of the Total Probability 
How are the total failure probabilities calculated? The probability of finding a 
system in the specific states is obtained from the application of the Born Rule 
(Section 4.1, 4.6) on the projection of those states, which is essentially the sum of the 
probabilities associated with the failing states. 
In the quantum treatment, contextual knowledge and information are captured 
in the states, in the form of state vectors or density matrix, and the concurrent failure 
mode probabilities are obtained directly from the joint states  
     (9.42) 
or  
      (9.43) 
depending on whether the modes are mutually exclusive, concurrent independent, or 





          (9.44) 
represents mixed states where precise knowledge might not be available.  
Keys to this process are the construction of the risk questions, the selection of 
the risk states, the change of states, the availability and use of knowledge, which 
collectively go beyond probability distributions and their mapping to represent 
uncertainties. Fragility curves, binary event trees and the outcome probabilities are all 
derivative products from the state vectors and density matrices. 
The quantum framework tracks the change of system states, which includes 
both the evolution of the system states and the number of states in the system. The 
total number of states in a system can change over time, reflecting the actual changes 
in the system itself. By design, the quantum system is re-normalized when the 
number of system states changes as a result of the increase or decrease of the number 
of states from tensor products or projection operations. This ensures that the total 
probability will not exceed unity.    
These two specific characteristics directly address some of the inconsistencies 
with some conventional techniques in the calculation of the total probabilities. The 
renormalization of the probabilities to resolve the inconsistency with the computation 
of the total probability for concurrent failure modes in the case with fragility curves is 
now a formal structure of the quantum framework. The notion with the potential over-
counting of the independent Bernoulli events can be addressed by state vectors where 
all the different combinations of states are tracked. The process to build composite 
system model with tensor product further ensures all event states are tracked and 





How does the quantum approach compare to the conventional probabilistic 
approach? The quantum framework provides a rich theoretical structure to model 
engineering system risk behaviors. The framework provides a structure where 
solutions from conventional methods can be derived from the quantum framework as 
products, and new insights can be obtained from the additional features introduced by 
the framework. However, one must accept the notion that the conventional and 
quantum approaches are fundamentally different, and side-by-side comparisons 
between the two might not be as valuable as examining their deviations. The 
remaining of this chapter focuses on a number of similarities between the two and 
explore how quantum deviates from the conventional approach. 
9.5.1 How Risk Problems are Represented 
Quantum thinking changes how one models systems since the mathematical 
framework moves away from conventional approaches. As discussed in earlier 
sections, the representations between conventional and quantum frameworks are 
conceptually similar but not the same. The quantum treatment embedded contextual 
information into the state vectors and the operators. Answers are derived from the 
system state vectors via extraction processes (such as projections) according to the 
questions. The formulation of a quantum system model mirrors the question: “What is 
the probability of finding the system in the working or failing state?” The system is 
model as a whole and not just a sum of parts. 
The quantum model allows the simultaneous representation of all possible 




a non-issue, since they are all represented in the model as a result of superposition. 
Independent, dependent, and joint events can be handled by product and entangled 
states. Information and knowledge constraint and adjust the system states.  The exact 
representation reflects the amount of knowledge we have; we can be as precise as we 
want if we have the knowledge; or we can choose to ignore some of the knowledge if 
computational complexity requires of it (at a cost of the introduction of additional 
uncertainty). Subspace extraction provides the mechanism to select the appropriate 
and relevant states to represent the system, and the various probabilities can be 
computed from projecting out the relevant states. 
9.5.2 How Conditionals are Represented 
Conventional probabilistic methodologies model concurrent risk events 
utilizing the following properties from probability theory:  
Complementary:  
        (9.45) 
Mutually exclusive:  
      
         (9.46) 
Not mutually exclusive: 
   (9.47) 
Conditional Probability: 





   
         (9.49) 
Dependent:   
      (9.50) 
Joint events, conditionally dependent: 
    (9.51) 
Joint events, independent: 
    (9.52) 
 
While concepts analogous to the above are available from quantum 
probability, their effects are different. For example, in the quantum treatment, mutual 
exclusivity of the basis state vectors defines the vector space they are in; whereas in 
conventional probabilities, mutual exclusivity does not define the sample space itself.  
With the quantum approach, the question affects the formulation of the 
problem, and in turn, affects how the system model evolves and change. In the 
quantum framework, due to how operators and quantum operations can change not 
only the states but also the system itself, the prior shapes the evolution of the risk 
questions.  This means that the questions we ask will also shape the outcome of the 
analysis. The right question has to be asked (the right set of risk states need to be 




9.5.3 How Probabilities are Updated 
In conventional probabilistic approaches, probabilities can be updated via 
Bayes Theorem. The process of updating the probabilities are referred to as Bayesian 
updating where new data and information are used to update the current probability 
model. Bayesian technique allows the incorporation of additional information and 
evidence into the probabilistic models, and hereby conditioning and updating the 
“prior” with new evidence, represented by a “likelihood function,” to derive the 
“posterior” probability. The posterior probability is obtained from the application of 
the Bayes’ Theorem. 
With the quantum framework, both the system and the probabilities can be 
updated. Technically, the probabilities are not updated directly. The system models 
with the system states are updated. The system itself can be updated with the 
additional and removal of system states (pure state) or by adjusting the mixture of 
states (mixed state). This process is driven by data (new data from physical 
observations and measurements), information (parameters in models), and knowledge 
(contextual). These are encapsulated into operators that act on system models, 
transition system models from states to states. Probabilities derived from the 
transitioned models are therefore reflecting the updated probabilities. 
Furthermore, an additional type of “conditional” comes with the operator-
based framework. Operators can be commutative or non-commutative. For 
commutative operations, the orders of the operation do not matter: . For 
non-commutative operations, the orders do: . The commutative property 
adds dynamic elements to how system can evolve under a variety of conditions. 
AB − BA = 0




Some of the conventional processes used to adjust structures, such as the 
adjustment of event trees, in the quantum framework, it is part of the framework 
itself. The operators can adjust the trees. 
9.5.4 How Problems are Analyzed 
The quantum thinking changes how one analyzes the problem. The quantum 
thinking changes how one formulates and analyzes risks associated with complex 
engineering systems. The issue with computing total probability for concurrent 
multiple failure modes, regarding the necessity to assume small and independent 
failure mode probabilities to allow the use of approximation techniques, does not 
manifest itself in the quantum approach. The process to compute the probabilities in 
the quantum framework is different than conventional probability. The tracking of the 
probabilities in the quantum framework is exact, all states are represented and 
tracked. The calculation of the probabilities does not require approximations. With the 
quantum framework, the “approximation” in the calculation is more of a reflection on 
how much knowledge one knows about the system, and not some mathematical 
constructs designed to address a particular aspect of the problem. With the quantum 
model, the summation of probabilities does not need to exceed unity since the 
conservation of total probability is guaranteed by the way of construction.  
The problem with the re-normalization of individual failure mode 
probabilities so that the sum adds to one are also addressed. With the quantum 
framework, the re-normalization is not about the individual probabilities; rather, the 
re-normalization is done as part of the construction of the system model. The system 




very real physical system. The re-normalization is performed not as a requirement to 
make the summation to be less than one; rather, it is driven by the reconciliation of 
the model with the actual physical system. The quantum framework focuses on the 
state of the system, and probabilities are attributes associated with the system, derived 
from probability amplitudes. 
In terms of the notion of over counting, the argument that uses the 
independent Bernoulli events to show that the process of enumerating the different 
probabilities and then summing them will lead to total probabilities greater than 1 is 
now avoidable. In the construction of the state vectors, the tensor products enumerate 
and track the changes and perform the counting. The reason why the states will not be 
double counted is due to the fact that the probabilities extracted from the state vectors 
do not come from simple addition of probabilities. The probabilities are calculated by 
projecting the states out from a system that is properly combined and normalized. If 
the process is properly followed, the states will not be counted more than once! 
Turning towards the ambiguity problem, the quantum models can potentially 
address it by capturing contextual information and knowledge using the additional 
degrees of freedom resulting from a scalar to a vector framework. The additional 
degrees of freedom can encapsulate knowledge and information directly in the system 
models, using the density operator formalism for example. The mixed state density 
matrix provides different pathways to model systems based on how much information 
and what type of knowledge one possesses, as well as the relationships between the 
different system states. In certainly case where the system behaves like an ensemble, 





In this chapter, the problem about finding the total probability for systems 
with concurrent failure modes was analyzed with the quantum framework. The 
quantum formulation allows the integration of complex models and physical models 
in the form of state vectors, which reflect our knowledge about the relationships 
between the failure modes.  Additional information, knowledge, and physical models 
are expressed in terms of the operators, connecting the physical problem with the 
change and evolution of failure probabilities.  
The quantum framework provides a powerful set of tools to differentiate the 
characteristics of the system beyond a simple probability framework. Binary event 
trees can be constructed from the state vectors using tensor products. The quantum 
framework does not predefine the paths; rather, it maintains that all states are possible 
as a result of superposition, and the system evolves as events unfold. The 
probabilities are extracted at the end of the system evolution. The quantum 
framework will result in total probabilities consistent with the law of probability 
when framed properly. The quantum calculation relies on projection to extract 
information; one does not just sum but select what to “sum” over via a purposeful 
extraction. 
The quantum framework is structured such that the different event 
probabilities, when properly framed and combined, will result in total probabilities 
consistent with the law of probability. The mathematical operations require the 
preservation of the law of probability, because it is a requirement to keep track of the 




number of possible states and the total number of actual available states are the same. 
The sample space is always the state space. The number of states can change in the 
quantum models via operations performed on the system state vectors. As a 
consequence, instead of common cause adjustments where one re-arrange the 
structure connecting the samples within a sample space, the quantum models simply 
track the system states, without any re-arrangements. While there are many different 
individual frameworks that can perform similar analysis, this new quantum approach 
integrates them under a single framework. Certainly, one can debate and argue the 
philosophical interpretation regarding special cases and conditions, but the use of the 
quantum framework provides a solid and coherent foundation where other techniques 





Chapter 10:  Quantum Experimental Model II: Scheduling Risk 
for Software Development  
 
 
If you don’t know where you are going, you’ll end up someplace else. 
- Yogi Berra 
 
 
In principle, the quantum framework is problem agnostic. Besides modeling 
physical engineering systems, it can be applied to analyze other classes of problem. 
This chapter explores the use of the quantum framework to analyze scheduling risks 
associated with the development of software systems for NASA missions.  
Conventional project schedule risk analysis starts with the question: “Given 
the uncertainties and multiple risks associated with a project, what is the probability 
that the project will complete within a given cost and duration?” Typically, to answer 
this question, different probabilistic models are developed for the cost-loaded 
schedule network scenarios, and statistical simulations are performed on those 
scenarios to generate duration predictions. The results are then compared to the actual 
schedule milestone constraints and cost constraints to determine the risk of missing 
schedule target. 
Schedule risk analysis does not and should not be confined to the initial 
project planning phase. From the project manager’s perspective, the key to success 
rests on how to continuously monitor and gain insights during project execution so 
that one can ensure the project meets the target schedule. As pointed out earlier, 
current risk analysis techniques gravitate towards the formulation of uncertainties to 




perspectives on the incorporation of the continuous evolution of uncertainties, the 
transitions of the “system” from states to states, and the contextual information about 
the activities into the uncertainty models.  
The quantum approach could realign the scheduling risk modeling process to 
better represent the scheduling lifecycle, reflecting how different software 
development workflow methodologies and processes dynamically change the 
scheduling risks. This chapter explores how the quantum approach offers new 
insights into the analysis of scheduling risks. 
 
10.1 Background and Current Approaches 
House Spending Bill, Report 116-HR 648 
James Webb Space Telescope (JWST).—The agreement includes 
$304,600,000 for JWST. There is profound disappointment with both 
NASA and its contractors regarding mismanagement, complete lack of 
careful oversight, and overall poor basic workmanship on JWST, 
which has undergone two significant reviews because of failures on 
the part of NASA and its commercial sector partner. NASA and its 
commercial partners seem to believe that congressional funding for 
this project and other development efforts is an entitlement, unaffected 
by failures to stay on schedule or within budget. This attitude ignores 
the opportunity cost to other NASA activities that must be sacrificed or 
delayed. The agreement includes a general provision to adjust the cap 
for JWST to $8,802,700,000, an increase of $802,700,000 above the 
previous cap. NASA should strictly adhere to this cap or, under this 
agreement, JWST will have to find cost savings or cancel the mission. 
NASA and its contractors are expected to implement the 
recommendations of both the most recent independent review and the 
previous Casani report and to continue cooperation with JWST's 
standing review board. The agreement does not adopt the 
reorganization of JWST into Astrophysics, and the JWST Program 
Office shall continue the reporting structure adopted after the Casani 







In space missions, PRA techniques are routinely used by NASA in assessing 
mission failure risks associated with hardware and software development programs. 
The NASA Probabilistic Risk Assessment Procedure Guide for NASA Managers and 
Practitioners (Stamatelatos and Dezfuli, 2011) contains detailed specifications on how 
to perform PRAs to analyze different scenarios including Common Cause Failures, 
Human Reliability Analysis, Software Risk Assessment, Probabilistic Structural 
Analysis, Launch Abort Models, Physical and Phenomenological Models. For the 
analyses of software risks, conventional PRA techniques are coupled with Context-
Based Software Risk Model (CSRM) technique to further integrate probability and 
contextual information in the modeling of scenarios. 
While PRA techniques are traditionally used in the area of reliability analysis, 
there are other types of risk problems associated with space mission development that 
conventional probabilistic techniques can be augmented with alternative techniques to 
gain insights. A significant number of space missions have not developed and 
launched on schedule (NRC, 2010), and software development has been identified as 
a major contribution to schedule delays or cost overruns which become risk drivers 
(see for example GAO, 2016, 2017, 2018). The standard approach to analyze 
schedule risks focuses on the identification, quantification, and probabilistic 
representations of cost and schedule uncertainties. The focus is on the identification 
of the different types of uncertainties, the occurrence probabilities, and their 
collective behaviors.  




1) Collect data about risk events: event and activity descriptions, occurrence 
probabilities, schedule durations, impacts on the activities and schedules. 
2) Model uncertainties with probability distributions and associate the 
probability distributions to the different events and activities. This step 
focuses on common cause variations. Aleatory uncertainties are the primary 
focus, and epistemic uncertainties are included where possible. 
3) If only quantitative probabilistic uncertainties (qualitative methodologies are 
more process driven than computational, see Dezfuli et al., 2011) are 
considered (step 1 & 2), the event chain probabilities are simulated via Monte 
Carlo (or other) methods to calculate the probability distributions for the 
scheduling durations. 
4) Additional contextual factors can be incorporated into the model, such as 
“special-cause variations” (project specific variations, e.g. environmental 
effects) that might introduce or eliminate uncertainties, and “risk drivers” that 
add additional weights to the scaling of the probability distributions.  
5) Additional activity correlations and branching (for example, in series or 
parallel) can be introduced to alter the network structure. 
6) The schedule network with the final probability distributions is then use as the 
input model for Monte Carlo (or other statistical) simulations to obtain the 
distribution for the scheduling durations, which is then used to answer the 





For tracking how uncertainties evolve and how risk states change over time, 
the current approaches often focus on the development of uncertainty models 
associated with the schedule, and periodically re-run the models during project 
execution to incorporate new data and contextual information. Bayesian techniques 
are used to update the probabilities for example, which help to improve the accuracy 
of the models in reflecting reality. Statistical simulations, such as Monte Carlo 
simulations, are often used to analyze schedule risks and derive results for complex 
projects with uncertainties.  
Advancements in the field over the past 20 years greatly enhance schedule 
risk analysis techniques. Simulation techniques have been refined to improve abilities 
and capabilities to model specific risks and uncertainties, to extend risk models to 
include multiple activities, in series and in parallel, with different durations and 
priorities. Advanced techniques, such as coupling Bayesian network with Monte 
Carlo simulations or system dynamics (Khodakarami et al., 2007; Ordóñez Arízaga, 
2007; Fenton & Neil, 2011; Varuttamaseni, 2011) have been developed to better 
model uncertainties, and it is still an active area of research. The Systems dynamics 
approach simulates the dynamical behaviors of how the different modeling variables 
and parameters might change the rate and flow of the network. More data can now be 
incorporated to provide more comprehensive systematic models to improve fidelity. 
The use of probabilistic branching structures allows better incorporation and 
connection of scenarios. Techniques have been developed to allow risk analysis at 




For software development scheduling risks, there are certainly many possible 
reasons as to why a development effort might miss target schedule. There are the 
internal (controllable) elements, such as development methodology and lifecycles, the 
external (uncontrollable) elements, such as external dependencies and budget delays, 
and finally the unknown-unknowns - the unpredictable events. Traditional approaches 
associate probability density functions (pdf) to duration uncertainties and then 
introduce these elements into the modeling process. Depending on the problem, these 
elements might be scaled and organized into different groupings and branching 
structures such as in the case with multiple related or correlated activities. 
Challenges and limitations remain in areas such as the identification and the 
interpretation of aleatory and epistemic uncertainties, the choice of the probability 
distribution functions to represent uncertainties, difficulties in separating and isolating 
concurrent risk impacts within a single event, which might not be feasible (Ordóñez 
Arízaga, 2007; Hulett, 2017). Statistical simulation techniques also have limitations 
on tracking states at the event level, since by nature these techniques are based on 
random statistical simulations; if one cannot fully track state information, prioritize 
risk mitigations might prove to be difficult since the needed state and contextual 
information are not available within the model.  
These challenges are all very similar to our earlier investigations with 
engineering systems. Perhaps the quantum approach can also provide new insights? 
One significant difference is the way the initial line of questioning differs between 
conventional and quantum approaches. Perhaps the quantum line of questioning 




10.2 The Problem 
Consider the development of the ground software system for space missions. 
The software system consists of multiple subsystems and components. To develop the 
software system, a typical software engineering process starts with decomposing the 
problem into lower level requirements, and the requirements are then allocated to 
development teams. After the development teams completed their development at the 
component level, the components are integrated by the integration and test (I&T) 
team into the final product. Often the components have different developmental 
schedules and they can also have dependencies on one another other. The 
development and integration of all the components into a coherent system within 
planned schedule present project management challenges.  
For space missions, if the software system is not sufficiently integrated 
beyond a critical operation threshold, the mission cannot proceed to launch. That 
means the integration process of the software system is connected to scheduling risk, 
the risk of not be able to complete verification and validation (V&V) on time (the 
event), which can result in launch delay (consequence), and add cost to the mission. 
The risk question is therefore: “What is the risk of not having an integrated working 
system ready by launch?”  
The same question can be asked in other ways, such as “what is the risk of the 
mission failing to launch at the target date?” The consequence of missing the launch 
schedule would be a launch slip, which carries cost impacts. The probability of the 
integrated system not ready for launch can be challenging to quantify and model since 




other constantly evolving and changing factors. Parameterization along this line of 
questioning can be complicated. However, the question can be recast as the 
probability of finding the system in a certain state since “a system not ready for 
launch” is one of many possible states the schedule network can be found in. To 
facilitate further explorations with this notion, a reference scenario drawn from real 
life space mission development situations is described below.  
 
The Reference Scenario for the Models — A typical space mission has three major 
systems: 1) the payload (satellite, space probe, etc), 2) the launch vehicle (the rocket), 
and 3) the ground system (the software and hardware that support mission 
operations). The three systems have to be operational in order for launch to proceed. 
For this scenario, we shall only focus on the software part of the ground system. The 
launch go/no-go decision requires answering the question of whether the ground 
system is ready and operational to support the launch and commissioning of the space 
mission.  
For this scenario, we are interested in assessing the scheduling risks associated 
with the development of the software system. A standard NASA systems engineering 
process (NASA, 2017) to ensure that software is working properly is to execute a 
verification and validation program on the system against requirements and 
operational scenarios; the verification and validation tests have binary pass or fail 
states. The progressions of these tests are influenced by various engineering 
development methodologies. There are different types of modern engineering 




iterative, spiral, or agile (Turner, 2007), and these methodologies affect how the 
schedule network (the system) transition from states to states. As such, the answer to 
the scheduling risk question must derived from both the states of the system and the 
process of how to go from one state to another. For this investigation, the 
conventional V-model (Figure 51) will serve as a reference model for the exploration 
on how the quantum framework can lead to different insights. 
 
Figure 51. A standard V-model for systems engineering lifecycle process. 
 
The following analysis will consider a simplified and generalized software 
development scenario derived from the development lifecycle for a subsystem that is 
part of a current NASA flagship mission ground system. This software subsystem, 
refer to as W, consists of three components: A, B, and C. These components are 
developed by three separate teams from three different organizations at different 
geographical locations. In this scenario, the development of components A and B are 
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and B. This development process can be represented by the following schedule 
network diagram (Figure 52).  
 
 
Figure 52: Schedule network for a software subsystem development scenario. 
 
The properties, characteristics, and challenges associated with this scenario: 
1) A, B, and C might follow different development approaches, processes, and 
methodologies.  
2) Software development are often iterative in nature. At a given instance, a 
component can turn from working to not working, and might not follow 
simple probabilistic distributions.  
3) The system requirements can evolve over time. The interfaces between A, B, 
and C, can change over time.  
4) With modern software engineering methodologies, the states of the system can 
change dynamically throughout the development lifecycle.  
5) The organizational and geographic separations between the development 
teams lead to: 
a. each team might have a different way to conduct their development 
activities. 
b. processes may or may not be shared between the teams, 




d. team deliverables come together only at the established schedule 
milestones. 
6) The development schedule is tightly connected with upstream and 
downstream dependencies. The interactions can be highly dynamic. 
Furthermore, statistical data about the scheduling metrics could be limited due 
to the nature of the work, which are often themselves technological 
demonstrations and prototypes. Simulation techniques, such as Monte Carlo 
simulations, might have significant uncertainties associated with the results 
and outcomes.  
7) Information about the rate of development is an important piece of contextual 
knowledge that is required for strong forecasting and prediction, which can be 
difficult to build into the statistical simulations. 
 
As mentioned in the previous section, current techniques focus on the 
modeling of uncertainties with probability distributions and then associated them to 
activities. In reality, however, the activity durations can be dynamically changed not 
just due to uncertainties; development methodologies and team dynamics often alter 
activity durations. Conventional techniques have some limited ways to address this. 
Conventional schedule risk analysis focuses on modeling the duration uncertainties 
and simulating the scheduling network to determine the type of risks that can impact 
the completion of a project. Systems dynamics approach simulates the dynamical 




interactions of the components, the feedbacks, stock and flow of the component 
network.  
The quantum framework, given its ease of tracking system states, the 
evolution and transition of states, and the change of probabilities of finding the 
system in certain states, might offer new perspectives to address this problem. 
Workflow methodologies and processes can be captured with operators, which 
dynamically shape the evolution of the schedule network and provide a level of 
integration where other techniques cannot easily achieve. 
10.3 The Quantum Model 
The quantum approach takes a different perspective and approach, which 
starts by redefining the questions. The schedule network can be thought of as a 
complex system with many different states where each state represents the 
developmental maturity of a software component, for example. The quantum model 
represents the various possible states in which the schedule network can be found, 
and the quantum operators model the behaviors of the system, the change of states, 
and the dynamic schedule behaviors of the system components.  
This perspective reformulates how we approach the scheduling problem and 
offers a new line of reasoning. The uncertainties are associated not with whether or 
not a component is developed on schedule (the duration) but the probability of 
finding the component in a working (completed development) or a non-working (still 
in development) state. The scheduling risk question is now recast as the probability of 




10.3.1 Basic Construction of the Quantum Model for the Schedule Network 
The construction of the quantum scheduling model starts with building the 
system model from the system state vectors. Scheduling information is built into a 
system model in the form of evolution operators. In essence, the modeling process 
focuses on modeling the complex system, the operators evolve the system over time, 
and the state of the system at different times can be extracted from the model via 
projection.  
The basic construction of the quantum model for the schedule network (Figure 
52) follows these steps: 
1) Construct the system components state vector: treat each development unit as 
a component, and let the states be passed or failed (or ready or not ready). The 
state vectors are the state of the system component at time t. 
2) Construct the operators. Operators change the components from states to 
states. One can think of them representing development lifecycles and 
activities that can change the system states. 
3) Construct the density operator for the components. Pure state density 
operators are used when we know precisely the development lifecycle and 
duration. Mixed state density operators are used when we do not know for 
sure the lifecycle and duration parameters. This is similar to the traditional 
notion of assigning PDF to durations; however, with the density operator, we 
have additional degrees of freedom to capture different scenarios and the 
ability to track states over time. The additional capabilities stand in contrast to 




durations, adjust with multipliers and weights, and then perform statistical 
simulations. The density operator approach incorporates additional 
information into the model in the sense of uncertainties about lifecycle and 
duration parameters!  
4) Construct the composite scheduling network system (the integration of 
components). Using the density matrix: 
       (10.1) 
Uncertainty modeling is done comprehensively across step 2-4 via operators.  
For this approach, the risk question is reframed as: “What is the probability of 
finding the system (the components) in a particular sequence of states (can be all 
working, or some of them might not be if not all the components have to be fully 
operation at launch, for example) at the target time?” In the quantum framework, the 
answers can be obtained from the construction of the projection operator to “collapse” 
the system into the state of interest, thus extracting the probability. The process 
projects out a targeted state of the system (summarizing the launch state requirements, 
such as which components are necessary for launch, which are good to have, or which 
are not necessary), and the measurement Ri (Chapter 4.6) performs on the target state 
gives the risk value. 
10.3.2 Operators and the Change of States 
The schedule network system, represented by the density operator, describes 
the state of the system. There are a number of activities and events that could alter the 
system states. Some typical development lifecycle activities are: 




a S-curve profile, 
• agile type developmental maturity lifecycle, like a rolling wave, where the 
maturity of the system is successively approaching completion in cycles, 
• spiral type development, which is incremental and similar to agile,  
• software fault, failure, and rework that can regress the state of the system and 
system maturity, which in the traditional schedule network might not be fully 
captured and represented.  
 
Since the purpose of this analysis is to illustrate how to model the schedule 
network system with the quantum framework, the rest of this exposition will utilize a 
simple time (T) operator model with a simple S-curve. The choice of modeling with 
the S-curve stems from the fact that the S-curve behaviors are widely observed in 
actual software development programs, and the S-curve behaviors have been widely 
studied in project management and complex systems. In project management, the S-
curve is a key element for modeling the probability of potential impacts in cost risk 
simulations (see PMBOK, 2013, 2017 for details). Figure 53, 54, 55, and 56 are 






Figure 53: A fragility curve traces a S curve. 
 
 
Figure 54: A S-curve for project costing. Adapted from PMBOK 2013 (PMI, 2013). 
 
 
























Figure 56: A reverse S-curve for project burndown. Adapted from Sandofsky (2015).  
 
Let the  operator denote general time operations, where i is the i-th system 
component. The general T operator basically contains the activity rate information, 
such as the maturity rate of system components, with ties to development workflow 
methodologies. For this experimental model, we shall consider only the simplest type 
of time operation, system maturity (M) with a development methodology, which we 
will denote by the  operator;  is a specific type of the T operator. For a system 
component A, the state of the development will be: 
       (10.2) 
 
The operator models the time behavior of the development activity maturity, 
with the interpretation that the successful completion of a development activity will 
result in a milestone achievement in the form of the delivery of a software 
component. In this scenario, the  operator traces and reflects the output and 
outcome resulting from the implementation and execution of a development 







can be described by the S curve. Thus, earlier operator models developed with the 
sigmoid function can be adapted to model the developmental activities associated 
with a scheduling system component.  
The sigmoid curve/sigmoid function, represented by the special case of the 
logistic function: 
         (10.3) 
can be used to model the behavior of the software development maturity process in 
. In this representation, the x-axis will be time and the y-axis will be a function 
tracing the maturity of the system, such as the fraction of tasks completed and/or the 
ratio of (# of tests passed)/(total number of tests). Operators representing different 
activity workflow processes can be constructed using different types of rate curves. 
Figure 57 is a composite curve from a composite operator obtained via the tensor 
product of two operators (representing different S curves for different components) 
acting on different components: 
 
 
Figure 57: Composite S curves. 












From the conceptional viewpoint, this  operator will adjust the probability 
of finding the system in working or failing state, and the shape of the curve traces the 
state of the system corresponding to the rate of completion of the scheduled task 
activities. This  operator correlates to the time behavior of the development 
methodologies. M tracks the completeness of a lifecycle process, such as the 
development of a software system, by tracking the successful completion of tasks or 
the verification of requirements. The particular choice of the tracing variables 
depends on how one defines what constitute an acceptable working state of the 
system. 
A key is the activity operator models the development workflow lifecycle. 
Essentially, the operator models the behavior of the development methodology and 
how the methodology affects the schedule as measured by the maturity state of the 
system. This aspect is not easily captured by PDFs in common schedule risk analysis 
models, especially in a dynamic fashion; current simulation-based techniques can 
only capture the effects of how the methodology affects the probability distributions 
that are used to model the schedule durations. In the quantum framework, the 
schedule network is actually a by-product of the system model formed out of the 




10.3.3 Construction of the Schedule Network Density Operator 
To represent the schedule network system, S, we start with the density 
operator for the individual components A, B, and C, then form the network, the 
composite system, via tensor product. For this scenario two different methodologies 
and (e.g. waterfall and agile) can be used for the development processes. The 
schedule unit (the system component) states are then represented by: 
           (10.4) 
           (10.5) 
In an actual development process, precisely which methodology and how they 
are used can be a form of uncertainty, and in fact hybrid approach where different 
methodologies are mixed together can be entirely possible. Unless one knows 
precisely that the development team follows a workflow methodology exactly and 
meticulously, a mixed state density operator would be appropriate to represent the 
development state of component A: 
        (10.6) 
where  represents the adoption (utilization) probability of methodology i in the 
practice. Similar density operators can be constructed to represent activities B and C. 
The density operators for components B and C are respectively: 
     (10.7) 
     (10.8) 
For S, the density operator is given by the tensor product of the component 
density matrices: 
       (10.9) 
A1 = M1 A0
A2 = M2 A0
ρA = wA1 A1 A1 + wA2 A2 A2
ρB = wB1 B1 B1 + wB1 B2 B2
ρC = wC1 C1 C1 + wC2 C2 C2




At this point, the density operator  is the most general and comprehensive 
representation for the system, containing detailed information about the scheduling 
network. The computational cost, the information compilation and maintenance cost 
for this model scale with the complexity of the system.  
Consider the following simplified scenario, where the development teams 
adopt and adhere to a specific methodology, either or . In this case, we can 
model each component in pure state. 
           (10.10) 
           (10.11) 
           (10.12) 
 
The possible states one can find the scheduling system to be in can be formed 
with tensor product: 
         (10.13) 
and the possible states are: 
   , , , , , , , . 
 
With the states defined, we then turn to specifying the questions one can ask 
of the system that can help us to analyze and understand the schedule risk associated 
with this development program. For space systems development, it often comes down 
to: Is the system ready to support launch? But how does that translate into in the 
context of this quantum model? The system needs to be in working states for some 
specific combination of , as dictated by the launch and commissioning 
requirements. For example, the requirements can simply be that for a system to be 
M1 M2
A = M1 A0
B = M2 B0
C = M1 C0
ABC = A ⊗ B ⊗ C




ready for launch support, only components A and C have to be fully developed and 
verified to be working at launch time, t, which correspond to the states , . 
10.3.4 Answering the Schedule Risk Question: Projection of Particular Events 
In traditional simulations, statistical runs enumerate what the system will be 
under certain assumptions and conditions, like in the process of going down the paths 
of a tree. At each node a choice is made in keeping the linear pathway from the head 
node to the leaf node. Most software development workflows do not follow this 
simplistic linear deterministic transition process. Whereas, the quantum approach 
aligns with how schedules behave in the real world, especially with modern 
development workflow like the agile methodologies. The quantum approach tracks 
the evolution of all the states, with the analysis focusing on what the intended end 
state one would like to achieve or expect. The probabilities are then extracted from 
the system via projections. 
To determine the schedule risk with the quantum model, the first step is to 
identify what constitutes the target end state. Certainly, a definitive end state is when 
all the components are working, which is simply the state for the three 
components scheduling network system. But in reality, for some space missions it is 
entirely possible that some of the components do not have to be in a fully working 
state before launch. In fact, some of the ground software components cannot be fully 
realized until actual data can be obtained from the spacecraft at the target location and 
operational environment; in such case, say if component B is not required at launch, 







system at launch has been identified, measurement and projection operations can be 
constructed and performed on the system model.  
The probability of the scheduling system at the desirable end state can be 
obtained by first transition the system from the initial states to the target end states via 
the application of the different transition operators. Essentially, one is transitioning 
the system from  to the planned completion milestone, say . But the quantum 
approach is different in that all possible states, the superposition states, are evolved; 
in contrast, conventional approaches nominally follow linear pathways. After the 
system transitioned into the targeted state at , the projection operator is then applied 
to the system and collapse it to the target state, such as , which gives the 
probability of the program hitting the milestone. 
The quantum thinking is about identifying the states in which the system can 
be found, which is informed and shaped by prior experience. Prior knowledge also 
influences the formulation of the problem and the construction of the state 
representations. The following scenarios highlight how the selection of the end states 
in the query determines the outcome. 
 
Scenario: All components have to be fully operational at launch. What is the 
probability of finding the system ready for launch? 
 
In this scenario, at launch time , A, B, and C should and can only be in one 






          (10.14) 
          (10.15) 
          (10.16) 
and  
     (10.17) 
 
The probability that the system is ready for launch is then:  
         (10.18) 
∎ 
 
Scenario: Only components A and C have to be fully operational at launch. B 
needs actual flight data at the stationary orbit to complete calibration for operation. 
What is the probability of finding the system ready for launch? 
 
In this scenario, there is no requirement for component B to be operational at 
launch. There is no requirement for a specific state of B at launch, so both working 
and not working states for B are acceptable. Therefore, at launch time , A, B, and C 
can be in these two states: the  and the  state. 
For this scenario, the state vectors at  are given by: 
          (10.19) 
          (10.20) 
          (10.21) 
and  
     (10.22) 
A(tL ) =M1(tL ) A0
B(tL ) =M2(tL ) B0
C(tL ) =M1(tL ) C0
111
A(tL ) =M1(tL ) A0
B(tL ) =M2(tL ) B0





The risk question is asking for the probability of finding the system in one of 
the two required states. The probability that the system is ready for launch is then:  
   +   (10.23) 
∎ 
 
Scenario: Only components A and C have to be fully operational at launch. B needs 
actual flight data at the stationary orbit to complete calibration for operation, but B 
has to be 80% complete. What is the probability of finding the system ready for 
launch? 
 
In this scenario, at launch time , A, B, and C should and can only be in two 
states: the  and the  state. Furthermore, there is a requirement that B has to 
be found in a maturity state with 80% functional completion. This particular 
requirement alters how the risk question is being asked, which also affects how we 
formulate the composite system. With the requirement, instead of considering both 
the  and the  state, we now should only look at the  state. The end 
state of the system, the  state, is different than the end state from the other two 
scenarios. For subsystem A and C, the  is defined as the system at 100% 
completion; whereas for subsystem B, the is defined as the system at 80% 
completion. The maturity operator, , will need to be constructed differently to 





The maturity operator, , can be constructed in a number of ways, 
depending on how one traces system maturity. For example, one can trace system 
maturity by mapping to tasks completion, requirements fulfillment, or the number of 
verified and validated requirements. Regardless of the choice of the tracking 
parameters, the key is to define the state with the 80% completion as the target. 
In essence, we are scaling the  function to match to the 80% completion 
requirement and use that in the construction of the  operator.  
The state vectors at  are given by: 
          (10.24) 
         (10.25) 
          (10.26) 
 
and  
     (10.27) 
 
The probability that the system is ready for launch is then:  
         (10.28) 
∎ 
 
In the last scenario examples, an important point is being made. The quantum 
approach does not necessarily follow a deterministic path, and prior knowledge, 
experience and expectations can influence the conclusion by affecting how the 
questions are being casted and how the systems are being constructed and evolved. In 
MB2
MB2
A(tL ) =M1(tL ) A0
B(tL ) =MB2(tL ) B0




conventional probability, conclusions are drawn from data, such as the frequency of 
occurrence of events. Bayesian thinking adds a new element to this by introducing 
prior knowledge and expectations into the data via Bayesian updates, and conclusions 
are drawn from data and prior expectations together. The quantum framework takes 
this to another level where prior expectations actually may influence the formulation 
of the questions, directly shaping the structures of the data and the type of answers 
one might derive from the data, which then conclusions are drawn.  
10.4 Insights 
The quantum approach offers interesting insights which differ from those of 
conventional techniques. 
 
Reformulate the problem and open new line of questioning and reasoning 
Whereas conventional approaches to scheduling risk analysis focuses on 
asking the probability and confidence of a project completing on target, the quantum 
reformulation treats the scheduling network as part of the system model and ask the 
chance of finding the system in a certain state or states. The schedule network is a by-
product of the system model. The uncertainties are associated not with whether or not 
a component is developed on schedule but the probability of finding the component in 
a working (completed development) or a non-working (still in development) state. 
The scheduling risk question is now recast as the probability of finding the system in 
certain states, of which impact information is considered not just as a scaling factor 




As brought up earlier, the selection of the target system state incorporates an 
impact decision. For the launch decision of a spacecraft, not all ground software 
components have to be fully functional in order for the issue of a go for launch. 
Certain hardware in the spacecraft could be failing, but the overall system can still be 
viable for a “go” for launch. The quantum framework can accommodate these in a 
straightforward systematic manner (the construction of projectors to extract subspace) 
when compare to conventional techniques. 
The quantum approach allows us to explore a few more lines of questioning 
and reasoning. Traditional methods answer the question about the schedule. In order 
to explore different conditions and scenarios, different schedule networks will have to 
be constructed, and different simulation runs will need to be executed. In contrast, the 
density matrix represents and captures all possible states of the system, which means 
all of the scenarios are simultaneously represented in the density matrix, and the 
system can be queried on multiple scenarios and perspectives at the same time, with 
the benefits of gaining procedural and computational efficiencies. 
Furthermore, the original schedule network is now modeled as a system in a 
complementary problem space. In this complementary problem space, operators 
represent processes, which directly model development methodologies and lifecycles. 
Operators change the states of the system, and the operator framework has more 
dimensions and degrees of freedom when compare to conventional approaches where 
the methodologies can only be represented indirectly by PDFs. Traditional approach 
focuses on modeling the uncertainty of the activity durations. Quantum approach 




the uncertainties change as the system changes and evolves in time. This is a key 
philosophical difference from conventional approaches! 
 
New Capabilities 
New risk analysis capabilities are introduced as we adjust to modeling how 
the system changes in time. This framework supports more intricate modeling of the 
actual processes, events and activities. The software development methodologies can 
be directly modeled to evaluate how they can impact the chance of realizing the 
system on schedule. Furthermore, the quantum framework adds another dimension 
for representing complex uncertainties with imprecisions. The density matrix 
representation allows some degree of impreciseness, which makes it possible to 
derive useful results without specifying precisely the exact type of methodology the 
development team employs. The model can capture a specific and well-defined 
workflow, but it also has the flexibility to handle hybrid development workflow 
methodologies. Before, modeling the individual methodologies can be complicated 
and are limited to adjusting the PDFs.   
The capability to query individual or combination of system states also 
changes how one formulates the questions. This encourages analysts to expand both 
breadth and depth in their investigation by probing the system from different angles 
and ask different kinds of questions, such as uncertainties introduced by human 
factors and lifecycle processes. The probabilities derive from the density matrix is the 
starting point; different operations can be performed on the density matrix to alter the 




to common cause adjustments can be incorporated into the operators and projectors, 
adjusting the number of system states, and rate parameters (S-curves for process 
maturity for example) can be fed directly into the model. Traditional statistical 
simulation-based solutions now have an additional analytical extension.  
A commonly used tool to communicate project completion rate, the burn-
down charts and curves, can be derived from the quantum model. In its most basic 
and simplistic form, burn-down charts and curves are simply the different projections 
of the state vector over time. More importantly, with operators, different scenarios can 
be evaluated (e.g. different combinations of states,  or , for example), very 
much in the same way we discussed earlier with fragility curves and how to combine 
probabilities.  
One thing not to be missed here, is that the activity operator models the 
development lifecycle and is essentially modeling the development methodology. 
How the development methodology affects the schedule has never been fully 
incorporated in other schedule risk analysis models in this fashion; the most is to 
capture the effects of the methodology in affecting the probability distributions 
modeling the schedule duration. 
 
Getting useful information without full knowledge; flexibility to explore scenarios 
The density matrix formulation captures multiple scenarios within the model, 
allowing some degree of mixing (hence mixed states), such as the mixed 
representation of several software development methodologies. The operators, with 





time. Different conditions can be applied to change the states captured by the density 
matrix, and the states can be evaluated at any given time slice. 
The formulation does not limit to questions about meeting project schedule 
milestones, but the risk scenarios can be decomposed and analyzed by components or 
a collection of components, which provides great flexibility in dealing with complex 
dynamic systems and processes. The risk question steers the construction of the 
projection operator to the probability of finding the system and the components in 
certain states. The projector itself is a specification of the consequence applicable to 
the risk decision, e.g., in the earlier scenario examples, the selection of which 
components are required to support launch reflects the incorporation of consequence 
into the formulation of the risk question itself. The value derived from the projection 
operation itself will be the choice of what is acceptable risk (or not)! 
A different way to think about the density matrix representation is that instead 
of associating statistical distributions, typically triangular distributions or other pdfs, 
to activity durations, the quantum analysis focuses on the modeling of the system and 
its behavior over time. The schedule network is a product, an attribute, a part of the 
system model. An analogy would be like procedural programming vs. object-oriented 
programming (OOP). In procedural programming, the connecting steps represent the 
model; whereas in OOP, the objects and how they interact, together, is the model. In 
OOP, one queries the object to derive state information based on the attributes, that 
change over the course of interactions between the object with other objects. The 
interactions between the objects are not necessarily deterministic; an object’s attribute 




alter and change the states of the system of objects. The exact behavior of the system 
is not defined a priori.  
 
Software verification and validation 
While this Chapter aims at exploring how quantum probability can be applied 
to model scheduling risk, the approach and interpretation have broader context 
beyond scheduling. This Chapter begins with the risk question: “What is the risk of 
not having an integrated working software system ready by launch?” This question 
typically is answer by the verification and validation (V&V) of the software system. 
In this context, what type of uncertainties are associate with the V&V processes? 
How can quantum probability model these uncertainties? 
The answers to these questions depend on the context of the problem, and how 
one interprets the probability framework under that context. Three areas are briefly 
explored here: 1) requirement verification in system realization, 2) complex event-
driven interacting systems, and 3) software system operating in the space 
environment.  
In the realization of software systems, conventional processes focus on 
verifying the software system against requirements and validating the system against 
use cases. Requirements come with different definition and specifications, and this 
discussion elaborates on the verification of system performances over time. In this 
case, the uncertainties can be associated with system processing performance 
scalability and stability over time. System performance can degrade over time for a 




bugs introduced from software patches, logical fault, or algorithmic induced latencies. 
Probabilistic models have been developed to assess these scenarios based on test data 
samples. Quantum probability can potentially be applied to model the intrinsic 
failures, such as random hardware faults and failures (aleatory), and event-based 
failure modes, such as performance degradation due to algorithmic latencies 
(epistemic). 
The second area relates to the modeling of complex software system failure 
probability. One common problem for modern software systems lies with the 
difficulty to verify all possible event modes, pathways, and scenarios for event-driven 
software systems. This can be particularly daunting for highly interactive event-
driven complex software system where the enumeration of all possible pathways can 
be a non-polynomial (NP) problem (takes a very long time). Probabilistic models 
have been developed to represent the frequency of event occurrences based on 
statistical sampling with smaller scale systems, which provide the means to quantify 
the uncertainties. Quantum probability can also be evaluated as a probability 
framework to model these types of problems, with failure probability (aleatory) 
associates with completeness measures and algorithmic complexities map to 
epistemic uncertainties. 
Lastly, software systems operating in space environment present an interesting 
case with a different range of failure modes and characteristics. A software system 
operating in the space environment can be subjected to a number of failure situations. 
Failures due to software algorithmic errors and out of bound conditions are relatively 




operation parameters go out of bound, leading to an unforeseen failure mode. Another 
type of failure, the Single Event Upset (SEU), is more random in nature. SEU events 
are caused by energetic ionizing particle (such as cosmic rays) striking a 
microelectronic device, such as the spacecraft computer, causing a bit-flip in memory 
that can potentially lead to software errors. Quantum probability can potentially be 
evaluated as a probability framework to model these types of system as well, where 
the SEUs are represented in the state vectors, the failure modes to be represented by 
the operators, and discrete probability distribution of failure modes in the density 
operator.      
The above explorations point to a common underlying theme. Quantum 
probability can be an alternative probability framework for modeling uncertainties in 
a variety of situations and problems. The interpretation of quantum probability in the 
context of the problem plays a significant role in determining its applicability and 
usefulness in the modeling process. For certain problems, conventional Kolmogorov 
based techniques might be the optimal tools, but quantum probability can also be 




Conventional techniques place strong focus on the formulation of 
uncertainties. While accurate representations of uncertainty are important, the 
quantum framework also captures how uncertainties change and evolve over time via 




incorporate additional contextual information about the behaviors of the system’s 
states and their transitions. This framework tracks the change of probabilities of 
finding the states besides tracking the states. Such is a fundamental change on how 
we view a schedule network. The approach illustrated in this chapter view the 
schedule network as a system with states and dependencies. Temporal information 
and knowledge are captured and embedded in the operators to moderate state 
transitions. The models describe how each component transitions from states to states 
at different time. 
The change of perspectives also enables the incorporation of additional 
elements such as workflow models into considerations. Workflow models to describe 
different development methodologies can be directly integrated into the process to 
“evolve” the probabilities, and not just statistical data from a priori or a posteriori. 
This allows additional degree of freedom to test and evaluate various constraints to 
improve the schedule risk assessment results. The direct incorporation of the 
“questions” in shaping the analyses aligns and reflects better with the dynamic nature 
of complex engineering systems, where traditional deterministic flow might not 
necessarily be true (e.g. event driven workflow).  
The new framework also facilitates the notion of making decisions with 
incomplete information, providing a bridge between pure statistical methods and non-
pure probabilistic methods (recall earlier references). The question risk managers 
might ask: “Can I do a quick risk assessment without knowing everything about the 




information” can be partially addressed. The quantum formulation opens up new lines 






Chapter 11: Conclusions and Future Directions 
 
 
You can’t connect the dots looking forward; you can only  
connect them looking backwards. So you have to trust that the dots  
will somehow connect in your future. 
- Steve Jobs, Stanford Commencement Speech 2005 
 
Exploring different and new approaches to represent uncertainty and risk for 
complex engineering projects has been an ongoing quest for risk researchers. 
Challenges with modeling complex engineering problems continue to drive 
researchers to explore ways to augment probabilistic techniques in the representation 
of uncertainty. One research avenue is alternative probability theories within the 
spectrum from pure to imprecise probability theories.   
In this dissertation, the theory of quantum probability and the associated tools 
of quantum mechanics were applied to investigate their usefulness as a risk analysis 
and assessment tool for engineering. This research investigates the application of the 
quantum framework to study engineering systems where the tracking of states and 
contextual knowledge can be challenging. The dissertation lays out the case for why 
the quantum framework can provide new tools to capture information in engineering 
risk system models; how quantum tools monitor, change and evolve the system; and 
how this characterization of information can support risk analysis.  
From a theoretical perspective, a case is argued for the quantum framework’s 




uncertainties. These models can capture different aspects of system states, and more 
importantly, the uncertainties about the system states.  
Fundamental aleatory uncertainties about system states are contained within 
the state vectors in the form of probability amplitudes. Epistemic uncertainties about 
models and parameters are partially quantified by operators (with the physics models 
built into them) acting on state vectors. Epistemic uncertainties are also captured by 
the density operator, interpreted as a statistical ensemble of possibilities. Finally, 
subjective beliefs and expert opinions are incorporated in the density matrix, using 
the probabilities as weighing functions.  
Compared to conventional frameworks, the quantum framework potentially 
brings benefits and extends risk modeling capabilities in several directions. The 
quantum framework provides a new way to encode information in a high capacity 
format as the density operator. Event information and physics are encoded in 
operators, which process the higher capacity information in different ways not easily 
available with conventional techniques. Ignorance or lack of information can be 
incorporated in the encoding of system states with the density matrix. The framework 
extends the common data and statistics driven mapping of PDFs to scenarios, to a 
function and physics-models driven approach; this provides a different treatment for 
static and dynamic uncertainties.  
The quantum approach, besides offering a new set of tools, also introduces a 
different way to construct questions about risk in engineering systems. Risk questions 
can evolve as the problem and system condition changes. The changes become new 




are derived from the evolved system model as by-products of the construction of 
quantum risk models themselves.  
This research suggests that the quantum framework may have broader 
applications beyond the study of risk for engineering systems. The use of the quantum 
approach to model software project schedule risk with the incorporation of workflow 
models points to the possibility of utilizing this framework as a general theoretical 
framework for the study of different types of risk problems. The framework can serve 
as a platform to advance research in a number of areas, such as the framing problem: 
“the answer and conclusion depends on how the question was asked and how the data 
were structured, organized, and presented” (Fenton & Neil, 2013), and the lack of a 
scientific platform to describe uncertainty, knowledge and risk (Aven & Zio, 2014). 
 
New Knowledge and Limitations 
Quantum probability is a mathematical framework for describing quantum 
systems in physics. Others have interpreted this mathematical framework in the 
context of cognitive and decision science. This dissertation presents an original 
interpretation of the quantum probability framework in the context of analyzing risks 
for physical macroscopic engineering systems, levees and floodwalls, and risks for 
software development processes. Quantum probability, as a mathematical framework, 
does not have any contextual notion about macroscopic engineering systems or 
software development processes. This work provides an original interpretation, 
proposing the corresponding mathematical representation of the risk equation in the 




computational algorithms for representing aleatory and epistemic uncertainties in 
system models, the transition of system states, and the equation for calculating risk 
values for dynamic systems.   
This research work also gained insights in understanding the potential 
limitations of the proposed approach. First, in order to build the quantum models, 
sufficient knowledge about the systems, events, and system dynamics have to be 
available for the construction of the state vectors and operators. This requirement 
itself is often a significant roadblock in the construction of a viable model. Not all 
engineering problems can be formulated with the quantum framework.  
Second, while quantum models with the combination of two probability 
frameworks might provide some computational efficiency for certain problems, 
general quantum models might not scale well in terms of computation complexity 
with classical computation. To model complex interacting composite engineering 
systems, the dimensionality of the system model can grow exponentially, and the 
corresponding matrix size can present computational challenges. While there are 
algorithms and techniques to manage and mitigate the sizing of the models, 
nonetheless the sizing problem is still a limitation with the current classical 
computing platforms.  
The computational scalability limitation can potentially be mitigated with the 
advance of quantum computing. Quantum computers offer a different computational 
platform with algorithms and paradigms that are capable of performing calculations 
that classical computers might take astronomical timescale to complete. While the 




field by companies like IBM, D-Wave, and Google are bringing quantum computing 
steps closer to the general engineering community. This is the time for us to be ready 
for quantum, for which this research work hopes to contribute a small step.        
 
The Tip of the Iceberg 
 This dissertation attempts to demonstrate concepts, illustrating the setup of a 
risk model with quantum probability and the quantum mechanics apparatus. The 
quantum framework is rich with features, and as a conceptual framework, it has the 
potential to be used for modeling a wide range of problem.  
To fully realize the potential, new research will need to take place beyond this 
dissertation. At this stage, the conceptual model here has not been tested against a 
broader range of problems. This work suggests that the framework can reproduce and 
replicate products from common risk analysis techniques. Furthermore, the 
framework allows the incorporation of new elements, offering new capabilities to 
augment conventional techniques. These capabilities will need to be explored to 
assess the potential of the approach.  
Follow on research can move in at least three different directions. One 
direction is to experiment with the above models and see how well it can make 
predications for complex modern storm protection systems. The simplistic models 
developed in this work can be refined and adapted to address new problems and to 
make predictions that can be compared with new observations and data. New 




and Bayesian concepts of using new data to update a prior can be applied to the 
probabilities in the density operator and the probability amplitudes.   
A second direction is to extend the application of the quantum framework to 
study problems from other engineering domains, such as agile software engineering 
workflows and practices. Specifically, common risk analysis approaches have been 
difficult to apply to agile managed projects and it is possible that quantum approaches 
may bring new capabilities to analyze the problem. This work has shown that the 
framework can be adapted to work with other risk problem types, such as scheduling 
networks. Future work can extend the scope to over a wider range of engineering and 
project management problems.  
Finally, the third direction is to continue to map out the various theoretical 
quantum constructs and explore how they can be used to perform risk modeling. This 
dissertation proposed the application of quantum probability as a mathematical 
framework to represent aleatory and epistemic uncertainties using the density 
operator. The density operator also has other properties that match with the 
characteristics of other problem domains. In earlier chapters one came across the case 
where density matrices derived from different mixed states can be identical, leading 
to ambiguity. Perhaps quantum structures such as the density operator and matrix can 
shed new lights on the ambiguity problem. In another front, to account for unknown-
unknown in analyzing multi-hazard risks, researchers have been exploring different 
concepts related to the entropy of information, the measurement of disorder such as 
Shannon Entropy, to quantify the quality and value of information available for use in 




al., 2016) have been proposed to characterize the quality of available information. 
The quantum framework provides potentially another alternative as a concept of 
entropy can be formulated using the density operator. The von Neumann entropy, S,  
,     (11.1) 
in which  is the density operator, extends the classical Gibbs entropy (a classical 
measurement of disorder in a system) into the quantum realm. This von Neumann 
entropy opens up an entirely different area for researchers to explore different ways to 
provide quantitative measures for degree of knowledge and information about the 
state of a system, analogues to the Shannon Entropy and Fisher’s Information 
Measures.  
This is possibly only the tip of the iceberg, with many directions awaiting 
others to explore! 
 













Appendix A: General Survey of Current PRA Techniques 
 
 This appendix provides a general overview of some current probabilistic 
based risk assessment methodologies and techniques. Classical probability techniques 
and methods are generally based on the works of Bernoulli (1738), Laplace (1814), 
and evolved over the years into the modern form by theoreticians such as Keynes 
(1921), Jeffreys (1939), Cox (1961), Jaynes (1957, 1968, 2003), and the current 
modern PRA formalism is usually based on the Kolmogorov probability framework 
(1933). However, there are several “interpretations” of the concept of probability 
(Hájek, 2012), and they generally fall into two main classes, the frequentist and the 
Bayesianism. This section will start with a brief review of the philosophies, and then 
proceed to review the PRAs techniques. 
A.1 Frequentist vs. Bayesian 
Mathematically, the frequentist and the Bayesian interpretations of probability 
are equivalent, but the philosophical interpretations are quite different between the 
two. In the frequentist interpretation of probability, the configuration space is defined 
as the set of all possible events, and a particular state of a system follows a well-
defined distribution which can be obtained by repeated trials of measurement for the 
outcome of the system states. In order words, more data from trials will increase 
precisions until one reaches the fundamental intrinsic variations of the states, and the 
probability values derived from this process do not subject to external (outside of the 
system) influences. The Bayesian interpretation approaches form a different 




rational belief of the observer based on the available information at hand at the time. 
The probability, therefore, can be updated and refined with posterior facts and 
information using the Bayes’ Theorem: 
       (A.1) 
Where the left-hand side, the posterior probability, is calculated from the prior 
probability, P(A), and the likelihood function from new evidence, P(B|A)/P(B). The 
probability values derived from the Bayesian thinking can therefore be subjected to 
external influences. Future interactions of the system with external elements can alter 
the probabilities. 
While practitioners tend to align to one philosophy or the other, it is the 
author’s opinion that our reality is a mixture of both and more. One can interpret that 
the frequentist’s thinking aligns well with aleatory uncertainties, and the Bayesian 
thinking aligns well with epistemic uncertainties. The subjective aspect of picking 
and choosing the boundaries firmly aligns with the human factors associated with the 
decision process. A mechanism unifying these concepts might lead to new and better 
approaches to represent and manage risks.  
Perhaps from another perspective, the choice between the two interpretations 
is a simple reflection of whether a problem can be sampled within a timescale suitable 
for frequentists or Bayesian. Bayesian takes chances based on available information, 
and frequentist waits for solid information to make inferences. For problems with 
short timescale, in terms of seconds, minutes, days, such as drug testing, then 
conventional frequentist statistics makes sense, since you have enough time to collect 




timescales of years and centuries, such as geo-technical applications, or problems 
with cosmic timescales, then one simply does not have the time to collect enough 
statistics to make frequentist-based inferences. Bayesian is then a better approach.  
A.2 Static vs. Dynamics Methodologies 
Besides philosophical interpretations, another way to classify and group risk 
assessment methodologies is by their capabilities to represent changes in the system 
and the states over time. In the context of this dissertation, static system means a 
system S stays in the exact same state at all times, or the state of the system is 
independent of time, dS/dt = 0. Dynamic system is one that can transition from one 
state to another state over time, or the state of the system is a function of time, dS/dt ≠ 
0. Static methodologies, under this context, are assessment methods applicable to 
systems that are in a steady state or at a fixed point in time. Dynamics methodologies 
consider a system’s changing states and the state transition processes. Often, the 
uncertainties of the dynamic system are treated as stochastic Markov processes. 
A.2.1 Markov Process 
A lot of processes in nature are random, and one of those processes are the 
Markov process. Markov process has 2 elements: a process consists of a sequence of 
transition stages (over time) and a stochastic (random) element for the transition. A 
stochastic process is a sequence of events in which their occurrences and the 
outcomes are probabilistic and random. Example of such include radioactive decay, 




financial experts might argue differently). A Markov process is a special kind of 
stochastic process exhibiting the Markov property:  
• The future outcome or state depends only on the present state, and not what 
preceded (the Markov property); future events (condition probabilities) 
depend only on current event and are independent of past events. The 
conditional probabilities are called transition probabilities. 
• Future predictions depend solely on the present state. This property is usually 
referred to as the memoryless property as prior results do not affect the future 
states.  
The Markov process is continuous in time, and a Markov process that evolves 
in discrete-time element is known as a Markov chain. Markov chain exhibits 
additional properties: 
1) The Markovian property, 
2) There are a finite number of possible states or outcome,  
3) The probabilities do not change as a function of time (stationary transition 
probabilities), and 
4) There is an initial state or boundary conditions. 
Therefore, the state changes can occur at any time for a Markov process, but for a 
Markov chain, the state space is discrete and their changes are discreet in time. 
A.3 Static Methodologies 
A.3.1 Risk Matrices 
Risk matrices is traditionally traced to the use of a 5×5 matrix to map the 




and 4.2 of Cox (2009). This methodology is an example of a scenario driven, semi-
quantitative approach for risk assessment. Essentially, a 2-dimensional risk profile of 
a risk event is developed by assigning values, such as 3-points or 5-points high-
medium-low value or a distribution function, to the consequence and the likelihood of 
the impact when the risk event happens (Figure A-1). The matrix element values are 
simple computation of the product between the consequence and likelihood, 
following the risk equation: Risk = Probability × Consequence. 
  
 Figure A-1. A Risk Matrix. 
 
To use the matrix, one would simply interpret the values as representation to 
the significance of the risk event, and the larger the value, the more “risky” the event 
is. This technique is widely used by many, and most might not realize the potential 
flaw in the quantitative computational values from the matrix. As point out by Cox 
(2008, 2009), in certain situations, the computed risk value can provide the wrong 
indications, such as a mismatch between the qualitative ratings and the quantitative 




aggregate risks or risks that interact with each other, the inability to reflect 
uncertainties in the risk parameters, the lack of numerical range and resolution to 
represent risks, and in the case where probabilities are allocated for the parameters, 
the joint quantitative probability might not match with the qualitative ratings from the 
matrix (Cox, 2008, 2009; Dezfuli, 2011). Finally, studies have also demonstrated that 
the use of risk matrices might not necessarily lead to better-than-random decisions 
(Cox, 2009). 
A.3.2 Event Tree or Event Sequence Diagrams 
The development of event tree can trace back to the work by Rasmussen 
(1975) and by Swaminathan & Smidts (1999) to quantitative and probabilistic risk 
analysis. An event tree is an inductive logical or chronological decomposition of an 
event into a progressive series of events leading to some subsequent outcomes, 
consequences, or end states. An event tree is a representation of Sample Space and 
need not represent a chronology, although it is often used that way in engineering 
system safety studies (Hartford and Baecher, 2003). The decomposed events, system 
elements, and steps are represented as a branching tree graph or flowchart, and 
Boolean logic serves as the connectors or nodes between them.  Probabilities for the 
chance of occurrences of the events can be associated with the nodes. Each event tree 
represents different scenarios formulated by the risk analysts to describe the various 
event paths leading to various outcomes. The tree structure provides an excellent way 
to visualize the different scenarios, and probabilities embedded in the nodes facilitate 
the computation of risk events. In other words, this tool can serve both as a qualitative 




outcome probabilities. The graphical representation of the scenarios also offers 
another advantage in communicating the risk scenarios to stakeholders in a visual, 
readable and easy to follow format. However, a key deficiency of this technique stem 
from the fact that the scenario building process requires the risk analysts to possess 
very comprehensive knowledge about the system, which might not be feasible for a 
lot of real-life scenarios, and once the scenarios have been built, changes to the 
system will require the risk analyst to redevelop the tree, which can be daunting. 
Subjective uncertainties can also be introduced into the system by the analysts. 
A.3.3 Decision Tree 
The decision tree is a variant of the event tree methodology with a focus on 
decision uncertainty and decision analysis in operations research and risk analysis. 
Similar to the event tree, the decision tree is a representation of scenarios of what can 
happen that lead to a particular outcome. Event states are connected to each other by 
nodes, consist of 3 different types: decision nodes, chance nodes, and end nodes. 
Each decision node is a logical branching point with a test condition (or decision), 
and each branch is a possible outcome of the test condition. A chance node represents 
stochastic event, and the end node, as the name implies, terminates the tree. The 
decision tree, therefore, is an abstraction of a decision problem, graphically 
describing the various possible outcomes, the decision pathways, the uncertainties 
and trade-offs. While the flowchart representation can serve as great qualitative visual 
aid to support decision makers to come up with a decision strategy, the decision tree 




assigned to or associated with the nodes, resulting in a quantitative measure to 
determine the best, optimal, or alternative paths.  
This technique, however, comes with deficiencies like those of the event trees. 
The analysts will need to have the knowledge to describe and model the many 
different combinations of events and decisions. A full characterization of a decision is 
therefore, not an easy task (Keeney & Raiffa, 1993) since it requires the analysts or 
decision makers to weight the paths at the decision points and the consequences at the 
end of the tree. Furthermore, subjective uncertainties and biases can be introduced 
into the system by the analysts or sometime by the very nature of the decision 
problem. Lastly, if there are many decision points and many uncertainties, 
quantitative computations can be very complex and have large errors (see Clemen & 
Reilly, 1999; Goodwin & Wright, 2004; Keeney & Raiffa, 1993). 
A.3.4 Fault Tree Analysis 
The Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) technique was developed in the early 1960s 
for the U.S. Air Force Minuteman Launch Control System (Ericson, 1999). The 
primary user communities nowadays for this technique come from safety engineering 
and reliability engineering. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), NASA and 
others further developed and refined this methodology over the years. Extensive 
description of the methodology can be found in Vesely et al. (1981, 2002). In brief, 
the FTA technique takes an analytical approach to understand the failure states and 
behaviors of a system by decomposing the top-level fault event (the root node) into a 
series of lower-level events. The fault tree itself, a hierarchical structured causality 




providing a traceable graph of how lower-level fault events connect and combine into 
the top-level root via Boolean logic. The fault tree can also be generated from a 
bottoms-up approach where different possible fault paths are identified. These paths 
are then joined together via Boolean logic, building up to the top event. Quantitative 
values, such as probabilities, can be applied to the nodes, and quantitative magnitude 
for the risks can be arrived at by tracing the paths and summing up the probabilities. 
While the FTA technique does allow users to perform quantitative risk 
assessments, the fault tree model itself is not a quantitative model. The FTA models 
do not provide a comprehensive and exhaustive enumeration of all possible failure 
modes for the system in question, nor does it exhaustively trace out all possible 
failure paths and causes. The models reflect heavily on the modelers’ knowledge, 
expertise, and their judgments. These models serve as a convenient starting point for 
the quantification process, but the fundamental qualitative nature of the models 
themselves remains. Intrinsic to the FTA approach is its reliance on Boolean logic 
and the assumption on the binary outcome (success or failure), but the reality of our 
world certainly contains many shades of grays.  
A.3.5 Event-Chain Model 
The event-chain model (or Chain-of-Events) is another variant of the event 
tree methodology for several uncertainty modeling. Originally, the technique was 
developed for the uncertainty analysis for the component failure scenarios for 
mechanical systems. This technique now finds a wide range of applications such as 
schedule network analysis, uncertainty modeling for project management, and 




some events, and the identification and management of these events can help 
maintain the project schedule. On the other hand, in accident analysis, the root event 
(an accident, a project) is decomposed into constituting events, sequentially 
connected by causal factors, forming a chain of events with the project objective or 
the accident as the last event.  
The fundamental assumption in this technique is that the events are directly 
and causally related, and each event has both a preceding and a following events. The 
relationships between the events, like the event tree model, are connected by Boolean 
operations and probabilities can be associated with the events and the operations.  The 
event-chain can have branches and strands, running in parallels and connecting to 
others at different time or at some common events.  Breaking the connections 
between the events along the chain will therefore prevent the occurrence of the root 
event (root cause or the initiating event). In accident analysis, for example, the single 
event or the sequence of events that can trigger or prevent the occurrence of the 
accident are the “critical” or the “critical chains” of events. Breaking the chain by the 
elimination of critical events - the failure modes - can therefore prevent the accident. 
Examples of event-chain based accident prevent techniques included Failure Mode 
and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) (Section A.3.4 above). 
While this technique helps analysts to identify important failure modes and 
conditions in a system, it does have some limitations. The construction of the event-
chain depends heavily on the skills and domain knowledge of the analyst. The 
selection of what events to include or not in the chain can be subjective and arbitrary. 




interactions between systems and subsystems greatly increase the complexity, making 
the model building process highly complex, challenging, and sometime impossible to 
attain completeness. Missing knowledge and information can further complicate the 
model development process. Subjective considerations, such as human organizational 
and management factors, can be difficult to integrate into the model. Finally, the 
strength of this methodology lies with its ability to identify failure modes and 
conditions, but it does not identify or point to the sources. Most of the time, the 
analysis will stop at the identification of the failure modes and cannot provide any 
further insights as to the cause of the problem nor ways to detect and fix the problems 
beforehand. (Leveson, 2001). Other paradigms were developed to help mitigate the 
weakness of the event-chain approach, such as applying system dynamics analysis 
and Monte Carlo simulation techniques to enhance the technique’s ability to deal with 
dynamic complex engineering systems (Dulac, 2007; Leveson, 2011; Fleming 2015). 
A.3.6 Bayesian Inference 
While semi-quantitative risk assessments can be performed with the risk 
matrix and fault tree analysis techniques, the fundamental qualitative nature of the 
techniques, a strong dependence on judgments and beliefs would put a limit to how 
far quantitatively one can reach with these approaches, as probability is applied after 
the formation of the models, instead of being built into the models. The uncertainties 
associated with judgments and beliefs are hard to quantify. For example, FTA is built 
upon Boolean logic, and the resulting tree itself is “deterministic” in that the 
probabilities are calculated by following the deterministic fault tree paths. But what 




between aleatory and epistemic uncertainties becomes crucial to the discussion. In the 
FTA example, the individual tree nodes are associated with a probability, and these 
probabilities represent the aleatory uncertainty at the node. The epistemic uncertainty, 
the uncertainty about the model, is the overall uncertainty associate with the tree itself. 
As pointed out earlier, the fault tree models are not exhaustive and they are limited by 
the knowledge possessed by the modeler, which would naturally have varying levels 
of epistemic uncertainty.  
Bayesian inference techniques address this issue by finding a way to combine 
together a current probability model with new data and information to “update” the 
existing model. Bayesian techniques, as the name implies, are based on the Bayes’ 
Theorem on conditional probabilities. Instead of taking and using probability from a 
pure statistical perspective, Bayesian technique allows the incorporation of additional 
information and evidence into the probabilistic models, and hereby conditioning and 
updating the “prior” with new evidence, represented by a “likelihood function,” to 
derive the “posterior” probability. The posterior probability is obtained from the 
application of the Bayes’ Theorem,  
       (A.2) 
where the left-hand side, the posterior probability, is calculated from the prior 
probability, P(A), and the likelihood function from new evidence, P(B|A)/P(B). Risk 
assessment is then performed, not just on the aleatory probabilistic models, but also 
the uncertainty of the model itself, the epistemic uncertainties, using all available 




The Bayesian inference methodology generally follow these steps after the 
risk elements have been identified: 
• Develop the aleatory uncertainty probability models for the failure states of 
the risk elements, think of the individual nodes in a fault tree, 
• Develop the epistemic uncertainty probability models for the system, think of 
the fault tree itself, in which the state of knowledge about the uncertainties of 
the models about the risk elements themselves are quantified, usually by the 
specification of a “prior” distribution for the model parameters. 
• Observe and collect data about the actual behaviors of the real system itself, or 
a related reference system, on those risk elements and model parameters. 
• The data collected is then used to “update” the “prior” distribution, folding in 
“new” knowledge, to make the “posterior” distribution better reflecting what 
we observed. 
• Verify and validate the updated model to see if it can make better predictions.  
This methodology allows the incorporation and updating of the model with newer 
information, similar to a learning process where the model learns by assimilation. The 
inferences are made about the “soundness” of the model by inferring from 
observational data and evidence collected, and not merely by some assumptions of 
the statistical behaviors of risk elements. 
While this represent a significant advancement in the treatment of 
uncertainties in risk models, the uncertainty models themselves are still rooted in 
classical probability and they are still bounded by the constraints that limit our ability 




elaborated in the next section when we review various perspectives from the literature 
and active research programs). 
A.3.7 Bayesian Network and Bayesian Belief Network 
Bayesian network, also known as Bayesian belief network, is an 
implementation of the Bayesian inference methodology with a probabilistic graphical 
model known as the probabilistic directed acyclic graph. Bayesian network is often 
viewed as union between Bayesian probability with graph theory to incorporate 
causality and ordering information into the otherwise traditional commutative 
algebra-based probability theory. The graphical network connections capture cause 
and effect associated with the system states, their relationships, and changes. The 
nodes in the model represent system variables and they are causally linked together 
with conditional probabilities, expressing how one variable can influence another. 
These approaches relaxed the constrains so that the models are no longer involve a 
simple causal explanation or over simplified statistical models. Current techniques 
based on graphs with nodes data lookup, or system dynamics model with simulations. 
Casual models, such as Bayesian Networks, allow us to go beyond data and explore 
the more subjective evidence and information.  
This technique finds a wide range of modeling applications, which includes 
artificial intelligence machine learning, medical diagnostic assessment, reliability 
analysis, organizational decision theory and analysis, and risk analysis (Cowell, 1999; 
Jensen, 2001; Pearl, 1988; Russell and Norvig, 2003; Ordóñez Arízaga, 2007; 
Mohaghegh 2010). Bayesian network can also be combined with other techniques, 




with PRA to model complex engineering system (Dezfuli et al., 2009).  Bayesian 
network, with Bayesian influence methods embedded within, is suitable for modeling 
problems where limited information is available or the input data has great 
uncertainties (Bedford and Cooke, 2001). Yet, Bayesian network’s ability to deal with 
limited information is also a potential weakness and liability for the technique. A 
Bayesian network is built by a modeler, and the goodness of the network in 
representing the problem depends greatly on the knowledge, experience, and skills 
possessed by the modeler. Subjective elements and biases can also be introduced into 
the process. The conditional probabilities assigned to the model are only as good as 
what is known; the prior data and knowledge that serve as the starting points can have 
significant impact to the downstream network, the computational complexity and the 
validity of the results. Finally, this technique relies on the ability to update the 
probabilities using the Bayes’ Theorem. For complex networks, the computational 
requirements to update and refresh all the node probabilities could be daunting (could 
be a NP problem itself). Finally, the network can only represent a particular instance 
in time; any changes to the system would require a model update or even building a 
new one. This is just another example of the challenges encountered by static 
methodologies. 
A.4 Dynamic Methodologies 
A.4.1 Systems Dynamics 
Systems dynamics is a system modeling technique developed by Forrester 
(1961) to study the non-linear dynamic behaviors of complex interacting industrial 




(Forrester, 1961), and is now being used widely for a range of problems, ranging 
from plant operations, aerospace safety (Sterman, 2000; Leveson, 2006; Dulac, 2007), 
human decisions, organizational behaviors, social technical risk (Mohaghegh, 2010), 
and the modeling of decision making process. The fundamental premise of the 
modeling technique is based upon the notion that a system is formed out of many 
interacting parts and components, and their interactions are often complex with many 
different characteristics such as positive and negative feedback loops, time-dependent 
relationships and interactions forming casual loops. Casual loops modeling the 
system behaviors are developed and then transformed into stock and flow models, 
which can then be quantified and expressed in mathematical equations. The 
mathematical models are then either solved via analytics or simulations. 
Unlike the static techniques before, system dynamics is usually simulation 
based nowadays due to the highly complex and non-linear nature of the modern 
systems, although analytical methods are available and can be applied to the study of 
simpler systems. Both analytical and simulation-based techniques can be highly 
complex and time consuming, and modern system dynamics applications are 
computer simulation based. This technique, besides the computational demands, also 
suffers from the same weaknesses as the earlier techniques, namely the soundness of 
the model depends greatly on the domain knowledge of the modeler. 
A.4.2 Dynamic Event Tree 
The dynamic event tree adapts the event tree methodology to model a 
system’s states evolutionary changes in time. A system can transition from one state 




change of a part within the system (for example, a failure of a part within a pump), or 
the changes could be deterministic changes due to wear and tear of a part due to usage. 
These changes, both stochastic and deterministic, can be modeled based on the 
physics, parametric equations derived from empirical observations, or simulations. 
The dynamic aspect was achieved by combining the traditional event tree 
methodology with Markov analysis. If the time behaviors of a system follow the 
Markov property, which means the stochastic process does not depend on the 
system’s evolution history, then the dynamic event tree for the system becomes very 
simple and can be discretized. However, for systems where state changes have strong 
dependency on evolutionary history of the system, the analysis process becomes an 
enumeration of a collection of event trees, tracking the changes of the trees over 
multiple time interval windows. Furthermore, any changes of the tree attributes, from 
the Boolean conditions to the node probabilities, would require a recompilation of the 
entire collection of event trees for the particular scenario. Finally, limitations for the 
static event tree also apply to the case of the dynamic event tree, and the limitation 
compound due to the additional time dimension (see Varuttamaseni, 2011 for a short 
summary). 
A.4.3 Dynamic Fault Tree 
The Dynamic Fault Tree (DFT) is a product formed out of the combination of 
the traditional fault tree methodology with Markov analysis. The DFT is an extension 
of the static fault tree by adding new elements to give the traditional fault tree 
methodology the capability to handle time evolutionary behaviors and dependencies 




introduced into the framework to model the dynamic behaviors and interactions (Shin 
and Seong 2008), and these new dynamic gates consist of the following gates: the 
warm and cold spare gates, functional dependency (FDEP) gate, the priority AND 
(PAND) gate, and the sequence enforcing (SEQ) gate. These gates basically model 
the state transitions as well as the ordering of the transitions between events, which is 
not available with the static fault tree methodology. Moreover, the DFT gates can be 
converted into Markov models, which simplify the modeling of sequential 
dependency relationships in a dynamic complex system where a state has dependency 
on the order of occurrence of prior events and states.  However, the ability to convert 
DFTs into Markov models brings not only the strength of the Markov analysis 
process, but also the challenges as well. As the complexity of the fault tree increases, 
the number of transitions and states to track and compute can grow rapidly, and 
greatly increase the computational complexity and the calculations can be very time 
consuming. To simplify the computational complexity, several different approaches 
are utilized to manage DFT computations, such as separating the computation into the 
static and the dynamic parts (divide-and-conquer), combining DFT with Bayesian 
network modeling, Monte Carlo simulations, and other approximation methods 
(Vesely et al., 2002; Pourret et al., 2008; Varuttamaseni, 2011; Lindhe et al., 2012).  
A.4.4 Discrete Event Transition Models 
The dynamic event tree methodology tracks the system state evolution over 
time. Another approach to model state transition is to look for ways to discretize the 
system states into different bins and track the state transition between the bins. In 




tracking the state parameters individually, and model the time evolution of the group 
over time bins. To do so, the parameters are captured within a vector which describe 
the states of the system. The analysis is then performed on the vector by assigning 
transition probabilities to the vector based on physics models or Markov properties. 
This technique is often couple with the use of Monte Carlo methods, and it finds 
applications in system reliability analysis and failure analysis. 
A.4.5 Monte Carlo Simulation 
When dealing with deterministic problems we often turn to the analytic 
approach in finding solutions to the problem, but not all problems can be solved 
analytically. For complex systems and problems with multiple coupled parameters 
and many degrees of freedom, analytic solutions are simply not possible. Monte Carlo 
methods are a broad group of computational methods that rely on random sampling 
and probabilistic techniques to simulate what might resemble and represent the real 
system and its behavior. This technique finds application in many different fields and 
disciplines, from finance, the physical sciences, engineering, to project risk 
management.  
The Monte Carlo technique is essentially a computation algorithm that 
randomly generate outcomes following a prescribed probability distribution and a set 
of constraints, test the outcomes against and aggregate those meeting some criteria, 
and by the repeated sampling and aggregation, the properties or the solutions can then 
be inferred and drawn from the statistics. Monte Carlo is a powerful technique, and it 




capabilities to handle large scale complex problems, sometimes as a last resort when 
the problem is very difficult or near impossible to be solved with other techniques.  
There are a few disadvantages associated with Monte Carlo methods. The 
computational cost for complex problems is high and can be time consuming. Also, 
the result is only a simulation, an imitation, and an approximation; the validity of the 
results strongly depends on the simulation logic, and that itself is limited by the 
knowledge of the analyst. The technique is also not one that can accurately represent 
time-evolutionary behaviors of a system. Finally, random sampling requires the 
specification of the sampling space, and this approach will encounter difficulty with 
the treatment of rare events, incomplete knowledge, and the unknown-unknowns. 
A.4.6 Dynamic Bayesian Networks 
Similar to other dynamic methodologies, Dynamic Bayesian networks 
(Dagum et al., 1992) attempt to describe dynamic systems by the incorporation of 
techniques to relate the variables (the nodes) to other nodes separate by time steps. 
Traditional Bayesian network models a system at a particular instance in time, and it 
does not capture time-based dependencies between the system states. In Dynamic 
Bayesian networks, an instance of the static Bayesian network is viewed as a time 
slice representing the system and the associated states at that time. Different time 
slices are then connected together to represent the time evolutionary changes of the 
states, and this is similar to time series analysis (Figure A-2). Often, additional 





Figure A-2. A graphical example of a Dynamic Bayesian networks. 
In this approach, the underlying Bayesian network is assumed to be fixed. This 
assumption is great when you have a simple system that itself does not change. 
A.5 Alternative Uncertainty Theories 
Traditional representations of aleatory and epistemic uncertainties have been 
in the form of probability. Recent research focuses have been on connecting 
probability with other uncertainty theories, especially in the case of epistemic 
uncertainties, where researchers are looking to extend classical probability with other 
theories (Aven, 2010; Aguirre et al., 2014; Flage et al., 2014). Others attempt to 
develop alternative uncertainty theories by investigating how the state of knowledge 
in the form of beliefs can be incorporated into the mathematical framework, such as 
the Dempster-Shafer theory (Dempster, 1967; Shafer, 1976, 2002). 
Aguirre et al. (2014) highlights some of the current research directions on 
alternative uncertainty theories:  
• Probability theory: this is to extend classical probability with the inclusion of 
subjective probabilities, “where a probability measure represents a degree of 
belief of an agent about the occurrence of an event A.” (Aguirre et al., 2014) 




• Fuzzy set theory: True or False or either (true or false). This is in essence an 
extension of the traditional truth table with the inclusion of an additional 
“either” state (Zadeh, 1965). 
• Possibility theory: extending the fuzzy set with the additional condition of 
normalization. (Zadeh, 1978; Dubois & Prade, 1988, 2001) 
• Belief functions theory: the above mentioned Dempster-Shafer theory - theory 
of evidence (Dempster, 1967; Shafer, 1976). This approach models the degree 
of belief using mass function, belief function, or plausibility function, and 
relaxes Kolmogorov’s additivity axiom.  
• Imprecise probabilities (Walley, 1991): a framework that admits imprecision 
in probability models and introduces probability bounds. 
 
A.6 Decision Entropy 
The concept of Decision Entropy was proposed by Gilbert et al. (2016) as a 
framework that recognizes that there can be different starting points for the initial 
prior probabilities, and each might lead to different decisions and therefore different 
risk assessment outcomes. The choice of the initial prior probability depends on the 
knowledge possessed by the assessor at the time. Given that the prior probability can 
either be providing informative or non-informative input into the decision process, the 
choice of the initial prior probability distribution is contextual dependent and relative 
to how the probabilities will be used for a decision. The theory puts forward that the 
end usage of the probability for making decisions drives the selection of the starting 




prior probability can provide valuable information applicable to the assessment 
process. This important distinction affects the application of Bayes’ theorem, since 
the basic Bayesian approach does not distinguish the prior probability based on their 
information context, and thus the initial selection of the prior is often based on what 
knowledge is available at the time. The choice of the initial prior, therefore, could 
direct the Bayesian update process down a path that could lead to wrong conclusions 
because of black swan type events.  
Gilbert et al. attempt to development a measure, the decision entropy, by 
quantifying the informative and non-informative prior probabilities in a mathematical 
framework which can be used to assess and establish the value of the initial prior 
probabilities relative to the end decision outcome. The theory postulates that the 
maximum decision entropy is when the prior probabilities contains the least amount 
of information; in other words, at maximum decision entropy, the prior probabilities 
are equal for all possible system states. Probabilities that do not contribute to the 
eventual decision, the “non-informative priors,” represents complete ignorance; 
whereas informative probabilities serve as input to the decision process and thus 
affect the management of risk. The non-informative prior sample space becomes 
important for this consideration because it sets the stage for assessing the 
conditioning probabilities on any available information (whether subject or objective) 
and shapes the assessment paths as the probability is being updated.  A quantitative 
measure of the priors can help guide and steer the use of new information and data on 
how to update the posterior probabilities. This approach can potentially prevent the 




open the options to consider different alternatives, allowing new information to be 
properly utilized for updating the posterior probabilities.   
The decision entropy theory is a mathematical framework to assess the risk 
probabilities for systems where the assessor has limited or incomplete knowledge. 
The framework attempts to look for a quantitative representation of the knowledge 
about the risk and uncertainty, from one end of the spectrum - zero knowledge - to the 
other end where we have full knowledge, in the form of an entropy measure. The 
theory focus on finding the optimal starting point, based on the end question, under 
limited or incomplete knowledge, using the entropy measure. While this theory 
present great potentials, it is still under active research and development. The 
mathematical framework will need to be further developed and refined. 
A.7 A Closing Note 
The above techniques rely on the use of probability theory to quantify 
uncertainties. A number of researchers have pointed out that while current tools allow 
us to sufficiently deal with many risk problems we encounter in different fields, there 
are still plenty of cases where they fail or fail to adequately represent reality (Cox, 
2009, 2012; Samuelson, 2011; Aven & Zio, 2014). The use of probability to represent 
uncertainties is a foundation element of risk assessment, so a change in the underlying 
probability theory can have great impact to the efficacy of the techniques. 







Appendix B: Quantum Probability 
 
God does not play dice with the universe 
- Albert Einstein, The Born-Einstein Letters 1916-55. 
 
When Einstein made the statement, he might not realize how true it is. Indeed, 
classical probability, where traditionally illustrated with a game of chance with dice, 
is insufficient to describe the quantum phenomena.  
Classical probability is based on traditional Boolean logic and sets. In the real 
world, physical phenomena cannot be fully accounted for by Boolean logic alone. 
Quantum probability evolved from the need for us to find alternative ways to describe 
the new quantum phenomena. For a thorough discussion and treatment of modern 
quantum theory, the following references can be consulted for in-depth discussions: 
von Neumann (1955), Dirac (1958), Sakurai (1994), Griffiths (2005), Khrennikov 
(2010), Busemeyer & Bruza (2012), Susskind & Friedman (2014), and Chang (2015). 
B.1 Dirac-von Neumann Axioms 
Whereas Kolmogorov probability is based on set theory, Dirac-von Neumann 
quantum probability is based on the theory of complex vector space. The original set 
of Dirac-von Neumann axioms were not developed specifically for quantum 
probability but to serve as the foundation principles for describing quantum 
mechanical systems. There are two basic formulations: the complex Hilbert space 
formulation and the C* algebra formulation (or operator algebra formulation). In this 





B.2 Mathematical Representations for Hilbert Space, State Space, State Vectors, and 
their Operations 
The Hilbert space contains the N-dimensional complex vector space with 
states that define a quantum system. Since the Hilbert space is a vector space, a 
general vector in it can be expressed in the traditional vector forms, in vector 
component form or in matrix form. Let A be a general vector in a Hilbert space of N 
dimensions, and ?̂?! be the basis vector spanning the vector space, A can be expressed 
in the traditional notation as: 
    (B.1) 
In quantum mechanics, an alternative notation, known as the Dirac Bra-Ket 
notion, is used to represent a vector. The vector A is denoted by  and is simply 
called a ket-vector or kets. With this notation, the above vector A can be expressed in 
the ket notation as follow (for N=3): 
   (B.2) 
Associated with the ket vectors are a number of axioms on their operations. 
Axioms for the ket vectors: 
1) Addition:       (B.3) 
2) Commutative:     (B.4) 




















A + B = C
A + B = B + A




4) The zero vector, or the null ket:    (B.6) 
5) Given any ket, there is a unique ket such that:  (B.7) 
6) Linearity:  
6a) Linear scalar multiplication, z is complex:   (B.8) 
6b) Distributive:     (B.9) 
Corresponding to the ket-space is a complex conjugate dual space, call the bra-space. 
There is a corresponding bra-vector , which is the dual vector, for every ket-
vector.  
 
Axioms for the bra-vectors: 
• For the ket-vector , the corresponding bra-vector is . 
• Let z be a complex number. For the ket-vector . the corresponding bra-
vector is , since the bra-vector is in the conjugate dual space. 
The bras can also be viewed as operators that operates on ket-vectors with a complex 
number as the resulting output.   
B.2.1 Inner Products 
Since the Hilbert space is a complex inner product space, inner products can 
be formed between a pair of bra-ket vectors: . The inner products take a pair of 
vectors and map them to a scalar. The inner products follow these axioms: 
A + 0 = A
A + − A( ) = 0
zA = z A = B
z A + B{ } = z A + z B ,
z + w{ } A = z A + w A
A







1) Linearity:    (B.10) 
2) Conjugate:      (B.11) 
3) Normalized vector:      (B.12) 
4) Orthogonal vector:      (B.13)  
5) Positive definite:  and  iff   (B.14)  
B.2.2 Operators 
We denote and define an operator M by its action to a vector, where M acts 
on the vector  to give : 
    (B.16) 
Properties: 
 Linear scalar multiplication:  
  If  then     (B.17) 
 Distributive: 
   (B.18) 
The linear operator M can be represented in terms of matrix elements. The 
matrix equation (B.16) can be represented in component form:  
         (B.19) 
        (B.20) 
Adopting an abbreviated form for , one obtains 
C A + B{ } = C A + C B
B A = A B
*
A A = 1
B A = 0
A A ≥ 0 A A = 0 A = 0
A B
M A = B
M A = B Mz A = z B
M A + B{ } =M A +M B
M j α j =
j
∑ β j j
j
∑
k M j α j =
j
∑ β j k j
j
∑




         (B.21) 
For some particular linear operator, there will be vectors whose directions are the 
same when they come out as they were when they went in. These special vectors are 
called eigenvectors. An eigenvector is defined by: 
          (B.22) 
And λ is called the eigenvalue of the eigenvector . 
The above defines the how a linear operator operates on the ket vector, and a 
linear operator can operate on the bra vector the same way, but with the adjoint of M, 
denoted as M† which is obtained from taking the complex conjugate of the transpose 
of M, defined by: 
        (B.23) 
B.3 Complex Hilbert Space Formulation 
A quantum system is described by a countable infinite dimensional complex 
vector space known as a Hilbert space, H. In this space, a quantum system is 
characterized by its states, observables, and expectations (measurements). Associated 
with these properties are operations describing the behaviors of them. They satisfy the 
following axioms: 
Axiom 1: States 
The states of a quantum mechanical system, S, are composed of 
normalized unit vectors, , of the complex Hilbert space, H, also 
called the space of states. A quantum state is denoted by the 
mkj
j
∑ α j = βk
M λ = λ λ
λ





normalized state vector  or  satisfying . The 
state vectors completely specify the properties of a quantum 
mechanical system. 
Axiom 2: Observables 
The measurable quantities of a quantum system, the observables, are 
described by self-adjoint linear operators A in a complex Hilbert 
space, H. If a measurement A is performed on a system in a state , 
the result of the measurement is .   is the eigenvalue and  is 
the eigenvector. The measurement is denoted by . 
Axiom 3: Expectation Value 
Let ,  denote 2 different quantum states of a system.  
(a) The probability of finding  in state  is given by the 
probability P where  
.     (B.24) 
This is known as the Born Rule.   
(b) The expectation value of an observable (operator) A, denoted by 
, for a quantum system in state  is given by the inner 
product  
.   (B.25) 
ψ ψ ψ
2
= ψ ψ = 1
λi
λi λi λi
A λi = λi λi
ψ φ
ψ φ
P(ψ , φ ) = ψ φ
2
A ψ




B.4 What Quantum Probability Brings to the Table 
Quantum probability introduces a number of new properties that are not 
derivable from classical probability.  
Non-commutativity 
In the classical framework, the order of the occurrence of events A and B do 
not affect the results from their combination, i.e. “A and B” and “B and A” will arrive 
at the same result. Non-commutativity simply states that the sequence of events “A 
and B” might have a different consequence than the sequence of events “B and A”.  
Quantum Superposition 
A quantum state can be formed from the superposition of two or more other 
distinct quantum states.  Furthermore, a quantum state can be formed from a 
superposition of infinitely many possible quantum states, and when a measurement is 
performed on the superposition state, it collapsed into a definite state.  
Quantum Interference 
A quantum state can be a superposition of many distinct states, or a linear 
combination of many distinct states. When performing a measurement on a quantum 
state, the expectation value is given by the inner product of the states and the 
probability is given by the Born Rule. The cross terms as a result of expanding the 
product are the interference terms, a result of the non-additivity of the probabilities.  
Quantum Entanglement 
Quantum entanglement describes the quantum state of a joint system, such as 
a pair of particles, where the entangled quantum state describes joint system 




unknown. At maximum entanglement, the state of the joint system is completely 
known, yet the individual states are complete unknown. Other mixed entangled states 
are possible. 
Quantum Logic and Computation 
The concept of measurement as defined in quantum mechanics deviates from 
and is inconsistent with the absolute notions found in classical logic. Quantum logic 
is a reformulation of propositional logic to arrive at a consistent logical reasoning 
framework for both classical and quantum systems. Quantum computing systems are 
systems that perform computations using quantum mechanical properties, such as 
quantum entanglement and superposition, as well as the use of quantum computation 
circuits, known as quantum gates, to perform operations. Quantum logic gates can 





Aleatory uncertainty Aleatory uncertainty deals with the inherent, intrinsic 
random stochastic variations associated with a physical 
system. 
Ambiguity Ambiguity can be defined as the possibility of different 
interpretations for a result based on the availability of 
contextual knowledge. 
Bayesian probability The probability represents not the absolute event states but 
the rational belief of the observer based on the available 
information at hand at the time; the probability, therefore, 
can be updated and refined with posterior facts and 
information using the Bayes’ Theorem. 
Belief functions theory This approach models the degree of belief using mass 
function, belief function, or plausibility function, and 
relaxes Kolmogorov’s additivity axiom. 




Multiple components may be susceptible to a common 
cause/mode where all the components can fail due to a 
single failure cause. 




analysis for restructuring logical tree structures. 
Composite operator The composite operator is formed from the tensor product 
of the subsystem operators and operates on the composite 
system state vectors. 
Composite system A system form from 2 or more subsystems; composite 
systems are formed from component state vectors through 
the use of tensor product. 
Deep Uncertainty Uncertainties due to insufficient data, information, and 
knowledge about the problem or the system for the 




The density operator is a linear combination of the different 
possible states of the system and is used to construct the 
mixed state quantum representation. The density operator 
can be expressed as a matrix with a specified basis, and as 
such, the term density operator and density matrix are often 
used interchangeably. 
Ensemble An ensemble is a large collection of identical or near 
identical systems. 
Entanglement Quantum entanglement describes the quantum state of a 
joint system, such as a pair of particles, where the entangled 
quantum state describes joint system completely, but the 




entirely unknown. At maximum entanglement, the state of 
the joint system is completely known, yet the individual 
states are complete unknown. Entanglement is a 
generalization of the concept of correlation in the quantum 
sense. 
Epistemic Epistemic uncertainty reflects the lack of knowledge and 
information about some properties and characteristics of a 
system. The epistemic uncertainty is a quantification of the 
degree of knowledge or the state-of-knowledge of the 
fidelity of the models, modeling parameters, and 
assumptions in representing the reality of the relevant 
physical processes and the systems’ behaviors as defined by 
the conditions. 
Events Events are “points in spacetime” where something 
happened leading to a condition, an outcome, or a result; 
within the quantum framework, events are points in a 
complex inner product vector space known as Hilbert space, 
a complex vector space contains the complete set of 
possible outcomes.  
Event tree An event tree is an inductive logical and chronological 
decomposition of an event into a progressive series of 




or end states. The decomposed events, system elements, and 
steps are represented as a branching tree graph or flowchart, 
and Boolean logic serves as the connectors or nodes 
between them.  Probabilities for the chance of occurrences 
of the events can be associated with the nodes. 
Expectation value The expectation value of an observable can be thought of as 
the average or mean value of the measured outcomes of an 
observable.  
Fragility curves Fragility curves plot out the functions describing the 
conditional probability of system failure over the full range 
of the parameters, such as loads, where the system is 
subjected to.  
Frequentist Assign event probability based on the frequency of 
occurrence in a large number of trials. 
Fuzzy set theory Fuzzy set theory is in essence an extension of the traditional 
truth table with the inclusion of an additional “either” state, 
besides True or False. 
Hilbert Space A complex inner product vector space. Objects in Hilbert 
space are vectors, and events are outcomes which are points 
in this vector space. 
Ignorance The term ignorance is generally referring to the lack of 




missing knowledge, or it can also describe the state where 
information and knowledge are deliberately discarded or 
ignored. 
Imprecise probability Imprecise probabilities is a framework that admits 
imprecision in probability models and introduces 
probability bounds. 
Inner Products The inner product space is a vector space where a number 
of specific structures and operations, such as the notion of 
length, the angle between vectors, and the inner product 
between vectors are defined. The inner product can be 
thought of as a generalization of the Euclidean space scalar 
product or dot product to multi-dimensional vector space 
(can be complex and infinite dimension). The inner product 
operation maps a pair of vectors to a scalar. 
Knowledge operators A class of operators that encapsulate historical and 
contextual knowledge about the system. 
Kolmogorov 
probability 
Most modern probabilistic methods follow the Kolmogorov 
formalism, where the Kolmogorov axioms define the 
probability mathematical framework; Kolmogorov 
probability can be regarded as a scalar theory with 
probabilities map to scalar values and functions. 




exhibiting the Markov property: 1) The future outcome or 
state depends only on the present state, and not what 
preceded (the Markov property); future events (condition 
probabilities) depend only on current event and are 
independent of past events. The conditional probabilities are 
called transition probabilities. 2) Future predictions depend 
solely on the present state. This property is usually referred 
to as the memoryless property as prior results do not affect 
the future states. The Markov process is continuous in time, 
and a Markov process that evolves in discrete-time element 
is known as a Markov chain. 
Measurement The results from the measurement of observables are 
eigenvalues of the observable operator.  
Minimal cut sets The minimal number of components, when fail in 
combination, leads to the failure of the system.  
Mixed state Mixed states are simply systems where their states are less 
than certain and the systems are described by the collection 
of the quantum superpositions related by probabilistic 
uncertainty, which can be thought of as probability 
distributions of the quantum superpositions ensemble. A 
mixture of different pure states is a mixed state.  




system are called the observables. They are represented 
with self-adjoint linear operators. In order words, an 
observable L, a measurable quantity, is associated with an 
operator L that acts on the vectors in state space.  
Operator The concept of operators was introduced as an operation 
that takes an input state vector (like the initial state of a 
system) to another state vector (the system at a different 
state). The operator can change the state of the system 
without modifying the system, or the operator can change 
the state of the system by changing the system itself. 
Outer Product The outer product is a product of two vectors forming a 
linear operator; the Outer product is a special case of the 
tensor product. 
Possibility theory Possibility theory extending the fuzzy set with the 
additional condition of normalization. 
Probabilistic Risk 
Assessment (PRA) 
PRA is a class of risk assessment methodologies. Current 
PRA techniques generally consist of the following three 
elements: 1) sets of scenarios, which can be physics or 
probability models to represent events and engineering 
systems (simple or composite), 2) the frequency of 
occurrences of the events associated with the scenarios, 




3) the consequences associated with the occurrences of the 
events, which can be numerical values, event triggers, event 
sequences, or impact statements. PRA techniques based on 
conventional probabilistic treatments, such as Kolmogorov 
axiomatic, Frequentist, or Bayesian treatments, have been 
widely and successfully used to investigate and model many 
complex engineering problems 
Probability amplitudes The complex basis components of a state vector.  
Product states For composite systems, individual components are formed 
by simple products of the probability amplitudes. For 
composite systems formed from product states they can be 
factored back into the separate individual subsystems. 
Projection operator or 
Projector 
Projectors are operators that can select a certain state or a 
set of states from the system and project them into a 




The projective measurement is the application of the 
projector to transition the system from the initial state 
(before the hurricane hit) to the observed state (after the 
hurricane hit). 
Pure state The state vector describing such a fully known system is 




complete and precise knowledge about it is available and 
known, such as right after the preparation and construction 
of a system, or after an observation and measurement. A 
pure state system is one that we possess full knowledge 
about the system, and we can continue to track and trace the 
changes of the system going forward.  
Quantum (von 
Neumann) probability 
Quantum or von Neumann probability can be regarded as a 
geometric theory with probabilities map to vectors and 
operators. 
Risk Risk = Probability × Consequence 
Risk Analysis 
(Quantum) 
Risk analysis (quantum) is the process of identifying 
corresponding risk states from the density matrix, 
calculating their chances of occurrence, and associating 
with them values of consequence. 
Risk value Associated with each risk system is an observable called the 
risk value denoted by the operator Ri. Performing the 
measurement Ri on a system’s basis state yields the scalar 




The event probabilities and consequences are represented in 
the form of vectors. 




behave in a correlated fashion. The composite system 
consists of “product states,” where the individual 
components are formed by simple products of the 
probability amplitudes. The composite system with product 
states can be factored back into the separate individual 
subsystems. The ability to decompose the system can be 
interpreted as having full knowledge of the individual 
subsystems, their characteristics and behaviors. 
State The first one characterizes the various possible 
configurations for the system in terms of probabilities, 
which is call the state of the system. 
State Space A quantum system is described by a state vector, a unit 
vector in a complex inner product vector space (a Hilbert 
space) called the space of states (state space). The subspace 
spanned by all the possible system states forms the state 
space for the system. 
State vector The collection of all possible events defines the quantum 
state space and the state of a quantum system is specified by 
a vector in the system’s state space called the state vector. 
State vectors completely specify the properties of quantum 
systems; The state vector encapsulates all the information 




can happen, and how systems evolve. 
Subspace The vector space contains the complete set of possible 
outcomes. A particular collection of events forms a 
subspace in Hilbert space, and many subspaces can be 
formed within the Hilbert space. 
Subsystem Subsystems make up a composite system and subsystems 
can be similar or different.  
Superposition A state vector is expressed as the superposition of the basis 
states, the orthonormal basis vectors in the system’s state 
space, and it is expressed as the vector sum of the basis 
vectors. 
Tensor Product Tensor product (⊗) is the product of tensors (of which 
vectors are subsets), and the result is an expanded space 
formed from combining vector spaces together. 
Unitary operator/ 
Unitary transformation 
Unitary operators keep the unit vector unchanged in 
magnitude. In other words, while the system might have 
changed to a new state, the system itself has not, keeping 
the same set of basis vectors and unit magnitude for the 
state vector; events that only change the system states and 
not the system itself are represented by unitary operators. 
Verification The process to ensure that a system is built to specifications. 




Validation The process to ensure that a system is built to solve the 
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